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Abstract  
 
This thesis examines the sex industry as a whole with the intention of establishing that 
prostitution should not be marginalised but integrated within the criminal law and regulated 
as other Sexual Entertainment Venues. 
I first establish a framework of analysis needed to illuminate the constraints put upon the 
different elements of commercial sexual activities. This framework stems from the Sexual 
Offences Act (SOA) 2003, the primary statute that regulates all sexual activities, whether 
commercial or non-commercial. It has four elements: consent, nature, purpose and visibility.   
By means of ‘black letter’ law and case histories, I then explore three areas within the sex 
industry: pornography, live sexual entertainment and prostitution in order to show that the 
element of consent is consistent throughout and relies solely on the SOA 2003 and is linked 
directly to the nature of the sexual activities. The nature of the sexual activities has its basis in 
non-commercial sexual activities, but is regulated in the sex industry in such a way that the 
nature differs between each commercial area. By contrast, the purpose remains constant in 
commercial sexual activities although it is at odds with non-commercial. All aspects of 
consensual sexual activities, whether commercial or non-commercial, must not be visible for 
unintended viewers. However, advertising of commercial sex is possible and thus visible, 
with the exception of prostitution.  With regards to prostitution, legislation criminalises 
prostitutes who advertise and their mere presence constitutes a form of advertising.  The 
public presence of prostitutes as well as the presence of their clients also creates the grounds 
for public nuisance.  
I then suggest, based on the above information, that statutory legislation could include the use 
of brothels, this stems from the New Zealand model, in order to respond to issues raised 
about consent and visibility, as well as extend the protection offered to prostitutes to other 
sectors of the sex industry when they are confronted with the issue of consent.  
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Introduction 
The sex industry is regulated by ‘a patchwork quilt of provisions ancient and modern that 
works because people make it do so, not because there is a coherence and structure’.1   It is 
this ‘patchwork quilt’ of legislation that lends itself to creating a legal exceptionalism with 
regards to prostitution. The purpose of the thesis is twofold: to compare legislation relating to 
sexual activity in non-commercial situations with sexual activity within the sex industry to 
show us that prostitution is treated differently in law; and propose a new structure where 
pornography, live sexual entertainment and prostitution, if regulated in the same manner as 
one another, would provide coherence in the law.   
It is the unsatisfactory nature of this ‘patchwork quilt of provisions’ with its lack of 
coherence and structure that leads to the question of whether there is a justification for the 
legal exceptionalism relating to prostitution.  My hypothesis is that new legislation based 
primarily on the NZ model for regulating sex work would address these issues. I suggest that 
this model together with aspects of the policing taking place in Leeds, may be a useful 
template for the creation of new legislation in this area. Both the NZ model and details of the 
practice in Leeds will be analysed in Chapter 5. 
This thesis offers an original contribution to knowledge by looking at all aspects of sexual 
activity as a whole instead of focusing on a single or dual aspect of the sex industry.  
Research to date has not had such influence to help lawmakers formulate an approach that 
does not echo the Nordic model where prostitutes are discriminated against by comparison to 
other sex workers.  In doing so it aims to demonstrate that by regulating prostitution, which 
will include legalising brothels, the legislation surrounding the sex industry can be 
rationalised.   It is intended that the findings of this thesis can be added to a body of work 
(including among others the work of Urquhart) which may help to influence policy makers 
who seek to reform outmoded legislation in this country. In this way, prostitutes will no 
longer be discriminated against through legislation and will be treated in the same way as 
other sex workers. The current discriminatory nature of legislation against prostitution will be 
discussed in depth in Chapter 4. 
                                                 
1
 Home Office, ‘Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sex Offences’  HMSO (July 2000) para 0.2 
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To help clarify the descriptions which follow, I propose to use four conceptual connectors: 
consent, nature, purpose and visibility.  All forms of sexual activity, whether commercial or 
non-commercial, are interlinked by these four conceptual connectors and furthermore the 
connectors highlight the discrepancies between the treatment of prostitutes as compared to 
other workers in the sex industry.   
These connectors will be used as tools to link the first four chapters: Chapter 1 presents the 
legislation that surrounds non-commercial sexual activity and provides the foundation for the 
following Chapters 2 – 4 covering commercial sexual activity.  By comparing the legislation 
that surrounds the four connectors, it can be shown that legislation sets aside prostitution and 
imposes a legal exceptionalism: this means that a prostitute can on the one hand be classed as 
a sex worker, and on the other hand be treated differently in order to prevent a street 
prostitute from working.   
0.1 The background 
 This thesis will show that from a criminal law perspective: (1) there are disparities in 
regulating the three mainstream forms of sexual entertainment: pornography, live sexual 
entertainment and prostitution; (2) prostitution is excluded from being a legitimate industry 
despite the fact that prostitution is not of itself illegal; and (3) to advocate, as a consequence, 
that there is a potential for new legislation, based on the NZ model for regulating the sex 
industry, that would treat prostitution as it does pornography and live sexual entertainment by 
permitting prostitutes to work together within brothels. For the purposes of this thesis the 
term ‘live sexual entertainment’ includes telephone chat lines, striptease and burlesque, pole 
and lap dancing (collectively referred to as exotic dancing) and peep shows.  
One could argue that the criminal law respects private relationships and is not there to be the 
moral arbiter of what sexual relationships should be acceptable or not, at least beyond 
ensuring compliance with the principle of harm. In that respect, criminal law could be 
expected to regulate equally non-commercial sexual activities and the different forms of 
commercial sexual activities. After all, the key statute regulating sexual activities, the Sexual 
Offences Act (SOA) 2003, does not mention or distinguish the purpose of the sexual activity. 
The SOA 2003 provides a basic framework on the assumption, albeit never stated, that it 
applies to all sexual activities, including those commercially motivated. For example, the 
21 
 
prohibition of rape established in s1 of the SOA 2003, in theory, protects any victim, 
including a sex worker or a performer of pornography.       
However, the criminal law is devised in such a way as to treat non-commercial sexual 
activities differently to commercial sexual activities. When it comes to consensual 
commercial sexual activities, specific legislation comes into play, depending on the type of 
commercial activities considered. Thus, criminal law, despite some regulatory 
commonalities, separates non-commercial from commercial sexual activities. By using non-
commercial sexual activity as the starting point I will show that legislation regarding non-
commercial activity forms the basis for the regulation of all sexual activities to ensure that the 
activity harms neither the persons involved, nor any person who does not consent to witness 
such activities. 
The sex industry is the commercialisation of sexual activity such as found in pornography, 
live sexual entertainment which includes nude dancing and telephone sex, and prostitution.  
Non-commercial sexual activity relates to sexual activity between two people without any 
financial transaction and can include couples in a relationship as well as casual sex. The 
sexual activity itself is not limited to sexual intercourse and can include activities such as oral 
sex and mutual masturbation.  The term ‘sexual’ includes penetration, touching or any other 
activity where a reasonable person would consider the circumstance and nature of the activity 
to be sexual.
2
  Whilst appreciating that prostitution and prostitute are pejorative terms, these 
terms will be relied on in this thesis in order to differentiate from other sex workers and 
because they are the terms used in cases and statutes.   
 
0.2 The Reasoning for the Project 
 
The unsatisfactory ‘patchwork quilt of provisions’3 that creates legal exceptionalism with 
regards to prostitution is the primary reason for proposing new legislation.  This can be 
shown by the scattered nature of the legislation regulating non-commercial and commercial 
sexual activities. Each commercial activity is regulated by its own specific statute or set of 
                                                 
2
 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s78 
3
 Home Office, ‘Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sex Offences’  HMSO (July 2000) para 0.2 
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statutes, established in apparent isolation from each other. There is no single umbrella statute 
for commercial sexual activities. 
The scattered nature of the criminal law is reflected in academic literature where the 
academic diversity leads, at times, to opacity as to how criminal law effectively deals with 
commercial sexual activities. Between those in favour of total decriminalisation of all sex 
workers to those wanting the criminalisation of all sex work or just some elements of it, the 
debate on how the law approaches and should approach commercial sexual activities is 
highly charged in terms of moral attitudes, emotional considerations and economic 
approaches.  
The academic discourses stemming from sociological and socio-legal work in academia at 
times overlap with the political discourses emanating from Parliament and Governments. 
However, the political discourse is subject specific in its approach and has remained steadfast 
insofar as the activities that surround prostitution are criminalised.  The discourses have 
changed historically from the prostitute being the criminal to being the victim. 
By starting with an analysis of legislation that surrounds non-commercial sexual activity this 
thesis offers an original contribution by dividing the different types of commercial sexual 
activity into four conceptual hooks: consent, nature, purpose and visibility.  This gives the 
opportunity to look at the sex industry in total; instead of focusing on single aspects in 
isolation.  This thesis offers a proposal that moves away from creating victims and criminals 
by addressing the issues of safety and respect for all sex workers.  The proposal will be based 
on the New Zealand model and the experiment taking place in Leeds where prostitutes can 
work without fear of arrest by police and suggests new legislation that will be wide enough to 
encapsulate all sex workers.    
Sociologists and feminists offer some very influential discourses regarding the sex industry, 
but, as with the government, the discourses tend to focus mostly on single issues.  
Sociologists and feminists agree that the negative connotations in the language used to 
objectify women should be removed with the more positive term ‘sex worker’ now used 
widely instead of the perjorative term prostitute.
4
  But there is a divergence of opinion 
between the academic writers with regards to whether the sex industry should be legitimised.   
                                                 
4
 Carol Leigh, ‘Inventing Sex Work’ in Nagel J, Whores and other Feminsts  (Routledge 2010) p225 
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The following arguments will be offered in the same order as the subjects within the thesis, 
beginning with pornography, then live sexual entertainment and finally prostitution. 
Arguments against pornography state that it oppresses not only those women who appear in 
the pornographic media but all women and should therefore be banned.
5
  Pornographic films 
direct the frequent use of abusive language and behaviour almost exclusively toward women
6
 
by utilising gender-based stereotypes of male dominance and female submission.
7
  
Pornography, it is argued, contributes to feelings of hostility toward women,
8
 and it is 
suggested that the regular exposure to violent or degrading pornography reinforces the culture 
of misogyny.
9
   The Government introduced an amendment to the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008 criminalising the possession of extreme pornography.  Extreme 
pornography is not about ‘fluffy Ann Summer’s handcuffs’10 but is the depiction of graphic 
sexual abuse.  The question whether all or only some pornography should be banned is a 
difficult one given that those in favour of banning pornography would argue ‘The case 
against banning the possession of such material is deeply flawed and misleading’11    
The counter argument to banning pornography is that ‘far greater harm is done in restricting 
production of or access to pornography’12 because the argument that pornography is bad 
perpetuates a sense of shame as it ignores the fact that women are also capable of enjoying 
pornography.
13
  Arguments for banning pornography are nothing more than a reactionary 
doctrine that mirrors right-wing politics.  Indeed, promoting censorship ultimately endangers 
sexual expression, and the blaming of pornographic images diverts attention away from the 
                                                 
5
 See for instance: MacKinnon C and Dworkin A, The Reasons Why: Essays on the New Civil Rights Law 
recognising Pornography as Sex Discrimination (Women Against Pornography 1985)  
6
 Robert Jensen, Getting Off: Pornography and the End of Masculinity (South End Press. 2007) p53 
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actual perpetrators of harm.
14
   The arguments for and against pornography fail to consider 
what impact banning or censoring pornography would have on the sex industry as a whole.  If 
pornography was completely banned on the basis that it discriminated against women, this in 
turn would have a causal effect on live sexual entertainment and prostitution for the very 
same reason.   
The discourses surrounding the live sexual entertainment industry show that telephone sex 
workers are less commonly researched but it is argued that there are physical risks as well as 
financial benefits.
15
   The usage of telephone sex calls has changed due to the availability of 
mass media via the internet.  The computer is now the first port of call for online sexual 
activity
16
 and the sexual activity is akin to that of a peep show. 
The basis of the arguments against live sexual entertainment in the form of lap and pole 
dancing are that live sexual entertainment is about selling intimacy, sexuality and body.
 
This 
argument is supported by the campaign group ‘Object’17 who argue that lap and pole dancing 
is in reality dancers who are virtually naked in front of repulsive individuals.
18
  It is argued 
that the pole and lap dancers are not in control because they have little or no choice who to 
dance for, especially if the dancer needs the money.   But this is not to say lap and pole 
dancing should be banned.  Instead boys at school should be taught to cherish women and 
respect their bodies.
19
  Object, argued that exotic dancing clubs normalises the sexual 
objectification of women and in their ‘stripping the illusion’ campaign state that buying a 
woman is not the same as buying a cup of tea.
20
  
The government, acting in response to the complaints regarding the increase of exotic 
dancing venues following the Licencing Act 2003, changed the licencing rules so that 
licensed lap and pole dancing clubs were put in the same category as sex shops and not cafes.  
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 It is argued that an increase in venues because of the Licensing Act 2003 is a perception ‘due 
to the increased visibility’ and not because of a ‘quantitative increase.’21  Despite  
management and dancers distancing themselves from the term ‘sex work’ it can be shown 
that lap/pole dancing is part of the sex industry given that the ‘labour characteristics, along 
with the marginal and stigmatized nature … definitively place stripping within a broader 
range of sex markets…’22 
The perceived proliferation of live sexual entertainment leads us to a similar argument 
regarding prostitution.   Prostitution can be distinguished by its many forms with each having 
its own moral level, nonetheless it is still commercial sexual exploitation.
 23
  By setting 
economic terms prostitutes are denied their rights to be able to signal, initiate or agree to have 
contractual sex.
24
   
In line with religious commentaries parliamentary discourses reflect the moral 
authoritarianism
25
 shaping public policy by the myths that surround prostitution.
26
  This can 
be seen in the Wolfenden Report where the ‘problem’ of prostitution is the harmfulness or 
nuisance caused by ‘its effects’27 and this has ‘underpinned the key critique to official 
discourse, and in particular, feminist conceptions of both the problem of prostitution and its 
regulation.’28  The policies perpetuate the myth that the prostitute is in some way to blame for 
her choices.  When regulatory frameworks move the concept of blame and harm from the 
prostitute to the client then ‘myth acceptance is understood to provide the key to identifying 
victim-blame.’29  It can, therefore, be seen that the political discourse is shaped from the 
rhetoric that prostitution is a form of victimhood rather than empowerment.  Until a space is 
created where the construction of “victims” is altered such rhetoric will prevent other 
discourses from opening up any new policy options that are currently outside the 
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parliamentary discursive framework.
30
  It is the ‘quasi-official discourses’31outside the 
traditional sites of moral [state] authority
32
 that underpin informal sex regulation and create 
the reforms.
33
  Prostitutes are discriminated against on the basis that prostitution creates a 
public nuisance, in other words it is a crime to be sexually assertive.
34
  This particular 
discourse is shaped by a central public v private distinction whereas the victimhood of the 
prostitute is shaped  by the moral ordered discourse drawn on a ‘‘more complex synthesis of 
international human rights rhetoric, religious orthodoxies and a feminist perspective on 
sexual domination’.35 
Alongside the arguments asserting that prostitution is a form of victimhood by putting the 
focus on the client, there is another connection made between prostitution and crime.  This 
can be seen with the introduction of legislation such as the Modern Slavery Act 2015 which 
repeals and replaces offences of human trafficking arising under section 59A Sexual Offences 
Act 2003 against trafficking. This thesis does not concentrate on trafficked prostitution but at 
this juncture it notes that ss 57 – 59 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (replacing the repealed 
s145 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002) criminalises human trafficking 
for exploitation.  The provisions within s58
36
 criminalises trafficking within the UK which is 
not without interpretative difficulties because of the notion that most workers who work for 
agencies have been trafficked.
 37
  It is the use of language such as ‘internal trafficking’ as 
used by the UK Human Trafficking Centre
38
 that blurs the distinction between trafficked and 
non-trafficked prostitutes and promotes the connection between prostitution and crime.   
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Non-trafficked prostitutes also work for agencies
39
  because an agency ‘will generally afford 
a degree of protection not available to a street worker’40 and the prostitute will travel from 
place to place within the UK.  When looking at the role of an agency it is a ‘classic fit for the 
s53 offence of ‘controlling prostitution for gain’41 but the agency is also liable within the s58 
offence ‘even in circumstances where she arranges her own transport’42 because the agency 
(and the taxi driver) could be said to be ‘intentionally facilitating travel’.43    
When comparing how the law is implemented, it is ‘time to stop assuming that traditional 
feminist analysis of sexual oppression alone exhausts all possible interpretations of 
commercial sex.’44  Academic discourses from both sides of the argument, to ban or 
decriminalise, do so on the basis that women who work in the sex industry are discriminated 
against and that their civil rights are violated.   
One problem is that sociologists, although they acknowledge the legitimacy of sexual 
activities within the sex industry and particularly prostitution, find it difficult to translate the 
issues into legal terms.  There is also a diversity among academics with regard to the sex 
industry compounded by the fact that some authors focus on specific areas of commercial 
sex, notably prostitution while others have a more general approach whilst considering 
different forms of commercial sexual activities.  By looking at regulation of sex work as a 
whole
45
 this thesis engages in dialogue regarding sex work in total and not as individual 
industries, and by taking into consideration a ‘pragmatic approach to safety’46 motivated by 
the damaging consequences of criminalising either the prostitute or the client it builds a 
framework that considers the issues solely from a criminal law perspective.   
0.3 Methodology 
Faced with the diversity of political discourse, legislative instruments and academic 
arguments, this thesis analyses the regulation of the sex industry from a criminal law 
perspective. Although pornography (excluding extreme pornography), exotic dancing and the 
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sale of sex are not illegal, by looking at the way the criminal law regulates non-commercial 
sexual activities, that is, sexual activity between two people without any financial transaction, 
it is seen that it shapes the regulation of commercial sexual activities.  By doing this the thesis 
shows that there are commonalities throughout all forms of sexual activities including 
consent, the nature and the purpose of the activity and privacy and observing how each area 
of the sex industry is regulated by different statutes and to different effects.  
This thesis thus starts by establishing a framework of analysis by utilizing the four conceptual 
elements: consent, nature, purpose and visibility that occur in non-commercial and 
commercial sexual activity and are used in each chapter to compare how the legislation 
regulates the three mainstream areas of the sex industry, pornography, live sexual 
entertainment and prostitution, which are set out in accordance to the distance between the 
viewer and the sex worker. For pornography (Chapter 2), there is no contact or 
communication; for live sexual entertainment (Chapter 3) the viewer is in the same vicinity 
(except for telephone sex chat lines), but cannot touch the sex worker; and for prostitution 
(Chapter 4) there is physicality between the client and sex worker. This framework and order 
of analysis allows the comparison of not only commercial and non-commercial sex, but also 
between the various forms of commercial activities in order to show that the criminal law 
does not regulate all commercial sexual activities in a consistent manner; instead it 
marginalises prostitution from the other forms of commercial sex. 
 
Chapter 1 will show that the SOA 2003 gives the definition of consent to be used for all 
forms of sexual activities, commercial and non-commercial, and criminalises sexual activity 
that has occurred without consent. The SOA 2003 establishes a minimum age for sexual 
activities and provides boundaries for persons engaging in sexual activities who have a 
limited mental capacity.  A second area discussed within Chapter 1 is the issue raised by 
behaviour: the problem regarding drunken consent and the relatively new concept of 
conditional consent. 
The nature of non-commercial sexual activity is directly connected to consent because 
consent is regulated in such a way that certain activities are forbidden such as the intentional 
exposure of genitalia;
47
 or intercourse with an animal.
48
  The prohibitions outlined in Chapter 
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1 provide the basis for non-commercial sexual activities in the sex industry.  The nature of 
sexual activity is not directly defined in either Criminal or Civil law statutes, nonetheless 
both statutes and case law carry certain restrictions, such as the criminalisation of necrophilia 
and where the activity involves an unwitting or unwilling partner or where the sexual 
activities may create harm.   The criminal law sets boundaries with regards to the nature of 
the sexual activity whereas the civil law sets out criteria that must be fulfilled for a marriage 
to be consummated.   In this instance intercourse must be full and complete, where the erect 
penis must enter the vagina fully and for a reasonable amount of time.  Non-consummation 
would be grounds for annulment and extra marital sexual activities provide grounds for 
divorce.  By outlining the Criminal and Civil law in Chapter 1 regarding the nature of non-
commercial sexual activity, we can see that the Criminal law focusses on prohibiting certain 
activities whereas the Civil law focus on activities that must be performed for the benefit of 
marriage.  It is from here the foundations are built for the remaining chapters. 
There are also constraints regarding visibility and although there is no law against nudity or 
having sexual intercourse outside, the law does prohibit public lewdness and  private sexual 
activity which when capable of being viewed by a non-consenting third party becomes public 
sexual activity.   Visibility is connected to the previous elements: consent, nature and purpose 
and s66 of the SOA 2003 legislates against certain sexual acts such as exposure (deliberate 
showing of genitals to a non-consenting viewer).  
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 will concentrate on commercial sexual activity and how the same sexual 
activity analysed in Chapter 1, when conducted in a commercial setting, falls within the law.  
By applying the same conceptual tools, consent, nature, purpose and visibility we can see that 
as with non-commercial sexual activity discussed in Chapter 1, as per s74 of the SOA 2003, 
consent can only be given where the party ‘agrees by choice, and has the freedom and 
capacity to make that choice’. The difference being that for commercial sexual activity the 
age of consent is set higher than for non-commercial sexual activity.  However, as noted in 
Chapter 1, s9 of the SOA 2003 the age of consent is set at sixteen but with regards to the sex 
industry s42 of the SOA 2003 sets the upper age of a child to be eighteen and subsequently 
limits all participants who work within the sex industry to being over eighteen years of age.   
Chapter 2 will show that in pornography consent is direct between the actress and the 
producer and filming/photographic crew and indirect, insofar as there is an implied consent, 
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between the actress and the viewer.   The subject of consent will be divided into three 
sections: the performers, the producers and the viewer.    
The nature of pornographic sexual activity is the same as it is in Chapter 1 but in addition it is 
also regulated by the Obscene Publications Act 1959, the Criminal Justice and Immigration 
Act 2008
49
 and the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.   
It is the purpose of pornography that differs from non-commercial sexual activity because 
pornography is commercial.  It is produced to make a financial profit by means of providing 
material (books, pictures or films) that sexually arouse the viewer.   
Visibility of pornography is divided into two sections: the permitted visibility and the 
constraints of displaying or possessing pornographic material.  Criminalising the possession 
of pornographic material is a recent legislative development.  The Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008 prohibits the possession of an image that portrays in an explicit and 
realistic way an image that:  involves an act which threatens a person’s life50, an act which 
results, or is likely to result in serious injury to a person’s anus, breasts or genitals,51 sexual 
interference with a human corpse,
52
 intercourse or oral sex with an animal (whether dead or 
alive)
53
 and a reasonable person would think that any such person or animal was real.
54
 
Chapter 3 compares various types of live sexual entertainment, including telephone sex chat 
lines, exotic dancing and peep shows.  Consent for all forms of live sexual entertainment is 
also restricted to 18 years of age as per s42 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 but is protected 
by the same means as non-commercial sexual activity.  Consent for participants who work as 
striptease dancers or lap dancers is also limited by the regulations imposed by the Local 
Authority by means of a rule setting a specific distance between the viewer and the dancer so 
that the person working within the sex industry can only consent to be watched.  Consent is 
implied between the dancer and the viewer but the stated consent between dancer and 
management raises issues which will also be addressed in Chapter 4. 
The nature of the sexual activity in the live sexual entertainment industry varies depending on 
which form of sexual entertainment is being discussed.  For telephone sex chat lines the 
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nature is verbal erotica whereas for the striptease dancers and lap dancers the nature is also 
erotica but this time it is visual.  The dancer, if she keeps within the regulatory guidelines, 
goes no further than to remove clothing in a sexually provocative manner.  It is the nature of 
the peep show artist that is more like that of a pornographic actress than of a burlesque dancer 
because the peep show artist can include self-masturbation for the viewer to watch.  
The purpose of live sexual entertainment carries a dual purpose.  Primarily this is profit 
achieved through the secondary purpose, sexual arousal.   However, the level of sexual 
arousal is limited by its environs: for burlesque the viewer must behave with a modicum of 
decorum, whereas whilst watching a peepshow or engaging with a sex chat-line operator the 
level of sexual arousal has no limits.   
The secondary purpose, sexual arousal, is limited because of the direct link between purpose 
and visibility and Chapter 3 explores that link by showing that the law has different rules for 
peepshows that have a solitary viewer as compared to striptease which can have a much 
larger audience. 
Visibility is also connected to the nature and purpose of live sexual entertainment and 
although there are similarities with Chapter 2, the live sexual entertainment industry is 
regulated by the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982. 
Chapter 4 draws on the information set out in the previous chapters to show how prostitution 
is marginalised.  Starting with consent, as with Chapters 2 and 3 consent can only be given by 
a prostitute who is over the age of 18.  But there are difficulties a prostitute encounters with 
the problem of withdrawing consent that are different to the sex-workers in Chapters 2 and 3.   
Drawing on similarities with Chapter 1 the issue of the presumption of permanent consent is 
raised with respect to a prostitute and a wife noting that the presumption was abolished for 
married women in 1992 whereas the presumption for prostitutes was not abolished until the 
SOA 2003.  This is because s74 makes no distinction regarding whether the woman is a 
prostitute or not but the interpretation of s74 carries its own set of difficulties when 
considering whether a prostitute has the freedom and capacity to consent.  Chapter 4 also 
focuses on payment and whether it vitiates the prostitute’s consent.   
A second issue is the vulnerability of women who are drunk or on drugs.   A comparison is 
also drawn between the prostitute and the live sexual entertainments worker regarding 
withdrawing consent.  All women are entitled to withdraw consent but it is the women 
32 
 
engaging in non-commercial sexual activity and prostitutes who are physically vulnerable 
whereas the women who engage in pornography and live sexual entertainment are 
economically vulnerable if they choose to withdraw consent.   
The nature of the sexual activity of a prostitute can be distinguished from the nature of non-
commercial sexual activity by comparing how a woman in matrimony, to use the polite 
vernacular ‘gives’ herself to one man, to the exclusion of all others, whereas a prostitute 
offers herself to all men.   A prostitute can perform any sexual activity from sex talk to sexual 
intercourse. 
The purpose of non-commercial consensual sexual activity is largely for procreation and 
pleasure (the two may be mutual).  The purpose of the sexual activity in prostitution is, unlike 
non-commercial sexual activity, largely to make money, the same as pornography and live 
sexual entertainment.  The difference being that for lap dancing or peep shows making a 
profit involves prolonging sexual satisfaction whereas for a prostitute it is the opposite, a 
prostitute needs to sexually satisfy her client as quickly as possible in order to engage with 
the next client. 
It is the issue of visibility that sets the prostitute aside from other sex workers and from 
women who do not work in the sex industry.  Non-commercial al fresco sexual activity is 
permitted unless it causes distress to non-consenting witnesses.  Similarly pornographic films 
and live sexual entertainment must be viewed in such a way that non-consenting viewers 
cannot see them; but all may be advertised.  But the laws against soliciting prevent prostitutes 
from advertising.  Scantily clad women may stand in the entrance of pornographic cinemas 
and live sexual entertainment venues as a form of advertisement but prostitutes may not 
congregate in any place. 
Having looked at the framework by using the four conceptual elements, consent, nature, 
purpose and visibility, Chapter 5 will examine how the law treats the prostitute as ‘other’ and 
proposes new legislation based on the NZ model (the Prostitution Reform Act 2003) to set 
out a new framework that provides an equal status for all sex workers based on those of 
Chapter 1.   
Chapter 5 containing the proposal is divided into four parts: The New Zealand Model; 
arguments against the New Zealand model and rebuttals thereof, the proposal; arguments 
against the proposal and rebuttals of those arguments.   The New Zealand Model will be used 
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as the basis to propose that brothels should be legally permitted for prostitution to be aligned 
with the rest of the sex industry.  By providing arguments and rebuttals regarding the New 
Zealand model and using arguments and rebuttals against legalising prostitution this thesis 
will show that there is merit in the proposal. 
 0.4  The Findings  
The four elements, consent, nature, purpose and visibility, each set within the four different 
topics show, by looking at the similarities and differences within the framework of this thesis, 
that the criminal law does not regulate all commercial sexual activities in a consistent 
manner. Instead it separates prostitution from the other forms of commercial sex by 
criminalising the actions that surround prostitution. Therefore, it is in need of an overhaul 
where all sex industry regulations are placed under an ‘umbrella’ statute that treats all 
commercial sexual activities equally; thereby creating a safe, legal environment for the 
prostitutes as well as other sex workers to work in.  
 The proposal in Chapter 5 is offered in line with the NZ model, whilst arguing for an all-
encompassing Act of Parliament that not only legalises prostitution, but also puts it into the 
same legal framework as other forms of sexual activities within the sex industry.  
The statute can then regulate all forms of commercial sexual activities uniformly and provide 
a legitimate argument for the use of brothels to respond to issues raised about consent and 
visibility, as well as extend the protection offered to prostitutes to other sectors of the sex 
industry when they are also confronted with issues of consent.  It will also acknowledge that 
the purpose of prostitution, like pornography and live sexual entertainment, is for profit.  But 
the statute will ensure that the profit benefits the sex workers as a whole and not only 
management, thus again alleviating the need for a sex worker to be under fiscal pressure to 
consent. 
 
34 
 
 
Chapter One – Establishing the framework for permissible and 
non-permissible sex.  
 
Introduction 
On the premise that no commercial sexual activity is per se illegal, the purpose of this chapter 
is to establish our framework of analysis for this thesis by exploring sexual relations and the 
restrictions imposed by criminal law in light of the four main themes: consent, nature, 
purpose, and visibility.  
These four themes are central to the primary statute that covers sexual activities and that is at 
the heart of this chapter: the SOA 2003. Written in neutral language, the SOA 2003 does not 
specifically refer to the purpose of the activity, bar in s76, which refers to deception as to the 
nature and purpose of the sexual act; and in s52 which clearly notes that the purpose of 
prostitution is for ‘gain’. 55 Therefore, the SOA 2003 is built on the premise that its regulation 
of sex applies to both commercial and non-commercial sexual activities, unless otherwise 
specified. Although in practice, the basis for regulating sexual activities remains enshrouded 
within non-commercial sexual activities.  Non- commercial sexual activity is, as the SOA 
2003 s73 defines, any activity a reasonable person would consider to be sexual, if the nature 
is sexual or if the person’s purpose in relation to the activity is sexual that is not for financial 
gain.   Non-commercial sexual activity is often connected to a romantic relationship.  
However, it would be more reasonable to argue that ‘paid sex is not a sad substitute’56 for 
non-commercial ‘intimate, private and romantic’57  sex.   Nonetheless non-commercial sexual 
activity in this instance is sexual activity within marriage, partnerships and casual 
relationships and can include sexual intercourse, mutual masturbation and oral sex. 
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 The four themes of consent, nature, purpose and visibility shaping the restrictions on sexual 
activities in the SOA 2003 remain constant in all forms of sexual activities, commercial or 
non-commercial. Thus, they set the parameters of our demonstration in Chapters 2 to 4 on 
how the criminal law works in relation to commercial sexual activities.  
My focus is on the current restrictions on sexual activities that criminal law today creates 
regarding these four themes. The shift from previous legislation to current legislation shows 
how both government and public attitudes change regarding certain sexual activities. 
Permissible sex in English criminal law had variations depending on gender within different 
situations. Male homosexual relations were against the law, whether consent was given or 
not; whereas the law was silent with regards to female homosexuals (lesbians). The notion of 
a sexual encounter was ‘phallocentric’ because it was ‘something done by the man and 
consented to by the woman’.58 Today the criminal law is arguably gender neutral.59 Notably, 
same-sex sexual activity, of whichever gender, carries the same constraints as heterosexual 
activity. Yet, the past continues to inform the present and examining current criminal law 
cannot be completely detached from references to past restrictions.  This is necessary in order 
to shed light on the significance of the possibility of future changes in legislating the sex 
industry as a whole and making prostitution inclusive.   
Whether in the past or today, and as noted in the introduction to the thesis, the four themes 
are interconnected. Central to all sexual activities is the concept of consent. However, 
establishing consent does not suffice to render all sexual activities permissible in English 
criminal law. The nature of the act also contains certain prohibitions, notably it must not 
cause harm to either participant or be performed on the dead or on animals. Although the 
nature of the act is restricted by the criminal law, the criminal law is indifferent regarding the 
purpose
60
 of the sexual act; it matters not whether it is purely for enjoyment, for procreation 
or for income. However, the act carries an expectation of privacy which needs to be defined 
as it does not solely depend on location, but rather on what is capable of being in public view. 
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The sexual activities must be confined to areas where other members of the public would not 
be offended. 
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Section 1 - The required consent 
This section focuses on the first of the four themes: consent. In this section consent will be 
shown in relation to non-commercial sexual activity in order to set the foundation for the 
following chapters.  
To establish a sexual offence it must be shown that consent to the sexual activity was not 
given.  Prior to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 neither common law nor statute gave a 
definition of consent, instead the law relied on a lack of consent.  From the 17
th
 Century until 
the Sexual Offences Act 1956 lack of consent in rape cases was formulated through common 
law as ‘against her will’61 per Blackstones definition of rape: the ‘carnal knowledge of a 
woman forcibly and against her will.’62  It was not until the Sexual Offences (Amendment) 
Act 1976
63
 that the terms moved from ‘against her will’ to ‘without consent.’64  The inclusion 
of she ‘does not consent to it’ found in the SOA 1976 was to provide a guide for the jury to 
ascertain whether the defendant was guilty (or not) of the charge of rape. 
The SOA 2003 provides a positive statutory definition of consent in s74: where an agreement 
is made by choice with the freedom and capacity to make that choice.
65
   Section 74 written 
in gender neutral terms puts the ability to consent of either party central to any sexual 
activity.  
To gain an insight into consent’s significance for all sexual activities, this section will further 
discuss the SOA 2003 giving a statutory definition to consent (1.1) and consider the 
difficulties surrounding consent.  Consent is restricted by age (1.2) and ability (1.3). It has 
also been shaped by civil law with regards to underage marriage (because of the minimum 
age of consent) consummation and bigamy (1.4), and continues to be influenced by 
environment and behaviours, raising issues as to whether consent can be given if the person is 
drunk or when outside pressure is exercised (1.6).  Finally, consent can be given upon certain 
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conditions (1.6), not the least that of the nature of the sexual activities, the second criteria of 
our framework. 
1.1. The first statutory definition of consent 
The change and move to a positive definition of consent in the SOA 2003 stemmed from the 
findings of the Home Office, published in the report: Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the 
Law on Sex Offences, Volume 1 (2000).
66
 It was recognised that the law in its present state 
was in need of change in order to ‘provide coherent and clear sex offences which protect 
individuals …’67 enabling abusers to be appropriately punished whilst remaining ‘fair and 
non-discriminatory in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Human Rights Act 1998’.68 Therefore a statute was required that shifted away from law that 
‘dates from a hundred years ago and more, when society and the roles of men and women 
were perceived very differently’69 to one that provided a definition of consent and refined the 
meaning in order to strengthen and modernise law on sexual offences.  It was a clear 
demonstration of the government’s intentions to reform the law on sexual offences coupled 
with stronger measures of protection with regard to the public from sexual offending. The 
resultant framework was intended to clarify the concept of consent rather than change its 
meaning, as defined in the case of R v Olugboja (1982),
70
 and to effectively eradicate the so 
called ‘rapists charter’ stemming from R v Morgan (1976)71 where, it was held, there could 
be defence in the mistaken but genuine and honest belief that consent had been given. 
Hence, the definition within s74 is: ‘a person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the 
freedom and capacity to make that choice’ which is then supported by s75 outlining the 
evidential presumptions where the prosecution proves that the defendant is aware that the 
circumstances within s75 existed.  The complainant will be presumed not to have consented 
to the relevant act and the defendant will be presumed not to have reasonably believed that 
the complainant consented.   Section 76 offers a new scope of presumptions where it can be 
conclusively presumed that the complainant did not consent. It may be said that s76 is no 
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more than a statutory formulation of the common law as it existed prior to 2003’.72 
Nonetheless, it offers a framework for offering a broader protection due to the capacity for 
wider interpretation.  
Section 74 contains two important elements in order to make a choice as to whether to give or 
withdraw consent: freedom and capacity. Where there is a lack of freedom or capacity, then 
consent cannot be given or assumed to be given. The text within s74 states that ‘a person 
consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice’ but 
the statute recognises that there are certain exceptions that must be taken into consideration. 
The lack of capacity can negate consent by two means: by the lack of mental ability to 
exercise choice and by age restrictions. Therefore, capacity to consent to sexual activities 
falls within two areas: the legal restrictions with regards to age, physical or mental capacity 
and problems such as drunken capacity. 
1.2 Age restrictions 
The legal provisions for age restrictions are primarily targeted at adults in order to protect 
children from sexual abuse. Campaigns by people such as Peter Tatchell
73
 to reduce the age 
of consent to lower than sixteen have been unsuccessful, with the government’s 
recommendations reflecting the cultural ideology that it would be morally wrong to lower it. 
This is despite the Office for National Statistics (ONS) saying that the rate of teenage 
pregnancies is now lower,
74
 and various Members of Parliament arguing that it was 
‘ludicrous’ to consider lowering the age of consent at a time when teenage pregnancy rates 
were still soaring.
75
 Thus promulgating the argument that if the age limit was reduced, the 
pregnancy rate would rise exponentially. The legal restrictions of age in relation to sexual 
consent reflect the cultural understanding of what age is considered appropriate.  
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The Sexual Offences Act 2003 sets the minimum age of consent at sixteen, and the offender 
must ‘reasonably believe’ the girl is over sixteen; but if the girl is under thirteen, then the 
‘reasonable belief’ element fails and whether the child consented or not is irrelevant,76 and an 
offence has been committed. The SOA 2003 does not fundamentally change the age of 
consent for girls, whereas it implements a significant shift for boys by applying equal age 
restrictions for boys as for girls. The purpose of treating boys equally to girls is to maintain 
equality with regards to the capacity to consent to homosexual activities.  
The problem when drafting the SOA 2003 was that instead of having two separate groups of 
sexual offences applicable: one for under 13 year olds and the other for children aged from 13 
to 16, it contained ‘a new list of no less than 11 specific offences.’  The resultant SOA 2003 
is overly complex and the result is that there is no distinction between pedophilia and teenage 
sexual exploration.  
Some acts between children ‘usually thought to be normal and proper, and others at least not 
seriously wrong’77 have been criminalised with actions such as two 15 year olds kissing or 
“heavy petting” carrying a potential prison sentence of up to five years.  This contrasts with 
15 year olds who are ‘Gillick’ competent being able to receive contraceptive advice and 
treatment if the health professional believes it is in the young person’s best medical interest.   
A ‘widely respected’78 study  shows that  first sexual experiences, such as kissing can happen 
around the age of 14 for girls and 13 for boys 
79
 and sexual activity often starts before the age 
of 16. 
The over-complication of the SOA 2003 and Home Office guidance stating that there is no 
intention to prosecute teenagers under the age of 16 where they are of similar age and they 
both mutually agree leads to situations where not only teenagers but professionals are 
confused.  In 2011 the Times sex counsellor advised a mother that ‘Technically a 15-year-old 
boy who has consensual sex with a 14-year-old girl has committed a crime that carries a two-
year prison sentence’ but the counsellor was incorrect: the boy and the girl would be equally 
liable under s9 and s13 of the SOA 2003.   
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In R v G [2008]
80
 a boy pleaded guilty to a charge under s5 SOA 2003 (Rape of a child under 
13).  The boy was 15 at the time of the offence and he had consensual sexual intercourse  
with a 12 year old girl who had told him she was also 15.  This case raised the question of 
whether prosecution violated the defendant’s rights under Article 8.  The House of Lords said 
that because the conduct was appropriately criminalised (sexual intercourse with a child 
under 13) it cannot be viewed as “private” and Article 8(2) provides for the state to interfere 
with Article 8 rights ‘for the protection of public health and morals.’  But in R v G the rape 
was no more than a technical legal sense and did not accurately describe what the defendant 
had done.
81
 
In R v G [2008] the girl lied about her age.  Lord Norton in 1883 believed that it wasn’t 
young girls that needed protection from men but that men needed protecting from immoral 
girls who might seduce and trap them.
82
 The reliance on the fact that the girl lied about her 
age in R v G [2008] and the judicial observations in R v C and others [2011]
83
 bears ‘modern 
echoes of the past.’84 In R v C [2011] six men, aged between 18 and 21, took two 12 year old 
girls to a park and had sex with them.  The men were convicted of raping two children under 
the age of 13 contrary to s5 SOA 2003.  On appeal of sentence Lord Moses contradicts 
himself.  On the one hand he notes that ‘the important and difficult question …[is] …to 
reflect the gravity which Parliament undoubtedly viewed such offences … by describing 
those offences as “rape” notwithstanding the consent of the victim’85 He also acknowledged 
that ‘Parliament has chosen to describe all offences with girls under the age of 13, where 
penetration of some sort takes place, as rape, with a maximum of life imprisonment’86 and he 
reflected that ‘[t]here are then mitigating factors where the victim is under 16 and sexual 
activity between two children was mutually agreed and experimental.’87 
 
But in this instance the sexual activity was not between two children.  All six of the 
defendants were adult.  However, Moses LJ saw fit to note that ‘the facts are wholly different 
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from those envisaged in the guideline
88
 …[and] … the guidelines did not cover this type of 
case.’89 
Instead Moses LJ’s commentary throughout the Appeal is one that echoes the sentiment of 
Lord Norton. He started by noting that ‘The appearance of the girls is important’90 and that 
there was nothing ‘to suggest they were under 16’91 He pointed out that on one occasion the 
girls had time to escape
92
 but made no allowances for the fact that the girls were a long way 
from where they were originally picked up and were now in a ‘highly vulnerable situation’93 
where it is likely they thought they could not extricate themselves.   
Moses LJ in his judgment failed to avoid stereotypical assessments.  He relied on the 
appearance of the girls and how easy it is to fool a man into thinking she is older than she 
actually is.  Section 5 of the SOA 2003 states that sexual intercourse with a child under 13 is 
rape.  It fails to explicitly state that s5 is a strict liability offence but when looking at the same 
offence with a child aged between 13 – 16, s10 states that the defendant is guilty if he ‘does 
not reasonably believe’ that the victim is 16 or over.   Moses LJ accepted the defendant’s 
argument that because of the way the girls were dressed they could ‘reasonably believe’ that 
they were over 16.  His argument applies to s10 but does not fit s5 although it was on this 
basis he allowed the appeal and quashed the imprisonment sentences substituting them for 
suspended sentences.   
The two cases show that both received the same penalty, although in R v G a boy of 15 
engaged in consensual sex with his girlfriend who he thought was 15 whereas in R v C there 
was ‘a clear imbalance of power’94 with six men having sordid casual sex ‘simply to salt 
[their] appetites.’95    
 
The SOA 2003 makes no distinction between teenage sex, an imbalance of (sexual) power 
between young adults and children and pedophiles.  During the drafting of the bill for the 
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SOA 2003, Paul Goggins MP challenged anyone who could write a clause that criminalised 
pedophiliac activity without criminalising normal teen sex.
96
 Goggins directed the Crown 
Prosecution Service to exercise appropriate discretion with regards to teen sex.  The 
discretion toward teen sex that Goggins sought was ignored and the result was “legislative 
overkill”97 that prohibits all sexual activity with a child under 16 including consensual teen 
sex.  A simple solution could have been, as Bois-Pedain and J Spencer both suggest, to take 
the example of French law which separates the offence of consensual underage sex between 
minors and that of defendants over the age of 18.      
The age restrictions change when the child is in a fiduciary relationship with the sexual 
partner. Section 16 outlines the abuse of trust if they intentionally
98
 touch the child in a 
sexual
99
 manner. The Act outlines a fiduciary relationship as ‘one of trust’ and clearly states 
in s22(2) that a person has a fiduciary responsibility to children under the age of eighteen ‘if 
he is regularly involved in caring for, training, supervising or being in sole charge of such 
persons’. 
Regarding homosexual relationships, the SOA 2003 put them on par with heterosexual 
relationships. Again, this is a significant break with past approaches, and demonstrates well 
how the government has responded to social mores. Consent has moved from being 
prevented due to homosexual relations being illegal pre-Wolfenden Report 1956, to having a 
minimum age set at 21 (the then age of majority) as per the SOA 1967. The Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 reduced the age to eighteen and the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 2000 finally set the minimum age at sixteen, an age that the SOA 2003 did 
not modify. 
Regarding lesbian relationships, prosecutions were extremely rare even though the law was 
not silent.  The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1880, ‘a piece of legislation often overlooked 
in histories of sex offences,’100 raised the minimum age for behaviour considered to be sexual 
(such as kissing and mutual masturbation) to 13 and effectively removed the defence of 
consent as a defence from the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.  The Criminal Law 
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Amendment Act 1880 was not gender specific and therefore had ‘the potential to encompass 
non-coercive sex between females’101 but makes no reference to, or definition of, the term 
lesbian. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1922 raised the age of consent for sexual 
behaviour considered to be sexual to 16 thus creating the minimum age of consent law 
regulating lesbian sexual behaviour.  Relying on the crime of indecent assault Parliament was 
able to avoid ‘drawing public attention to the existence of lesbianism’102 and the age of 
sexual consent between two women ‘was thus conceived within the prevailing rationale of 
silence and concealment.’103   
The silence was broken with the introduction of the SOA 2003.  Although s1 is an offence 
specifically perpetrated by men, ss2, 3 and 4 create the gender neutral offences ‘assault by 
penetration,’104 sexual assault105 and causing a person to engage in sexual activity without 
consent.
106
 If two women engage in sexual activities, they are also bound by ss2, 3 and 4 and 
their consent is required with the same proviso’s set in s74. The SOA 2003 puts lesbian 
relationships on the same legal footing as heterosexual and homosexual relationships.   
The Offences against the Person Act 1861 protected girls under the age of 12 and the SOA 
2003, criminalised any sexual activity with a child under the age of 13.  The SOA 2003 also 
continues to restrict the minimum age of consent to sixteen.  Previous legislation was written 
in gender specific terms but the intention of the SOA 2003 is to treat consent to all sexual 
activity equally.   There are further limitations to consent in s30, where the person has either 
mental (learning) difficulties and s74 protects those with physical difficulties.   
1.3 Capacity to consent – mental and physical disabilities 
The SOA 1956, using language dating from the Mental Deficiency Act 1913, prohibited 
intercourse with an idiot or imbecile
107
 or a defective
108
 who was under care or treatment. 
However, s8(2) offered the rebuttal that ‘a man is not guilty …if he does not know and has no 
reason to suspect her to be a defective’. 
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The SOA 2003 also considers disability as negating consent. The SOA 2003 states that a 
person commits an offence if he intentionally
109
 sexually
110
 touches a person who is unable to 
refuse because of a reason related to a mental disorder
111
 or is unable to refuse
112
 because that 
person lacks the mental capacity
113
 to choose whether to agree to the touching or is unable to 
communicate. 
114
   
Although the law is clear regarding mental capacity, it is not so clear or protective for persons 
with a physical disability. The disability relies on lack of communication: s75(2)(e) supplies 
the evidential presumption that ‘because of the complainant’s physical disability, the 
complainant would not have been able at the time of the relevant act to communicate to the 
defendant whether the complainant consented’.  
When discussing physical disability and communication, s75(2)(e) states that ‘because of the 
complainant’s disability, the complainant would not have been able at the time of the relevant 
act to communicate to the defendant whether the complainant consented.’   Section 75(2)(e) 
is vague: as Jenny McEwan askes: ‘what are the facts the prosecution need to prove in order 
for the presumption to arise?’ 115 Does it mean that the complainant must be unable to 
communicate by any method whatsoever?
116
 The wording does not state that the complainant 
must be mute, it says that the complainant must be unable to communicate due to a physical 
disability.  A person with physical disabilities can utilize many different methods of 
communication depending on the level of the disability, to be able to consent or to withdraw 
consent, but the problem arises because this relies on the need for the person ‘with whom 
they are trying to communicate to understand them’ and because the courts must take into 
account whether the particular disability impeded communication.    
The reliance depends on proof of being unconscious or physically incapable of giving 
consent as opposed to taking into consideration that the lack of consent may be in the form of 
gestures. Given the English Supreme Court’s ruling on Bree (2007),117 and subsequent cases 
involving drunkenness and consent, which is discussed later in this chapter, such a narrow 
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view on what consent is could be possible. Yet, in R v Cooper (2009)
118
 Lord Rodger 
distinguishes the difference between the mental incapacity to communicate and physical 
incapacity when he states that the SOA 2003 ‘had in mind an inability to communicate [and] 
there is no warrant at all for limiting it to a physical inability to communicate’.119   
The law therefore should protect people with disabilities—either mental or physical—within 
the framework of the SOA 2003 for both non-commercial and commercial sexual activities. 
This issue is not discussed in this thesis, not because it would not be relevant to the 
commercial sex industry: certain niche markets cater for people who have fetishes for sexual 
activities with disabled women,
120
 but rather because the issue covers limited situations that 
fall outside the remit of this thesis. Following on from the ability to consent due to mental 
and/or physical difficulties, the civil law also puts separate constraints upon consent but 
limits it to marriage. These limits lend themselves to the criminal law if breached.   
1.4 Consent to a sexual act within marriage 
Consent to a sexual act within marriage was and is still partially shaped by the civil law of 
marriage.  Civil law continues to lend two factors within marriage to the application of the 
criminal law: firstly, the minimum age for marriage is 16, the minimum age of consent is set 
at the same age: 16.  Secondly an unconsummated marriage provides grounds for the 
marriage to be voided, and bigamy negates the validity of the second (or subsequent) 
marriage(s). 
Criminal law makes no distinction as to whether consent to a sexual act occurs in or outside 
of marriage.  Lack of consent in either situation following from R v R
121
 and s74 of the SOA 
2003 is rape.    Criminal law also makes no marital distinction with regards to the lack of 
consent where there is a risk of transmission of disease.  However as shown in R v B 
[2006]
122
 the transmission of an STI
123
 would cause serious bodily harm and therefore 
amount to GBH and not rape.  R v Golding [2014]
124
 widens the margins of ‘really serious 
harm’ within s20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 to include genital herpes 
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where the defendant did not disclose his diagnosis of genital herpes to the victim and 
consequently passed the virus to her.  By not disclosing his condition the complainant could 
not make an informed decision whether or not she wanted to risk acquiring herpes.  However, 
if the victim does in fact consent to the risk, this will provide a defence under s.20 as held in 
R v Dica [2004].
125
 
1.5 Issues raised by behaviour 
The statutory definition of consent is found within s74 of the SOA 2003 where it states that ‘a 
person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that 
choice’.127 Nonetheless, the issue of consent often leads to deciphering whether a woman is 
consenting in certain complex situations. The Home Office review
128
 from which the SOA 
2003 ensued made it clear that consent was to be something given on equal terms, and not 
given by the weaker person to the stronger. The intention was to break with prior 
interpretations of consent.  
As mentioned earlier, consent or, more appropriately, lack of consent, was formulated by the 
courts as ‘against her will’.129 Lack of consent was portrayed as being shown by the woman 
struggling to get away and/or screaming for help; however, this has been shown not 
necessarily to be the way women inevitably manifest their lack of consent in the given 
circumstance. This legal understanding of ‘lack of consent’ prior to 2003 has reflected social 
attitudes where the woman was not perceived as a victim of predatory sex but instead was 
considered to be ‘provocative’130 and ‘asking for it.’131 The SOA 2003 has aimed to break 
this ‘blame the woman’ social attitude that the law partially integrated when the victim is 
drunk or influenced by the defendant’s behaviour. To do so the SOA 2003 contains three 
important requirements: a statutory definition of consent, linked to a test for reasonable 
belief, combined with an evidential or conclusive presumption about consent. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
125
 R v Dica [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 28. 
127
 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s74 
128
 Home Office, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sex Offences, Volume 1 (2000) para. 2.10.3 
129
See Sir Matthew Hale’s History of the Pleas of the Crown: rape is “the carnal knowledge of any 
woman above the age of ten years against her will, and of a woman-child under the age of ten years with or 
against her will” 
130
 Seligman C, Brickman J, and Koulack D, “Rape and Physical Attractiveness: Assigning Responsibility to 
Victims,” Journal of Personality (December 1977)Vol 45, no. 4: 554–563. 
131
 See Kimberly Fairchild ‘But Look at What she was Wearing! Victim Blaming and Street Harassment’, in  
Tarrant, Shira (ed) Gender, Sex, and Politics (Routledge 2015)   
48 
 
the law has its shortcomings, not the least because the ‘blame the woman’ culture has not 
completely disappeared from our society including in Parliament.
132
 
1.5.1 Consent in light of drunken behaviour 
The prevailing view with respect to drunken consent is led by a focus on the issue of consent 
rather than the capacity to consent. 
Prior to 2003, the common law, in Malone (1998),
133
 recognised that some victims may 
freeze or may be unable to positively dissent, protest, or resist because of being too drunk. 
However, as the jury had to decide, social attitudes to drunkenness could lead to a finding of 
consent rather than lack of consent. The SOA 2003 aimed to break this pattern, but the first 
case seemed to point to a failure to do so. In R v Dougal (2005) in a Crown Court case in 
Swansea,
134
 Dougal led to the popular but ‘controversial’135 belief that there could be no 
charge of rape if the complainant gave consent whilst drunk as ‘drunken consent is still 
consent’. 
The Court of Appeal in Bree (2007)
136
 did not challenge the essence of the legal principle, 
but provided the opportunity to re-interpret ‘the once broad definition’137 of “a drunken 
consent is still consent” to one where stereotypical assumptions of victim guilt are removed.   
The Court of Appeal noted that the SOA 2003 provided a clear definition of consent for the 
purposes of rape, and by defining it with reference to ‘capacity to make that choice 
sufficiently addresses the issue of consent …’ agreeing that the definition of consent within 
s74 is written in, what the Government intended to be, a clear and concise format: ‘a person 
consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice’. 
However, it became immediately apparent that there were no definitions for the terms 
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‘freedom’, ‘capacity’ or ‘choice’ to be found in s74, and as Simpson notes, s74 contains a 
vague undefined language, and requires a more drastic interpretation.
138
  
Sir Igor Judge P stated that the ‘phrase [‘drunken consent is still consent’] lacks delicacy, but 
… it provides a useful shorthand encapsulating the legal position’ and drew a distinction 
between someone who through drink lacks capacity to consent and someone who retains the 
capacity to consent: 
‘If, through drink (or for any other reason) the complainant has temporarily lost her capacity 
to choose whether to have intercourse on the relevant occasion, she is not consenting … 
However, where the complainant has voluntarily consumed even substantial quantities of 
alcohol, but nevertheless remains capable of choosing whether or not to have intercourse, and 
in drink agrees to do so, this would not be rape’.139 
Bree however, does not stop at this juncture; Sir Igor also made the significant statement: 
‘We should perhaps underline that, as a matter of practical reality, capacity to consent may 
evaporate well before a complainant becomes unconscious’. This statement could be 
interpreted that Bree, although limited by its own parameters, left it open for the court in 
future cases to direct the jury to consider the balance between the level of s75(d) where 
capacity is lost if the victim is either unconscious or asleep and s74 where the person is so 
drunk (but awake) that they have lost the ‘freedom’ to make a ‘choice’.  
Elvin suggests that the state of legal interpretation of s74 left by Bree is not without 
criticism
140
  and as Wallerstein argues, the rationale “a drunken consent is still consent” 
should not be recognised
141
 as consent and Simester maintains such phraseology should not 
be used.
142
 
The ‘vague undefined language of s74’143 creates inconsistent directions to the jury.  Finch 
and Munro found that jurors carry prejudicial notions that women bear some responsibility.
144
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The 2005 Amnesty International study
145
 found that the public attitude toward drunk victim 
responsibility echoed Finch and Munro’s research.  In contradiction to Loveless146, to prevent 
jurors from bias and continuing to interpret the law incorrectly, further guidance by way of 
‘express provisions on voluntary intoxication’ is needed to establish that the complainant 
suffered a lack of awareness, understanding and ability.
147
  This will not create ‘further 
complications.’148 
The issue of intoxication and consent in relation to s74 and s75 was considered by the Home 
Office following the proposal in Setting the Boundaries of a further presumption to cover 
situations where the complainant is ‘too affected by alcohol to give free agreement’.  The 
government rejected the proposal to avoid ‘mischievous accusations’149 arguing that 
legislative clarification or reform of the status of voluntarily intoxicated and incapacitated 
victims is unnecessary.
150
 
The practicalities of balancing the level between s75(d) and s74 were reviewed in the Crown 
Court in Caernarvon in R v Evans and McDonald (2012)
151
 where the defendant was accused 
of rape and CCTV footage showed a young woman who was extremely drunk, yet clearly not 
unconscious. The issue was whether she was so drunk she was incapable of giving consent. 
Judge Hughes noted when handing down the guilty verdict that she was: ‘…extremely 
intoxicated. CCTV footage shows …the extent of her intoxication when she stumbled into 
your friend. As the jury have found, she was in no condition to have sexual intercourse. 
When you arrived at the hotel you must have realised that’.152 The comments from the judge 
show that the courts are prepared to move away from the dicta in Bree and widen the scope of 
‘freedom and capacity to make that choice’ as found in s74.153  
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The recent case of R v Tambedou (2014)
154
 confirms that drunkenness can vitiate consent and 
that the lapse of memory resulting from a drunken state cannot be interpreted as the woman 
having consented.  
The jury was entitled to consider absence of consent and to distinguish it from evidence of 
absence of memory. Both [defendants] in interview conceded that the complainant was very 
drunk. There was no evidence of her flirting or inviting, let alone instigating, intimate 
contact, with the appellant. Her evidence was that she would not have consented to 
intercourse with him, although, by reason solely of her absence of memory, she felt unable to 
exclude her consent.
155
  
Furthermore, during sentencing, Hayward J encouraged anyone ‘who has been a victim of 
sexual assault …to report it to the police [who will] take the report seriously and give the 
victim all the support they need to make sure the offender is brought to justice’.156 This 
statement is in tune with the message the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has tried to 
communicate recently. At the National Rape Conference in January 2015, the CPS was 
assessing the issue of consent and the myths and stereotypes that have surrounded the issue of 
consent and concluded that because there is still far too much variation in the way that forces 
move a complaint of rape through the system, ‘toolkits’ would be provided to clarify the 
situation where a potential victim either may have been unable to consent or where consent 
could not reasonably be considered to have been given.Police and prosecutors must make 
sure they ask in every case where consent is the issue: how did the suspect know the 
complainant was saying ‘yes’ and doing so freely and knowingly.157   
Helen Reece argues that ‘there is little evidence that the rape myths are widespread’158 
nonetheless, a victim-blaming poster from NHS/Home Office declared that: ‘One in Three 
Reported Rapes Happens When the Victim has been Drinking.’159  The Director of Public 
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Prosecutions, Alison Saunders, expressly refers to how the ‘blame the victim’ social attitudes 
have influenced the law on consent in sexual offences and states that ‘For too long society 
has blamed rape victims for confusing the issue of consent—by drinking or dressing 
provocatively for example—but it is not they who are confused, it is society itself and we 
must challenge that. Consent to sexual  activity is not a grey area—in law it is clearly defined 
and must be given fully and freely’. She added, ‘It is not a crime to drink, but it is a crime for 
a rapist to target someone who is no longer capable of consenting to sex though drink. These 
tools take us well beyond the old saying "no means no”’.160 Thus the comments by Judge 
Hayward and the Crown Prosecution Service go some way to ensuring that s74 is interpreted 
such that the woman has the freedom and capacity to make a choice whether to consent or 
withdraw consent. In instances where the woman is incapacitated through alcohol, as 
Saunders noted ‘We want police and prosecutors to make sure they ask in every case where 
consent is the issue - how did the suspect know the complainant was saying yes and doing so 
freely and knowingly?’. The interpretation of s74 SOA 2003 could succeed in breaking with 
prior perceptions of what consent could be when the victim is drunk without ‘further 
instructions, directions and the additional defining of legal concepts’ since the decisions in 
Bree and Tambedou have helped to move away from the notion of “drunken consent.” This 
may not be the case when the offender uses non-physical means to inhibit or incapacitate 
consent, a situation more likely to happen than not since, as DPP Saunders recognised, not all 
rapists are men wearing ‘a balaclava in a dark alley. We know that most rapists know their 
victim…’.161   
1.5.2 Behaviours inhibiting or incapacitating consent 
The scope of ‘freedom and capacity to make that choice’ within s74 of the SOA 2003 can be 
limited by four forms of external factors: violence, fear, social pressure and deception.  
Violence in the SOA 2003 is the physical force exerted towards the victim and is recognised 
through the rebuttable presumptions of s75(2)(a), (b) and (c), where the defendant used or 
caused the victim to fear violence or detained the victim. The presumption is that the physical 
imbalance between the victim and the defendant vitiates the former’s consent, but the 
defendant can rebut it, a scenario that will arise for example when the persons engage in 
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sado-macochism. Consent to violence as a circumstance surrounding the sexual activities is 
possible, providing that the degree of harm does not reach a threshold negating consent. The 
starting point regarding infliction of harm for sexual gratification is R v Brown (1994).
162
 In 
Brown the House of Lords  answered the question of whether prosecution must prove lack of 
consent in the negative holding that consent could not be a defence to offences under sections 
20 and 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The result is that consent does not 
preclude a conviction unless it is for ‘good reason’.163  
However, lack of consent can stem from the victim’s fear without the defendant having 
exercised physical violence. The simple presence of the defendant may inhibit the victim into 
expressing her lack of consent. The problem rests on how to prove the absence of consent 
when the victim has remained passive and submitted to the sexual activities without having 
expressed her fear and unwillingness to engage in those sexual activities. Prior to the SOA 
2003, the law was ambiguous and in effect worked against the victim. In DPP v Morgan 
[1976]
164
 the House of Lords held that as a general point of law, genuine belief of consent 
negated any intention to rape. That the victim was passive and unable to express lack of 
consent could be interpreted by the defendant as the victim having consented even when the 
facts demonstrated that the belief in consent was unreasonable. Morgan became known as the 
‘rapist’s charter’165 and the furore prompted the then Home Secretary to promise government 
action. The ‘action’ was an Advisory Group set up ‘to give urgent consideration to the law of 
rape in the light of recent public concern’.166 The Advisory Group recommended that the law 
governing rape as set out in the House of Lords judgment in Morgan be set out in statutory 
form but it was not until the SOA 2003 that the promised action fully materialised. 
In between, where the woman does not show any physical or verbal signs of consent, the 
debate focused on whether submission was consent or a sign of coercion and lack of consent, 
such as in R v Olugboja (1982).
167
 In Olugboja, the victim was so frightened she offered 
absolutely no resistance but did not consent. It was held that a woman does not have to 
actively resist in order to show a lack of consent; indeed, the jury distinguished that her very 
passivity was an indication of lack of consent. Dunn LJ noted that consent was different to 
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mere submission and said: ‘…every consent involves a submission, but it by no means 
follows that a mere submission involves consent’.168 Consequently, Olugboja significantly 
foils any assumption that rape automatically involves some degree of open physical 
resistance by the victim before or while the offender rapes her. 
Nevertheless, prior to 2003, in the absence of a definition of what consent was, there was 
room for social attitudes not favourable to victims of sexual offences to take precedence  
within the jury room and whilst consent was to be given its ‘ordinary meaning’, the term 
‘should not be left to a jury without some further direction’.169 The distinction between 
consent and non-consent is ‘… to be drawn in a given case  for the jury to decide, applying 
their combined good sense, experience and knowledge of human nature and modern 
behaviour to all the relevant facts of that case’.170 This approach was problematic because 
‘[t]he concept of consent has, in reality, no single clear “ordinary meaning”’171 and as a 
consequence, the ‘further direction’ offered to the jury provided a large amount of discretion. 
‘The gradations of submission are infinite’172 and if the law does not provide clear and 
objective directions, it leaves the door open for subjectivity and social attitudes condemning 
the victim rather than the offender. 
The common law distinction between submission and consent, as outlined in Olugboja, has 
been replaced by statute law via s74 SOA 2003 and its positive definition of consent. 
However, the notions of ‘choice’ and ‘freedom’ that form the definition have yet to be fully 
explored in cases such as Olugboja or where other subtler pressures might invalidate consent. 
As Claire de Than et al. note, the submission secured by promises of advancement, such as 
the actress and the casting couch scenario is likely to be regarded as consent.
173
 This type of 
non-physical pressure generating fear and passivity for the victim creates the problem for the 
jury to decipher whether a woman does consent against the ‘she asked for it’ culture borne of 
male chauvinism.
174
 It is a fine line to draw between the ‘greedy’ wannabe actress and the 
woman who feels she has no alternative, and it is this type of cultural view the courts must 
now ensure that the jury does not carry into the deliberation room. Section 74 of the SOA 
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2003 offers a definition of consent and ss75 and 76 offer presumptions in order that the jury 
should be able to interpret consent as something that is given or withdrawn and not have to 
rely on the moral standards that question whether ‘she asked for it’ or was the sexual 
activities ‘against her will’ meaning that there should be some sort of physical evidence to 
show a struggle or fight ensued. In that sense, compared to the law prior 2003, s74 SOA 
represents a step forward.  
However, it has not resolved the matter fully. Section 74 gives little guidance as to when or 
how the individual has the freedom or capacity to choose if they are not caught within the 
constraints of age or the presumptions of ss75 and s76. There is no guidance where the victim 
in a more social setting is subjected to typically persuasive factors. These factors can include 
cajoling by a man who is not violent or openly threatening but nonetheless persistent; or 
where the cajoling is combined with the liberal plying of alcohol or drugs. It could be argued 
that s74 is sufficient with regards to coercion as the choice and freedom elements would be 
removed. However, it is still left for the courts to direct the jury to ascertain whether the 
submission equated to lack of consent and where freedom and capacity reside. As shown in 
the research by Vanessa Munro,
175
 juries still have pre-conceptions with regard to the 
necessity of struggle despite the fact that s74 of the SOA 2003 now includes submission 
within its definition. These terms of freedom and choice are more likely to be interpreted 
narrowly
176
 and lend themselves to integrating the jury’s social prejudices, despite there 
being a demonstrable lack of consent.
177
 As Susan Leahy notes ‘[the SOA 2003] does not 
really improve the prospects of obtaining a conviction for sexual coercion without extrinsic 
physical violence’.178   
So, whilst s74 defines consent, and breaks with the previous law that contains ‘little general 
guidance … as to the meaning of consent’,179 it creates ambiguity by failing to offer a 
definition of ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’ within its remit. The SOA 2003 fails to explain to what 
extent social conditions may constrain an individual’s choice and how they are accounted for, 
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if they are. As such, it falls short of the Government’s intention to ‘make statutory provision 
on this issue that is clear and unambiguous’180 as expressed in the Government report 
‘Protecting the Public’.181 
The same conclusion can apply to s76 and its conclusive presumption of lack of consent in 
case of fraud or deception. Prior to the SOA 2003, the common law recognised deception as 
vitiating consent. In non-commercial incidences, often the deception takes place where the 
perpetrator pretends to be a person carrying a qualification such as a man posing as a doctor,
 
182
  or having some medical knowledge
183
  or similarly, in R v Tassbaum (2000),
184
 where the 
‘nature and quality’ of the act vitiated consent, the defendant carried out an examination on 
the breasts of three women pretending to be conducting a study on breast cancer. The House 
of Lords noted that the women were consenting to a medical examination and not to the 
defendant’s indecent behaviour, thus ‘there was consent to the nature of the act but not its 
quality’.185  
Building on the common law, s76 (2)(a) of the SOA 2003 creates the conclusive presumption 
where the defendant intentionally deceives the complainant as to the nature or purpose of the 
relevant  sexual act. This means that actions such as Tassbaum would be criminal or indeed 
anyone who intentionally tells the woman that penetration (either digitally or by the penis) is 
necessary for medical reasons when in fact it is for his own sexual gratification. Section 76(b) 
offers a conclusive presumption about consent by criminalising deception where the 
perpetrator ‘intentionally induced the complainant to consent … by impersonating a person 
known personally to the complainant’. This presumption is intentionally narrow and does not 
apply in a number of cases.   
For example, in R v Jheeta [2007]
186, the defendant, who was the victim’s boyfriend, sent text 
messages to the victim, pretending that they were from the police, threatening that he would 
likely commit suicide if she failed to have sexual intercourse with him. Charged with rape, it 
was held that s76 could not be applied as the victim was not deceived as to the nature and 
purpose of the act: she consented to the sexual nature of the activity and for the purpose of 
                                                 
180
 Ibid at paragraph 30 
181
 Home Office, ‘Protecting the Public - Strengthening Protection against Sex Offenders and Reforming the 
Law on Sexual Offences’, The Stationery Office CM5668 
182
 R v Flattery (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 410. 
183
 The King v Williams. - [1923] 1 K.B. 340 
184
 R v Tassbaum [2000] Crim Lr 686 
185
 R v Tassbaum [2000] EWCA Crim 90 at [38] per Vice President Rose LJ   
186
 R v Jheeta [2007] 2 Cr App R 34 
57 
 
sexual gratification. However, she was still deceived, but that deception fell under s74 rather 
than s76 because although s76 does not contain an exhaustive list of deceptions, in Jheeta s74 
was considered subject to s76.
187
 The court held that she did not have 'a free choice, or 
consent for the purposes of the Act'.
188
 
A further form of deception is the recent judicial expansion of criminal liability for sexual 
fraud resulting  in a ‘witch hunt’189 of five gender fraud cases190 that were successfully 
prosecuted between 2012 and 2015.  In each of these cases the ‘gender fraud’ was perpetrated 
by a person whose gender identity led the female complainants to believe that the defendant 
in each case was a male and not a female, resulting in ‘a gap between belief and reality.’191   
In R v McNally [2013]
192
 the court held that ‘deception as to gender can vitiate consent’ under 
s74 but not under s76. In this instance McNally identifying as a male  when aged 13, met up 
online with a 12-year-old girl.  Several years later when McNally was 17 they met up and in a 
dark room they kissed and McNally digitally penetrated the young woman and performed oral 
sex.  All the while the young woman believed McNally to be a boy until a friend of the 
family discovered a bra and strap-on dildo in McNally’s overnight bag and the police were 
called. 
McNally pleaded guilty to six counts of assault by penetration contrary to s2 of the SOA 
2003.  Part of a lawyer’s responsibility is to advise the client (without bias) with regards to 
how the client wishes to plead.  Why McNally chose to plead guilty, or was advised to plead 
guilty, warrants further analysis but is too wide for this thesis. Alex Sharpe suggests that 
‘pleading guilty … is not the same thing as being guilty’193 and the ‘kids accused of gender 
fraud’194  suffered from ‘internalised shame.’195  Alex Sharpe also argues that the ‘recent 
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spate of criminal prosecutions of LGBT youth …calls for rigorous analysis in its own 
right.’196 
The problem is that s74, by not defining freedom and choice, leaves the door open to various 
interpretations of what circumstances would be acceptable as deception, including subjective 
interpretations based on social attitudes and prejudices.   The lack of definition within s74 
generates a situation where a form of ‘state violence’197 is created because of the distinction 
made between ‘the fleshy and the non-fleshy penis in legal constructions of consent.’198 
It is my contention that s74, with the presumptions set in s75 and s76, does not sufficiently 
address the issue of submission because of the subjective test (albeit with an objective 
element) of reasonable belief. So, although an attack or threat of violence is caught within 
s74 because violence removes choice and freedom, this is not without its own criticism: the 
circumstances set out in s75 and 76 in conjunction with s74 create a hierarchy where fraud or 
deception scores higher than threats of violence which can be rebuttable.  Deception in the 
form of gender deception should not relate to the concept of ‘gender deviance’ but should 
look at the gender identity of the defendant and whether there was an emotional involvement 
with the complainant.  As Sharpe notes: ‘it is important to recognise that for some 
transgender men, a prosthesis is experienced as a penis.’199  The issue of gender fraud is 
fraught with cisgender autonomy and the state should not be used as a tool for women to 
‘mobilise against other men with whom a woman chooses to have sex.’200 
  A final area showing the difficulties within the SOA 2003 with regard to consent is 
‘conditional consent’. 
1.6 Conditional consent 
Conditional consent is an emerging concept where it is held that the consent given contains 
an express condition. When one looks at the commercial sex industry it is shown that consent 
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is often given for certain areas of sexual activities, i.e. viewing only, and is not given for any 
other form of sexual activities i.e. touching or intercourse. An example of non-commercial 
conditional consent can be shown in Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011]
201
 
where the woman made it clear that she only consented to intercourse if Assange used a 
condom.  
In the Assange case, Sir John Thomas was of the opinion that unless the condom accidentally 
split or came off, intercourse without a condom in the circumstances set within Assange 
‘would therefore amount to an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003’202 and although 
s76 was too narrow, s74 could be relied on in this instance.  
Again, an example of conditional consent, and the issue of choice when it is pitted against 
intention, can be seen in R (on the application of F) v DPP [2013]
203
 where the woman 
consented to intercourse on the condition that her husband would not ejaculate inside her. Her 
husband told her he had a perfect right to ejaculate if he wanted and proceeded to have 
intercourse. Subsequently she became pregnant. Prosecution in the first instance refused to 
proceed with the charge of rape on the basis that there was no reasonable prospect for 
conviction. The decision was taken to Judicial Review and the Divisional Court said that the 
crucial factor was that she was deprived of choice and therefore her consent was negated. It 
was not a matter of the man intending to withdraw but ejaculating either prematurely or 
accidentally, but whether the man intended to ejaculate despite the condition imposed not 
to.
204
  
These two cases create a new concept of conditional consent. It could be argued that the 
concept creates a gap between the Court’s understanding of rape against that of the public, 
similar to that of the ‘mock jurors’ who did not ‘leave their personal prejudices and 
stereotypical preconceptions behind them when they enter[ed] the courtroom’.205 The 
argument also resonates when the age of consent was set at sixteen: assessing the difference 
between a girl under sixteen to one who is sixteen or over was ‘too difficult to establish’.  In 
cases of conditional consent there is ‘clearly a strong public interest in requiring men to 
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respect the wishes of their sexual partners’206 but similarly to the stereotype where it is 
difficult to ascertain the age of a girl, the courts have to address the concept of conditional 
consent where the man assumes that although the request to either not ejaculate or to wear a 
condom has been made, it is his prerogative to ignore such a request.
207
  To date conditional 
consent is restricted to consent to sexual activity excluding ejaculation and sexual activity on 
the condition a condom is used.   
Another emerging behaviour, ‘revenge porn’, could be looked at under the prism of 
conditional consent. Revenge porn, which is not commercial pornography, is the public 
sharing of sexually explicit communications, usually in the form of pictures, sent via social 
media without the consent of the subject of the photograph or other materials. McGlynn 
describes this behaviour as ‘just one form of a range of gendered, sexualized forms of 
abuse’208 and instead of referring to it as ‘revenge porn’ it should be known for what it is: 
‘image-based sexual abuse.’209  Revenge porn, or image-based sexual abuse, is when private, 
sexual images are share widely onto the internet and the ‘images generally attract comment 
most of which is extremely abusive and the abuse is sexualized.’210 
Consent would have been given for the original image to be taken and sent to the intended 
recipient. It is part of the practice of ‘sexting’ where an image is generated by an individual 
(an intimate ‘selfie’) either as a result of a request or sent to a recipient who has not requested 
it.
211
 The sender and recipient are either already in an intimate relationship or in the case of 
the unsolicited intimate selfie, the sender anticipates an intimate relationship. This type of 
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conditional consent where the consent has not extended to the sharing of the images by the 
recipient with others than themselves is an offence within s33 of the Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act 2015 alongside the Communications Act 2003, the Malicious Communications 
Act 1988 and the  Protection from Harassment Act 1997  Protection from Harassment Act 
1997  and is not caught within the SOA 2003. 
New technologies and the omnipresence of the Internet means that the image is subsequently 
(often after the break-up of the intimate relationship) re-distributed, without the consent of 
the victim, often via social media to third parties. The images are distributed by several 
means: changing the profile picture on Facebook as in R v Humphrey (2015),
212
 ‘Whatsapp’ 
profile picture as per R v Duffin (2015),
213
 to that of the intimate picture of the victim is not 
uncommon. Not all images are posted on the Internet, in R v Brimson (2015)
214
 the pictures 
were posted on the inside and outside of a supermarket. The intention of posting such pictures 
is to humiliate the victim by causing as much distress as possible. The SOA 2003 does not 
cover this situation. This is a failing of the Government in resisting the label sexual offences 
with regard to revenge porn.  As McGlynn notes the images are sexual and the harm caused is 
because the images are sexual.  ‘It is a plain fact that non-sexual images simply do not have 
the same potency to cause harm and abuse.’ Instead revenge porn is dealt with by s1 of the 
Malicious Communications Act 1988, which provides the offence of sending letters, et 
cetera, to another person with the intent to cause distress; the Communications Act 2003 and 
the more recent Criminal Justices and Courts Act 2015.   
The Malicious Communications Act was written at a time before social media had become 
popularised and was primarily to criminalise hate mail. Furthermore, s127 of the 
Communications Act 2003 widened the scope and criminalised anyone who sent a message 
or other matter that is grossly offensive. The wording of the previous Acts was too narrow to 
protect the victim because the reliance was upon the content of the image. The modifications 
in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 created a wider scope. Although the reliance is 
still on the content being such that the photograph ‘shows all or part of an individual’s 
exposed genitals or pubic area’,215 it does not have to be obscene as required by the Malicious 
Communications Act 2003. The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 also carries an 
expectation of privacy if, as defined by s35(2), ‘it shows something that is not of a kind 
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ordinarily seen in public’. McGlynn notes the shortcoming of the provision within the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 that it is ‘restricted to disclosure only, does not cover 
threats, and the intent requirement cannot be satisfied by recklessly causing distress.’216 
Prima facie revenge porn is a civil matter, although as Pegg notes ‘we have seen a steady 
creep of criminal law into private relations’217 where in revenge porn the photograph is taken 
with the subject’s consent but is disclosed publicly. The crux of the offence is ‘the later, non-
consensual disclosure of that image.’218  Here the criterion of consent interplays with the 
fourth element of our framework, visibility.   
It is shown that with regards to sexting and the subsequent revenge porn, consent, and the 
lack thereof, falls into two distinct classes: where the consent is conditional and the picture is 
either taken by someone other than the subject or the subject themselves, and where no 
consent has been given at all because the subject of the picture was unaware the photo or 
video was being taken as was the case R v Kennedy (2015)
219
 or in R v Asagba (2015)
220
 
where the victim was asleep when the pictures were taken. In either scenario the picture (or 
video) is of a nature such ‘that a reasonable person would consider to be sexual’.221  
However, consent, despite whether it is conditional (you can take and keep the picture but do 
not show it to anyone else), or absent (you cannot take a picture), could still be lacking 
because of the expectation of privacy. Therefore, although conditional consent may be 
considered of a lesser quality, the law regards the conditional consent with the same rigour as 
general consent. 
This section has established that although the law prohibits non-consensual sexual activities, 
the courts and Parliament were loath to define consent. It was not until the SOA 2003 that the 
definition of consent finally gained statutory recognition. There are still legal difficulties 
within the drafting of s74 as establishing consent in relation to freedom and choice remains 
reliant on judicial interpretation and directions given to the jury. In turn, and despite the 
presumptions of s75 and s76, how to understand s74 requirements leaves the door open to 
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integrating social attitudes, some of which can be prejudicial to women, into the definition of 
the law.  
Furthermore, an interesting development is that of conditional consent, where consent to the 
sexual activities by A is formulated upon the compliance by B to certain conditions: either as 
to the nature of the sexual actual (no ejaculation) or with regards to the visibility or lack of 
visibility of the act (no picture taken or no picture sent to third parties). In those cases, that 
are concerned with non-commercial relationships, the breach by B of the condition(s) 
formulated by A has been interpreted has negating consent by A. A is considered to have 
been deprived of choice as per s74 SOA 2003.  
In the guidelines within the 2003 White Paper prior to the SOA 2003,
222
 the Government 
clearly acknowledges that within all sexual encounters the issue of consent is central to 
establishing whether a sexual offence has or not taken place.  
Elliott and DeThan criticise the fact that the definition of consent is limited to sexual offences 
and argue that there should be a unified definition in all areas of criminal law saying ‘all 
relevant offences should use a single core statutory definition of consent so that the 
boundaries of criminality are stated more effectively’.223 This criticism, given the 
government’s obligation to regulate against harm, is relevant when considering non-sexual 
offences under the Offences against the Person Act 1861. Elliott and De Than state that it 
creates ‘artificial and illogical distinctions’ especially when in practice domestic violence and 
sexual offences are often linked. Nonetheless, parameters have been established within s74 of 
the SOA 2003 regarding sexual consent, but not without certain difficulties remaining in the 
interpretation of s74, especially with regards to capacity.  The parameters fail when 
considering the issue of consent with regards to transference of sexually transmitted diseases, 
instead this is caught within the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and does not capture 
the ‘freedom and choice’ of s74. 
The recent development of conditional consent plays a fundamental role in commercial 
sexual activities as often, especially for prostitution, consent is conditional. It also 
demonstrates how consent is linked to the nature of the act by its implicitness. The following 
                                                 
222
 White Paper ‘Protecting the Public: strengthening protection against sex offenders and reforming the law on 
sexual offences’ Cm 5668 November 2002 
223
 Elliott C and De Than C, ‘The case for a Rational Reconstruction of Consent in Criminal Law’ (2007) 70(2) 
MLR 225 at 249 
64 
 
section explores the nature of non-commercial sexual activities in order to show how the law 
regulates the nature of commercial sexual activity. 
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Section 2 - The nature of the sexual activities 
 
The second conceptual connector is the nature of the sexual activities.  The law regulating 
non-commercial sexual activity offers the foundation for regulating commercial sexual 
activity where the same restrictions apply but with additional restrictions depending on which 
area of the sex industry is involved.     
The offences in the SOA 2003 depend on the activity being sexual as defined in s78. Section 
78 of the SOA 2003 defines ‘sexual’ as something a ‘reasonable person’ would consider to be 
sexual and this includes (but is not exhaustive) penetration, touching or any other activity 
(my italics).  Thus, the definition is reliant on ‘a reasonable person’ considering the activity 
along with the circumstances and purpose to be sexual. However, the exact nature of the 
sexual activities, other than penetration and touching is not defined, yet deserves more 
attention given that the commercial sex industry can involve a number of sexual acts.  
Criminal law hardly sets any restrictions with regards to the nature of the sexual activities, 
even if historically it did (2.1). Today, the boundaries concern essentially the sexual activities 
with an unwitting partner (2.2), and when the sexual activities may create harm (2.3). I also 
review the approach to sexual activities in the civil law of marriage (2.4) to show how sexual 
activity in the form of consummation is obligatory. 
2.1 The changes of legal and moral attitude toward the nature of the sexual act 
Historically anal and oral intercourse was not permissible at all by law. The prohibition 
shows the interplay between the nature of the act and the third criteria of our framework, the 
purpose of the sexual activities. Indeed, the rationale for prohibiting these forms of sexual 
activity was that it was not conducive to procreation, and therefore the church banned it 
within marriage.  
Oral and anal intercourse were decriminalised first by the SOA 1967, which decriminalised 
homosexuality, then by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, consolidated by the 
66 
 
SOA 2003. The decriminalisation of anal intercourse removes the state interference for 
sexual activities that does not have procreation as the primary purpose. 
Prior to the SOA 1956, ‘there was no specific provision that applied when a man compelled 
his wife to perform acts of bestiality.’224 Section12(1) criminalised a person who committed 
‘buggery with another person or with an animal’ thus the term buggery is employed instead 
of bestiality.  Section 69 of the SOA 2003 modifies the wording of the SOA 1956 as it 
decriminalises buggery with another person. It continues to criminalise sexual activities 
involving an animal with the addition of when a person intentionally performs an act of 
penetration with his penis
225
 in the vagina or anus of a living animal
226
 or if a person 
intentionally causes a human vagina or anus to be penetrated
227
 by the penis of a living 
animal.
228
 The SOA 2003 s69 criminalises sexual activity with an animal but there does not 
appear to be a provision against either penetrating or being penetrated by the penis of a dead 
animal.   
It may be argued that the majority of people probably feel ‘some sort of repulsion at the idea 
of another human enjoying sexual intercourse with a non-human’.229 The criminalisation of 
bestiality was justified because of a lacuna in the law and on morality.  The Home Office in 
Setting the Boundaries noted that ‘that there was no specific provision that applied when a 
man compelled his wife to perform acts of bestiality’230 and morally it was ‘an act that 
offended against the dignity of animals and of people’231  that reflected a ‘profoundly 
disturbed behaviour’232 of which ‘society had a profound abhorrence for this behaviour.’233  
Within the SOA 2003, sexual activity is defined as ‘penetration, touching or any other 
activity
234
 if a reasonable person would consider that
235
 it is because of its nature sexual
236
 or 
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because of its circumstances or purpose is sexual’.237 The statutory definition is thus reliant 
on the jury to act as the ‘reasonable person’ and decide whether the activity is sexual based 
on their perception of the views of modern society. This broad definition of the nature of 
sexual activities rests on the assumption, never stated, that the person is a human being and is 
not dead. If the sexual activities involve a non-human or a corpse, then criminal law reinserts 
some boundaries.   
Necrophilia is the erotic attraction to corpses and is not dependent on a distinction between 
private or public sexual activities. The SOA 2003 s70 criminalises an intentional ‘act of 
penetration with a part of his body or anything else … of a dead person… and the penetration 
is sexual’. The offence precludes any sexual act and certainly prohibits a person from 
penetrating any part of the deceased’s body with his penis, finger or any other object. It is 
understandable that the penetration must be sexual; otherwise autopsies would be 
criminalised and morticians would not be able to embalm the body. However, the SOA 2003 
is not designed to cover situations where a person dies during sexual intercourse. The SOA 
2003 was designed to protect bodies in a mortuary or in situations where the defendant is 
reckless as to whether the body is alive or dead.  
Sexual activities involving the use of objects instead of humans or animals in private is not 
prohibited. The issue is whether the object could cause harm, but the sale and possession of 
objects (sex toys) is not prohibited, as shown in R (Ann Summers) v Jobcentre Plus.
238
  
2.2 Sexual activities involving an unwitting partner.  
Sexual activity involving an unwitting partner is not about touching or penetration. The 
nature of the activity is by means of gaining pleasure from viewing and is therefore 
interconnected with visibility. Voyeurism or ‘flashing’ or ‘peeping’ is not restricted by 
location despite both practices usually being performed in open spaces—the essence is the 
very fact that the complainant is unwitting.  
Until 2003, there was no legislation against voyeurism although it was regarded as nuisance 
under common law where distress had been caused. The law offered no remedy ‘unless the 
proceedings were recorded and could be considered as indecent or obscene material’.239 To 
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resolve this gap in the law, the Home Office Review Panel recommended in ‘Setting the 
Boundaries’240 in 2000 for, ‘a new offence of voyeurism to deal with the observation of 
people without their knowledge or consent when they have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy’.241 Consequently voyeurism became a criminal offence as defined in the SOA 
2003.
242
 Voyeurism in the form of ‘peeping Toms’ is criminalised as opposed to the form of 
voyeurism within a swingers party, where watching sexual activities is as enjoyed by some as 
partaking is for others. The party is held in private and consent to being viewed is given, and 
so the voyeurism within a swingers’ party would be outside the constraints of the SOA 2003.   
The location of voyeurs is irrelevant. Some voyeurs, such as R v Richardson-Blake (2014)
243
 
watch from within a private space. The facts in Richardson-Blake are that the defendant 
planted a hidden camera in the female changing rooms at Abingdon police station. Upon 
pleading guilty to s67 of the SOA 2003, his sentencing was referred to Crown Court where 
Judge Pringle said: ‘This was probably one of the worst abuses of trust that you could 
commit’.244 The comment by Judge Pringle shows how the criminal law is interpreted by the 
courts with the victim’s expectation of privacy at the forefront. The person in the changing 
room had an expectation of privacy and therefore trusted that nobody would spy on her 
getting changed.  Tony Doyle argues that when voyeurism is detected it can ‘do grave harm 
and to that extent should be severely punished’245 but he maintains that ‘perfect voyeurism’, 
where the person being watched is completely unaware, creates no harm.  He suggests that  
privacy belongs to the victim and should act as ‘a shield that can protect [them] from 
embarrassment’246  and although he is arguing that voyeurism before becoming noticed is a 
victimless hobby his argument regarding the shield must apply to all victims.  This thesis 
concentrates on the capacity for autonomy whereas a voyeur uses the victim for his own ends 
disregarding the victim’s autonomy.  Gardner argues that sexual crime diminishes ‘people’s 
                                                 
240
 Ibid 
241
 Home Office ‘Setting the Boundaries’ The Stationery Office, 2000 para 0.22 
242
 Sexual Offences Act 2003 c42 s67 
243
 R v Richardson-Blake Oxford Magistrates' Court (unreported) 3
rd
 March 2014 
244
 Nimmo J, ‘Peeping Tom who filmed women in changing room at Abingdon Police Station sent to jail’  
Oxford Mail (04 April 2014) 
‘http://www.oxfordmail.co.uk/news/yourtown/abingdon/11125907.Peeping_Tom_who_filmed_women_in_chan
ging_room_at_Abingdon_Police_Station_sent_to_jail/ (accessed 09 June 2016) 
245
 Doyle T ‘Privacy and perfect voyeurism’ (2009) Ethics, Information and Technology Volume 11 pp181-189, 
181 
246
 Ibid 181 
69 
 
sense of ease with their living environment’247 and ‘the right to sexual autonomy, the right at 
the centre of … modern [criminal] law.’248 
Another form of sexual activity that involves an unwitting partner is ‘flashing;’ a form of 
‘paraphilia involving exposing one's genitals to a stranger’.249 The modern form of ‘flashing’ 
is reminiscent of R v Sedley (1663),
250
 given that Sedley whilst standing semi-naked on a 
balcony, urinating into bottles and then throwing them at the crowd below, would have had 
also shown his genitals to the crowd below his balcony. The SOA 2003 criminalises anyone 
who intentionally exposes his genitals
251
 and intends for someone to see them and cause them 
alarm or distress.
252
 These two examples, voyeurism and flashing, although reliant on the 
criminal law definition for what is public or visible, also depend on the element that the other 
person involved is unwitting.  
2.3 Criminal law approach to a sexual act potentially involving harm 
John Stannard suggests emotions play a part in the criminal law and that the law is not an 
‘emotion-free’ zone where reason is king.253 The nature of sexual activities, as seen in the 
previous sections, relies on consent, and the consent, according to Stannard may be granted 
because of three types of emotion: fear, hope and love,
254
 or at the very least some kind of 
relationship. The harm caused and thus the level of harm that may occur or feared to occur 
also governs the nature of the activity.  
In the following three cases there was a relationship between the defendant and victim and 
consent was freely given. Yet, in two cases, it was considered that the nature of the act 
consented to, because of the potential harm or actual harm, was not legal. 
Briefly the limitation of criminal law can first be seen in R v Brown
255
 (where a group of 
homosexuals participated in sado-masochistic practices), followed by a relaxation in R v 
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Wilson 
256
(a married couple practice sado-masochist practices) and a ‘step too far’ in R v 
Emmett
257
 (where a heterosexual couple also participated in sado-masochistic practices).  
Brown, the landmark case, limited the level of participatory consensual (homosexual) sado-
masochistic behaviour so that the behaviour does not exceed causing harm above the level of 
assault as per s47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and that such behaviour, 
despite being consensual and in private, was not protected by Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.   
An interesting move happened between Brown and Emmett. In R v Wilson the case consisted 
of a married couple where the husband consensually branded his initials on his wife’s 
buttocks. The courts distinguished Wilson on the grounds that the branding was, for want of 
better words, a loving adornment given from husband to wife and amounted to no more than 
a tattoo. The level of harm was not seen to be as great as that in Brown and the case gave the 
appearance of the courts taking a step back from the strict criteria within Brown. A second 
criticism of the Wilson/Brown cases was that it showed a marked distinction in how the 
courts treat a heterosexual married couple as opposed to a group of homosexual men.
258
 In 
Emmett the male of the unmarried heterosexual couple poured lighter fluid on his fiancée’s 
breasts and set light to it. The result was severe burns to her chest. The courts held that this 
was indeed a step too far and relying on Brown held that these were not acts to which lawful 
consent could be given. In Emmett it can be seen that the courts followed Lord Jauncy and 
Lord Lowry’s dicta in Brown arguing that Emmett went beyond the point where there is a 
realistic risk of injury that is more than trivial or transient. Thus the degree of potential harm 
and unpredictability to injury gave cause for the criminal law to intervene and the line is now 
drawn so that at the level of harm must be below that of Actual Bodily Harm as per s47 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The logic for distinguishing Emmett from Wilson is 
vague, with the Court of Appeal arguing that ‘this was not tattooing’ and ‘it was not 
something which absented pain or dangerousness …’ but in Wilson the branding surely must 
have caused ‘pain or dangerousness.’  The Court of Appeal ruled that it was not ‘in the public 
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interest’ that private activities of married couples should be sanctioned by the criminal law 
and concentrated on the issue of ‘adornment’ as with tattoos instead of the infliction of pain.  
These three cases created a delineation of what is and what is not lawful for a couple to be 
able to consent to.  Suffice to say that any harm that is calculated to interfere with the health 
or comfort of the victim which includes injuries ranging from minor cuts, bruising or a brief 
loss of consciousness to broken teeth or multiple bruising would amount to ABH and as per 
s47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.  
Brown, Wilson and Emmett show how inherently linked consent and nature are, both inside 
and outside of marriage. There is no special defence for sado-masochism, either inside or 
outside marriage, because the risk of allowing people to indulge in consensual sexual torture 
may lead to a situation where sado-masochistic tastes are ‘better satisfied where consent is 
absent’.259 However, this argument, based on the Brown case, is not about what the law is but 
what it ought to be
260
 and clearly represents the fact that the judges did not like or approve of 
such sexual activities for various reasons; the primary one being one of public policy, but 
they failed to answer why public policy should prevent adults of full mental capacity 
consenting to sado-masochistic sexual activity that involves harm.
261
 Nonetheless, the judges 
held that if such activities should sustain serious injury or threatened public interest then the 
criminal law must be invoked and that freedom of (sexual) expression would not offer a good 
enough reason to justify the said harm. Public policy, considering the positive public reaction 
to “50 Shades” may need to be readdressed for issues that involve consensual sado-
masochistic sexual activity.   
One argument against reviewing public policy is that a statutory reversal of Brown would 
render the position of battered people worse than it now is because the abuser could say that 
the victim consented to a higher degree of harm than under the current law, and it would be 
one word against another.  
A second area of harm, and one where the decision is contentious, is the current position 
regarding someone who passes HIV without informing their sexual partner that they carry the 
virus. In R v Dica [2004]
262
 it was held that Dica had inflicted grievous bodily harm under 
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s20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. In Dica the courts distinguishes Brown and 
as Sharon Cowan notes, ‘for entirely the wrong reasons.’263 She notes that Brown was about 
serious violence for sexual gratification whereas in Dica the courts separated the two forms 
of harm by making ‘an explicit assumption’ that passing HIV is a normal risk in normal sex. 
But as Cowan notes the distinction rests ‘on a very traditional, conservative and 
heteronormative view of what sex is really supposed to be about’.264  
People may engage in sexual activities with implied assumptions that if not fulfilled would 
not vitiate consent, but, as in the HIV cases, would inflict GBH.  Furthermore, if the civil law 
of marriage considers that consent to sexual intercourse within marriage does not include 
consent to a risk of harm and on the contrary vitiates the contract of marriage, maybe the 
criminal law could look at the issue of engaging in sexual activities as associated with 
objective conditions such as not engaging in unsafe sex. Conditional consent upon the use of 
condom is already recognised by case law.  In Assange the failure to use a condom was an 
active deception because it was made clear that consent was conditional on the use of a 
condom. The use of condom has two functions: avoiding procreation and avoiding sexually 
transmitted diseases. So the question must be asked: why recognise conditional consent with 
regard to condoms but not when the issue is regarding the question of transmitting HIV.  
Likewise, consent may not be given to BDSM sexual activity where harm may occur, but the 
law does not recognise that consent can be vitiated by sexual activity that could cause death 
by HIV.  As Cowan notes ‘combine this [policy reasons of public health] in the HIV cases,  
[with] the abuse of trust and lack of respect for sexual autonomy …and we may well have a 
stronger case for the criminalisation of Dica (non-consensual violence) than for Brown 
(consensual sex).’265   
2.4 Civil law boundaries on the nature of the sexual activities within marriage 
The legal basis of marriage consists of three elements: consent to marry, the contract of 
marriage and, capacity to consummate the marriage. It is the third aspect that I will engage 
with. Cretney et al. notes: ‘physical capacity is as much a basic requirement as the intellectual 
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capacity to consent to it is’.266 Consummation of marriage is indeed necessary for the 
marriage to be valid, but consummation has a very specific meaning in the civil law regarding 
marriage: it is a particular form of sexual activity. It must be full intercourse, the penis must 
fully enter the vagina, and until 1950, as shown when discussing transgender and same sex 
marriage, the purpose of consummation was no more than a form of encouragement for 
married couples to produce children.
267
   
The absence of full sexual intercourse did not and still does not have a bearing on criminal 
law. There is no criminal offence for not complying with the civil law when applied to 
consummating a marriage. However, the nature of the sexual activities required for a 
marriage to be valid matters for the thesis. First, because the civil law restrictions on the 
nature of the sexual activities do not match those of criminal law, especially with regards to 
rape which is not limited to full intercourse. Second, because the focus on full intercourse for 
the purpose of procreation, allied to the prohibition of sex outside marriage, had the effect of 
making prostitutes outcasts; as prostitutes were considered to be engaging in full intercourse 
for money instead of for procreation. Although prostitution was not illegal, socially the 
prostitute was considered to be breaking the boundaries of society. I explore those themes 
further in Chapter 4, but to do so, I need to establish those civil law boundaries within 
marriage to show the importance of coitus (sexual intercourse) in marriage and why 
intercourse outside marriage equates with the moral repugnance toward prostitution.  
The importance of sexual intercourse within civil law is directly linked to the fact that a 
marriage is void unless consummation (sexual intercourse) takes place after the ceremony 
and if intercourse takes place outside the marriage it provides grounds for divorce, thus 
embracing the moral ideology of heterosexual monogamy.   
Within marriage, legislation through common law states that vaginal penetration must be 
performed in order to consummate the marriage. Thus, non-consummation (no sexual 
intercourse between husband and wife) would be grounds for annulment. The Church and the 
Courts insist on ‘ordinary and complete’268 sexual intercourse, that is the male maintaining an 
erection and fully penetrating the female vagina for a reasonable amount of time
269
 and, 
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although orgasm may be desired, it is not obligatory.
270
  What is evident is that intercourse 
prior to the marriage is deemed irrelevant.
271
  
Consummation should not however be confused with the definition of sexual activities. The 
legal definition of sex is not found within the statutes and case law of marriage. Case law 
gives the definition of what is required to consummate a marriage and both statutes and case 
law also show that sex (meaning intercourse) outside the marriage by one of the partners can 
be used as evidence in order to obtain a divorce.  Although there is no legal definition of what 
sex is within marriage, there are definitions within case law to ascertain what type of sex is 
not permissible within marriage.  
At this juncture it is interesting to note that the courts are satisfied that consummation has 
taken place by the penis being fully inserted into the vagina whereas in a case of rape or 
adultery the mere touch of the penis to the vagina suffices.  With regards to rape, as per s79 
of the SOA 2003, penetration is a continuing act from entry to withdrawal
272
 and that the 
vagina includes the vulva
273
 and therefore the criminal law is satisfied if the penis does not 
enter fully, whereas in civil law to consummate a marriage intercourse must be full, in other 
words the penis must penetrate the vagina fully. 
The emphasis on penile penetration of the vagina is reflected by the State, and in law with 
regards to heterosexual couples but it is silent with regards to same sex couples and lack of 
consummation is not grounds for voiding a same sex marriage.  The Marriage (Same Sex 
Couples) Act 2013
274
(s1(1)) permits same sex couples to marry.   The Government noted that 
by not creating a law insisting on consummation for same sex marriages it would not be 
‘altering the legal position [of annulment] unnecessarily’275 but Herring suggests that ‘It may 
have been that the government felt uncomfortable in defining what amounted to 
consummation within the context of a same sex couple.’276 The Government is equally shy 
when outlining what form of non-marital same sex activity constitutes adultery.   
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The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 states that adultery is ‘only conduct between the 
respondent and a person of the opposite sex’ thereby the courts can ‘coyly look away’277 now 
that the Government has ‘de-sexed’ same sex marriage.278  The ‘de-sexing’ nature can also be 
seen in Chapter 3 where the ‘café culture’ resulted in a proliferation of lap dancing clubs and 
the Government’s reluctance to legalise brothels as shown in Chapter 4. 
This second section has shown that the nature of sexual activities is constrained by the 
criminal law insofar as the level of harm caused and the person is either unwilling or 
unwitting. Consent and nature are interlinked because of the limits placed on consent by the 
very nature and purpose of the sexual activities. The criminal law recognises that consent can 
be vitiated with some levels of harm but when it comes to transmitting sexual diseases, 
consent to engage in the sexual activities is said to include consent to be open to the risk of a 
sexual disease despite the harm that a sexual disease can do.  
The nature of sexual activities is influenced by civil and criminal law.  Civil law provides 
grounds for annulment of marriage if consummation does not occur and criminal law 
provides the boundaries should harm occur.  The nature of sexual activity in marriage is 
linked to the purpose of the activity whereas for sexual activity outside marriage the link 
between nature and purpose plays a different role.  The next section will show how the 
influence of the civil law is reflected in the purpose of the sexual activities.   
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Section 3 – The purpose of non-commercial sexual activity 
 
The purpose of sexual activity is only mentioned once in s76 SOA where there is a 
conclusive presumption if the defendant has deceived the victim as to the nature and purpose 
of the act. There is however no definition and given the constraints put on the interpretation 
of s76 since the presumption is conclusive, the cases seen previously do not offer much help 
in offering a clear understanding of the purpose of sexual activity. 
The purpose overlaps with the nature of sexual activity. Section 2 showed that the purpose of 
non-commercial sexual activity falls into two categories: procreation in section 3.1 and 
“pleasure” meaning non-procreational sexual activity in section 3.2 and as will be shown 
these two categories are not mutually exclusive.  The following chapters will show that the 
purpose of commercial sexual activity include profit whereas the purpose of non-commercial 
sexual activity lays the foundations of the limits of “pleasure” (non-procreational sexual 
activity) for commercial sexual activity. 
3.1 Procreation as the purpose of sexual activity 
As noted earlier, the purpose of sexual activities within marriage per civil law was for the 
consummation of marriage and subsequently for the procreation of children.  The church and 
canon law restricted sexual activity to marriage as a means of having control over sexual 
activity and carnal desire.  Pleasure in sexual activity was to be avoided and the role of sexual 
activity ‘required forethought, deliberation, and conscious reflection’279  in order for 
procreation.   
The purpose of consummation in the 21
st
 Century simply symbolic: it ‘seals the deal’ in 
heterosexual marriage and the symbolism draws a clear demarcation between heterosexual 
marriage and same sex marriages.   The Civil Partnership Act 2004 was drawn up to give 
same-sex couple equality in terms of legal protection for property and financial security and 
the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 amended the Marriage Act 1949 to include same 
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sex couples.  S1(1) clearly states that ‘marriage of same sex couples is lawful’ but makes no 
provision for the legal requirement of consummation.   
Procreation can be said to be a purpose that is exclusive to heterosexual non-commercial 
sexual activity although adoption and surrogacy are available to  same sex couples.  In 
commercial sexual activity procreation is invariably an accidental by-product because the 
primary purpose is profit.   
3.2 Pleasure as the purpose of sexual activity 
It can be shown that the purpose of sexual activity within marriage is also for pleasure. The 
insistence on the use of condoms, as shown in Baxter v Baxter [1948]
280
 was not sufficient to 
classify as a refusal to consummate but coitus interruptus (the withdrawal of the penis from 
the vagina prior to ejaculation) met with conflicting decisions by the courts: In Grimes v 
Grimes [1948]
281
 it was held that consummation required ‘emission’ within one's wife 
whereas two days later in White v White [1948]
282
 the courts held that ejaculation was not to 
be a prerequisite of consummation and again in Cackett v Cackett,
283
coitus interruptus was 
sufficient to consider consummation had taken place. The purpose of non-commercial sexual 
activities is therefore two-fold. It is to procreate and it is for pleasure. 
When the purpose of sexual activities includes pleasure, the nature and the purpose overlap. 
However, if the purpose is to indulge in sado-masochistic practices then such activities are 
restricted by the level of harm caused in the name of public interest.  The public interest 
argument may be distinguished when looking at boxing because boxing follows a strict set of 
rules whereupon a boxer may be criminally liable if it can be shown that the harm caused was 
due to the offending punch being thrown in such a way it breached the rules of boxing. This 
is in contrast to the rules for sado-masochistic sex or an orgy, which are ‘subjugated to the 
passions’284 and therefore are more fluid and would change from sex party to party and also 
between participants. Yet as Nussbaum commented, boxing is an activity ‘in which working-
class people try to survive and flourish by subjecting their bodies to some risk of harm … 
[and there] is a stronger case for …regulation of boxing [because of ] the glorification of 
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violence as [an] example to the young]
285
 but it is in the public interest to criminalise 
consensual sexual activities that may cause an equal or lower level of harm (and by this I do 
not mean breaking noses!). 
 In some instances, the purpose of the sexual activities is to give sexual pleasure to voyeurs or 
to gain sexual pleasure from having sexual activities with random people or group sex. The 
sexual activity that includes voyeurism is often in the form of ‘dogging’ where groups of 
people congregate in their vehicles and perform sexual activities whilst others look on. 
Another activity which is purely for pleasure and not for procreation is masturbation. This 
comes in many forms and may include the use of sex toys or other objects.  
In all of these instances the purpose of the activity is pleasure and not procreation. This is 
also part of the purpose of commercial sexual activities. And similarly to commercial sexual 
activities the actual activity must be private. 
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Section 4 - Visibility  
 
Having discussed the criminal law constraints regarding consent, nature and purpose of non-
commercial sexual activities this section will show that consensual sexual activities also carry 
further restraints in the form of an expectation of privacy. In this instance privacy carries a 
different interpretation than in civil law. In civil law privacy equates to ownership, i.e. private 
property for instance, and as Tony Doyle notes, we have a ‘distinct interest in privacy’ given 
that most of us would choose not to have ‘certain types of information’ made public’286 but 
the criminal law equates privacy to visibility and more importantly the acts that are visible. 
The criminal law only interferes with visible sexual activities if it interferes with the comfort 
of other members of public. 
Historically, the Vagrancy Act 1824
287
 criminalised ‘every Person wilfully, openly, lewdly, 
and obscenely exposing his Person in any Street, Road, or public Highway, or in the View 
thereof, or in any Place of public Resort, with Intent to insult any Female’; and Evans v Ewels 
(1972)
288
 held that ‘his person’ meant penis. 
Today the law still prohibits ‘public’ lewdness and the definition of ‘public’ changes 
depending on the situation. Technically there is no law against nudity or having sexual 
intercourse outside, but there are three areas of legislation that could be relied upon if the 
activity is morally repugnant. The SOA 2003 legislates against exposure (s66) voyeurism 
(s67) and sexual activities in a public toilet (s71). Other acts of indecency that outrage public 
decency are caught by the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  
Exhibitionism would most likely be caught under the Public Order Act 1986 as it prohibits 
any activity which is intentionally ‘threatening, abusive or insulting within the hearing or 
sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress’. Another method of 
limiting the visibility of sexual activities is the Public Space Protection Order, as 
implemented in Birmingham. This order lasts for three years and outlaws public sexual 
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activities.
289
 The sexual activities proscribed are defined in s78 of the SOA 2003
290
 where 
any activity is sexual if a reasonable person
291
 would consider that … its nature is sexual292 or 
because of its circumstances or purpose is sexual.
293
 The required level of alarm or distress 
suffered by an unwitting witness is not mentioned though in the SOA 2003. The purpose of 
such constraints is, as stated in R v Stanley (1965) that society is entitled to a modicum of 
decorum.
294
 But the decorum is a public decorum. The same sexual activities can occur 
without criminal intervention if it is in private. The problem is, as Lord Coleridge noted, 
295
 it 
is difficult to define affirmatively what a public place is. In R v Reakes (1974)
296
 it was held 
that ‘you look at all the surrounding circumstances, the time of night, the nature of the place 
including such matters as lighting and you consider further the likelihood of a third person 
coming upon the scene’.  
Thus, the private space becomes a public space if and when it can be viewed by a third party. 
And the activity within the locus, as noted in R v Crunden (1809),
297
 depends on being in the 
presence of people. McDonald CB held that ‘…the law will not tolerate such an exhibition… 
to corrupt the public morals’. The common law established that an open but private space 
becomes a public space, and therefore a private space frequented or within the sight of the 
public, becomes public if the nature of the act is sexual; there is an unwilling audience; and 
the threshold of public decency is crossed by the onlookers becoming morally outraged.
 298
  
An example of the locus and constraints of public decency was considered in Rose’s Case 
(2006)
299
 where the facts of the case were such that a girl performed oral sex on her boyfriend 
during the early hours of the morning in the foyer of a bank. It was possible for passers-by to 
see in and the foyer was monitored by CCTV. The bank manager saw the act the following 
day when she reviewed the overnight CCTV footage. Although it was a public place, there 
was no evidence that there had been any passers-by. Stanley Burnton J held that the offence 
of outraging public decency had not been committed as it had not been seen by anyone who 
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was not participating in it and there was no evidence of there being any passers-by. The 
sexual act made visible does not necessarily need to involve more than one person. It is a 
criminal offence under the SOA 2003 s66 if the person exposes their genitals with the 
intention of causing alarm or distress.  
Section 66 of the SOA 2003 prohibits any person to intentionally expose their genitals to the 
public (commonly known as ‘flashing’) as opposed to someone who has accidentally exposed 
themselves. It is interesting to see that the police and courts find nudist Stephen Gough 
otherwise known as the ‘Naked Rambler’ as an exhibitionist (or flasher perhaps) when he has 
no intention to shock the public. But for people such as Gough it is also possible that it could 
be a triable offence under common law of creating a public nuisance by ‘outraging public 
decency’300 if the act is considered to be lewd, obscene or disgusting. The level of indecent 
behaviour must go ‘beyond the susceptibilities of, or even shocking, reasonable people’ as 
per Lord Simon in Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v DPP
301
 and the act 
must occur in public, as in Wellard
302
 where the offence occurred in a field where others 
sometimes walked by, but if it is out of sight from the general public as in Walker,
303
 where 
the defendant exposed himself to his daughter and another girl in his own home, this would 
not be ‘in public’ as the general public do not have access and the occurrence happened out 
of view. Deliberate sexual congress or lewd behaviour inside a property but in front of a 
window or other viewable space from the outside also constitutes a public space.
304
  
In such circumstances the publicity requirement is that there must be two or more persons 
present. In Rose no offence was committed because there were not two or more people 
present to witness it. However, an ambiguity was created because in R v Hamilton it was held 
that although there were numerous people present, nobody observed Hamilton’s activities and 
therefore were not offended. The court held that the two-person requirement was that the 
action was capable of two or more persons seeing it. R v F [2010]
305
 has since resolved the 
ambiguity by making the decision that at least two people must be present and were capable 
of seeing the nature of the act and being affected by it. This does not affect the Rose case 
because there were no people present or capable of seeing the nature of the act at the time the 
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act happened. The result would most likely have been different if the sexual activities had 
happened during the day instead of night. 
The voyeur participating in non-consensual voyeurism is subject to s67(1)(b) of the SOA 
2003 where the voyeur ‘knows that the other person does not consent to being observed for 
his sexual gratification’ This section in the Act effectively deals with ‘peeping Toms’ but 
could also be applicable if couples choose to go beyond the realms of privacy and 
deliberately perform sexual acts outside, in spaces where they are likely to be seen by 
passers-by. Arguably acts, such as ‘dogging’, are performed in cars, a private space, and 
usually on private car parks. However, because the spaces are viewable by the public, the 
sexual activities then become prohibited. If the acts are not witnessed by a member of public 
who is morally outraged, then the sexual activity, as with a couple rather than a group, 
offends no-one and is not prohibited. The act of ‘dogging’ clearly shows that it is a mixture of 
location combined with witnesses that causes the tension. Yet s67 of the SOA 2003 requires 
that consent to be viewed is absent and s66 requires that the participant intentionally shows 
their genitals to shock. The difficulty is that ‘doggers’ do neither. Sexual acts that do not 
include groups or viewers are similarly limited by location. Although there is no statute law 
against enjoying sex ‘al fresco’, both cottaging and cruising are prohibited. 
As with heterosexual activities, it is the nature of the act, within the location, that creates the 
prohibition. The nature of the male homosexual act in private is no longer prohibited, and 
homosexuals are treated equal to heterosexuals for the purpose of defining the term public, 
therefore gender is merely irrelevant. It is the behaviour surrounding the act, much like in 
prostitution, that is prohibited. ‘Cruising’, the term used for male homosexuals when looking 
for a sexual partner, happens in open spaces such as parks or heaths, and can be likened to 
‘kerb crawling’ where men look for prostitutes. Both cruising and kerb crawling are 
prohibited by the SOA 2003 s51A as amended by the Policing and Crime Act 2009 s19 
where a person is guilty of the offence of soliciting in a public place, which includes a 
vehicle. Section 16 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 replaced the term ‘prostitute’ with 
‘person’. Therefore, within s16 and 19 of the Policing and Crime Act, a person may not 
persistently, meaning taking place on two or more occasions in any period of three months, 
loiter in any public place for the purposes of obtaining any sexual activities. 
A second area of homosexual acts prohibited by location is ‘cottaging’. The Crown 
Prosecution Service states that the offence was introduced to give adults and children the 
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freedom to use public lavatories for the purpose for which they are designed without the fear 
of being an unwilling witness to overtly sexual behaviour of a kind that most people would 
not expect to be conducted in public.
306
  
To ‘cottage’ per the Dictionary of Slang is ‘to frequent public lavatories for [homosexual] 
sex’.307 Although the SOA 2003 s71 is written in gender neutral form, it is used to prevent 
homosexuals from cottaging.  Cottaging is a different category to cruising; the SOA 2003 s71 
creates the offence for someone to engage in sexual activities in a public toilet. This includes 
within a closed cubicle where a public toilet is considered to be public whether the door of 
the cubicle is open or closed. Closed doors create no expectation of privacy within s71(1)(a) 
as it defines a public lavatory as: ‘to which the public or a section of the public has or is 
permitted to have access, whether in payment or otherwise’. The homosexual sexual activities 
are defined within s71 as ‘sexual if a reasonable person would …consider it to be sexual’.  
By comparison, the regulation of lesbians has followed a different legislative route. 
Lesbianism has never been prohibited and there are no criminal offences against lesbian 
relationships. When lesbianism per se becomes public knowledge the state has no grounds to 
prosecute. This can be seen in Gardner v Gardner (1947)
308
 where the relationship Mrs 
Gardner had with another woman constituted cruelty as grounds for divorce. This case 
brought into the open the lesbian relationship of Mrs Gardner but did not go as far as using 
the relationship as grounds for divorce because there was no prohibition to enforce. 
Nevertheless, any sexual act between two women, as with two men or a heterosexual couple, 
if, when espied by the general public cause’s distress, then that act would fall within the 
purpose for prohibiting public sex. The expectation of privacy, as shown, is reliant on the 
location: ‘al fresco’ sexual activity is not in itself prohibited, but the criminal law puts 
constraints on the activity so that the general public would not see it and be harmed by what 
they see.  
The criminal law also puts constraints on private sexual activities within internal spaces for 
sex clubs and commercial sexual activities. Although I expand further in the relevant 
chapters, a few words, at this stage, are necessary. Comparably ‘swinging’ - the modern term 
for ‘wife swapping’ because the sexual activity is not limited to married couples or indeed to 
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heterosexual couples - was originally a private action. However, swinging is now organised 
in the form of swingers’ clubs that although not considered as part of the sex industry per se, 
are considered to be sex establishments and are licenced by the Local Authority
309
 under the 
Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, and by the Licencing Act 2003 
because alcohol is served in the clubs. The sexual activity in swingers’ clubs therefore 
consists of quasi-commercial sexual activities. There is usually a club membership fee, which 
could, but does not, put swinger’s clubs on par with lap dancing clubs. Nonetheless, swinging 
parties are regulated by the Local Authority and held within a private space which is not open 
to the public, unlike lap dancing venues which are open to the public but because of the 
signage outside the premises the public are aware of what is happening inside. Therefore, as 
with lap dancing venues, there is no risk of accidental viewing by non-consensual viewers. 
This is the thrust of the argument: the sexual activity ‘behind closed doors’ is not viewable by 
others who are not invited, and thus it is permitted. Nevertheless, neither of the two 
regulations protects the swingers from prosecution for being a brothel.
310
 The distinction is 
made if it is a brothel where the sexual activity would be for payment even though it would 
be ‘behind closed doors.’ This begs the question whether there really is a difference; after all, 
swingers often have to pay club fees to belong to the club. Is this not the same as paying for a 
prostitute within a brothel? 
Conclusion 
Although the boundaries have shifted over the years, the criminal law approach to sexual 
activities remains structured with regards to the four interconnected criteria present in the 
SOA 2003.  
Consent is the central requirement for permitted sex, and it may be difficult to establish in 
certain instances because the wording of s74 does not define freedom and choice. 
Circumstances may amount to deception; others may be recognised as forming conditional 
consent to the sexual activities. However, the law pertaining to s74, by leaving to the jury 
much to decide as to what is freedom and what is choice, leaves the door open to subjective 
criteria underlying the understanding of consent or lack of consent. Even if established 
though, consent is not sufficient to render sex permissible.  
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The nature of the sexual act also influences where the boundary must be set, as the act must 
involve living human beings but not animals, and must not harm the participants, although 
what constitutes harm is not as straightforward as it may seem, transmitting a sexual disease 
for example not vitiating consent.  
Furthermore, criminal law differs from the civil law of marriage, as the purpose of the sexual 
activity is irrelevant, unless the purpose is associated with an intent to do the prohibited act 
such as voyeurism. It is the intent that triggers the criminality.  Finally, sexual activities are 
permitted when they are not visible to the outsider. Like all of the three requirements, this last 
condition carries important consequences as to how criminal law approaches the regulation of 
commercial sexual activities. I start by examining the regulation of pornography.  
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Chapter 2 – Pornography 
 
In this chapter I start the analysis of the three main areas of the sex industry, in light of the 
framework established in Chapter 1. Pornography is the most distant form of sexual 
encounter because the performers and film crew who make pornography have no contact with 
the viewer who watches the materials. Pornography is not illegal, but it is regulated. To 
outline how criminal law approaches pornography, I will apply the four concepts of the 
previous chapter, namely consent, nature, purpose and visibility, and discuss how they apply 
to pornography and compare to non-commercial sexual activities.  
The first element to be discussed is consent. In pornography, whilst appreciating that much of 
what is performed in pornographic literature and film can also be performed in non-
commercial relationships, the test is whether the issue of consent goes beyond that of non-
commercial sexual activities. Unlike non-commercial sexual activities that can include wife 
swapping and dogging, pornography cannot exist without an audience; because of the 
commercial aspect, it also needs a management team. Therefore, in this section, consent from 
the viewer as well as from the performers and other members of the pornographic industry 
will be discussed. 
The second element is the nature of pornography. It is here where the meaning of the term 
‘pornography’ and the subsequent test for obscenity is discussed.  The nature of the sexual 
activities within pornography, although contained within the same criminal laws as any 
sexual activities, also has statutes devoted to what may and what may not be produced or 
possessed.  Therefore, the question to be answered is what is different, with respect to the 
criminal law, between the nature of non-commercial and commercial sexual activity and why 
does the criminal law treat it as such?  
Following on from the nature is the purpose of pornography. Unlike non-commercial sexual 
activities, where arousal may promote pleasure and/or procreation, this section looks at the 
purpose of the sexual activities to ascertain whether it has an entirely different raison d’être 
and how criminal law acknowledges the commercial purpose of pornography.   
87 
 
Regarding visibility, this chapter considers the definitions and relationships of privacy 
applied to pornography. In pornographic pictures and films, all sexual activities physically 
exclude the viewer, although it could be argued that the activity is strictly for the delectation 
of the viewer. By its very nature, this form of commercial sexual activity carries no 
expectation of privacy; yet visibility is restricted by law to protect the public. As with non-
commercial sex, it is the viewer whom legislation seeks to protect. Using the foundations set 
within the previous chapter, I demonstrate that the protection has developed in terms of 
content and vulnerability.  
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Section 1 - Consent and pornography  
 
In order to determine whether the issue of consent goes beyond what is required for non-
commercial sexual activities, I must consider first what it is that the persons involved in 
pornography are consenting to and, second, whether the constraints regarding consent are the 
same as those in non-commercial sexual activities.  
Consent within the pornography industry, like for any sexual activities, falls under the 
auspices of the SOA 2003 s74. Consent must be given where a person ‘agrees by choice, and 
has the freedom and capacity to make that choice’. Capacity and age restrictions apply as 
well. Thus, when it comes to age restrictions, the threshold is higher for the performer in 
pornography. The age of consent for non-commercial sexual activities is set at sixteen as per 
s9 SOA 2003 however, the age of consent for commercial sexual activities is set at eighteen 
years of age.   Section 48(1)(i) SOA 2003 states that a child is a person who is under the age 
of eighteen, and s47 criminalises any person from paying for the sexual services of a child or 
for causing, inciting or controlling a child involved in pornography. Furthermore, the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s84 amended the Protection of Children Act 
1978 s1 to include making pornographic photographs as well as distributing or showing them 
and this also includes pseudo-photographs as referenced in s7 Protection of Children Act 
1978 meaning an image, whether made by computer-graphics or otherwise. The pseudo-
photograph (or copy) would be treated as showing a child, notwithstanding that some of the 
physical characteristics are those of an adult. The sentencing may reflect the difference.
311
 
Nevertheless, an offence would be committed as long as the child is under eighteen. 
Therefore, the age of consent is raised from sixteen to eighteen for anyone participating in 
pornography. Any sexual activities involving a child under thirteen, whatever the purpose, 
carries the irrebuttable presumption of lack of consent. Therefore, all participants must be 
adults, that is, over the age of eighteen. 
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The participants in pornography consist of two groups: first, those within the sex industry 
who either perform or produce the pornographic film (or pornographic literature that contains 
no pictures) and secondly, those who look at pornography (the viewers). For the benefit of 
this thesis, the issues surrounding consent are therefore divided into three sections: the 
performers, the producers and the viewer. 
1.2 Consent of the performer(s) 
The performer, who must be eighteen or older, must have the freedom and capacity to be able 
to agree to consent to a) performing the sexual act with other actors, b) being filmed or 
photographed  (thus consent must be between performers and film crew) and c) the resultant 
film being watched by the viewer. Differing from prostitution, the parties to the contract are 
at a remove because the customer pays for the depiction of sexual activities and not the 
physical exchange of sexual activities as in prostitution. Consent does not extend to 
permitting the stage director or crew to indulge in any form of sexual activities with the 
performers. Should this be required then the performers must be free to consent as per s74 of 
the SOA 2003 in the same manner as they would with co-performers. 
Regarding consent with the viewer, the performer has a tacit consensual relationship with the 
viewer. The consent, as with that of the stage crew, is only that the viewer may view. The 
viewer may look at the film or picture, but the performer gives no consent for any physical 
connection. In this instance, unlike the film crew, there is a physical distance between the 
viewer and performer; the viewer only gets to see the celluloid version of the performer. 
With regards to consent for performing and being filmed, the consent of the performers is a 
mix of contractual and non-contractual consent. As part of the contract, they agree to 
participate in sexual activities with the other performer(s) and they consent to being filmed. 
The contract should specify, if necessary, the sexual activities the performer does not want to 
engage in. Hence, any conditional consent would be within the remit of the contract. For 
example, the performer may state that they would not perform intercourse without the use of 
condoms. Violations of those contractual obligations could fall either within the ambit of civil 
law for breach of contract or criminal law for rape as per R v Assange [2011]
312
 and applied  
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in R (on the application of F) v DPP [2013]
313
.   In R(F) v DPP Judge CJ noted that 
‘What Assange underlines is that “choice” is crucial to the issue of “consent”.’314  
Pressure to consent for the performer, because of financial considerations, also relate to the 
fact that most studios do not insist on condoms being worn by the performers.  The financial 
pressure for studios to continue working is surely passed on to the performer which may lead 
to sexual risks taken by the performers as happened in 2010 when a performer tested positive 
for HIV and two pornographic film studios had to be temporarily closed down.
315
  Today 
many studios insist on the performers being tested for STDs (and of course AIDS) once a 
month
316
to prevent the loss of studio time. 
Pornographic film studios may also fall within the scope of criminal law if consent has not 
been obtained in compliance with the rules established by criminal law. The performers must 
be free to consent as per s74 of the SOA 2003 to all legally permissible sexual acts performed 
on and off screen and agreed in contract. In that sense, the commercial purpose of 
pornography does not modify the criminal law restrictions imposed on consent for sexual 
activities as established in Chapter 1. 
However, it should be considered to what extent consent in contract law matches consent in 
criminal law and whether it promotes compliance with the criminal law definition of consent.  
In civil law, if the payment for services are made by freely consenting adults, within the remit 
of the SOA 2003, then, in law the contract is valid and the contract should not be overturned 
because the commodity is sex. Freedom to contract implies that morality is not a valid reason 
for preventing such a contract to be entered into. Many people agree to work in various 
industries because of the financial incentive even if the work is dangerous or unpleasant.   
Provided participation is voluntary by all parties, even if the consent is fiscally driven, s74 
SOA 2003 provides no valid objection to a contract in pornography.  
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However, it is the element of voluntariness that creates concerns. Edlund and Korn may make 
a parallel between women engaging in sex within marriage and those in the sex industry,
317
 
but this parallel does not highlight the fact that some choices are not made as freely as others.  
As Easton argues ‘women’s choices may be condition[ed] by fundamental structural 
inequalities which affect … life chances and earning capacity’. 318  The social inequalities 
form an oppressive social context in which a woman creates an ‘internalised oppression’319 
which frame the decisions based on ‘mistakenly adopted beliefs … that reinforce a position 
of lesser power.’320   
This is not to ignore the fact that marriage is not exempt from structural inequalities, but as 
Easton notes it is the very life choices causing the women who belong to the weakest groups 
of society, through poverty or racism, that the pornographic sex industry exploits.
 321
 When 
arguing that women have a ‘free decision’,322 the sex industry continues to perpetuate gender 
inequality and ‘institutionalising access to women’s bodies’323 and ignores the ‘subordinate 
position of women in the labour market’. 324 Subordination also comes in the form of 
assumption, female performers rarely engage in robust conversations about what she would 
or would not do on camera
325
 which fits with the argument that all prostitution exploits 
women regardless whether the woman consents or not.
326
   
Therefore, there is an issue of freedom to contract but does this issue at civil law translate in 
criminal law terms to an issue of freedom as per s74 SOA 2003? Section 74 states that a 
person, in order to consent, must have ‘the freedom’ to make that choice, but it does not 
define ‘freedom’. The issues raised in Chapter 1 about whether consent exists when outside 
pressure is exercised but does not take the form of physical violence is of particular salience 
for the performers of pornography. I have argued that the concept of freedom to consent in 
s74 is more likely to be interpreted narrowly than broadly even when there could be a 
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demonstrable lack of consent.
327
 The problem with commercial sexual activities like 
pornography is that it brings additional means of pressure specific to the industry that are not 
necessarily present where non-commercial sexual activities are considered and that s74 seems 
unlikely to accept those factors demonstrating lack of consent. Notably, performers may feel 
they have no choice than to accept certain forms of sexual activities or activities without a 
condom, for example, because the industry would refuse to employ them in the future. Thus, 
the SOA 2003 has its shortcomings. Whether this is because s74 may have been drafted with 
primarily non-commercial sexual activities in mind is difficult to assert conclusively yet it is 
an issue that runs throughout the sex industry, beyond pornography, and is particularly acute 
when it comes to prostitution, as shown in Chapter 4. 
1.2 Consent of the pornographers (producers, distributors and film crew) 
The pornographers must consent to viewing the sexual activities that they are in the process 
of filming. The consent could be included within a contract although most employment 
contracts do not need to be in writing to be legally valid. The EmpLoyment Act 2002 makes 
provision for a person in fixed-term employment (for instance the making of the film) should 
be treated no less favourably than employees in permanent employment. The contract, either 
verbally or written, would stipulate that the job requires viewing/filming sexual activities and 
the employee would be obliged to consent before working in the industry.  A tacit consent 
would also arise between the distributors and the film studio because they too are likely to 
view the content of the film.     
1.3 Consent of the viewer 
Consent of the viewer is interlinked with visibility. The viewer must consent to viewing the 
pornographic work but is limited to viewing such works in private. The pornographic images 
are produced with the assumption that the viewer is a consenting adult.   
The similarity between persons watching non-commercial sexual activity (i.e dogging) as 
described in Chapter 1 and the viewer of pornography is that both must consent to viewing. 
Thus, the adult viewer consents to view pornographic material of which the content is of a 
nature that, if viewed accidentally by another person, could corrupt that particular individual.  
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Interestingly there is no statutory age limit to consent for the viewing of ‘soft’ pornographic 
magazines such as ‘Mayfair’ or other ‘top shelf’ magazines that do not breach the Obscene 
Publications Act 1959, Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 as amended by the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, or Coroners and Justice Act 2009. However, by 
convention, the purchaser must be over eighteen and the ‘no sale to under 18s’ rule was 
applied before the SOA 2003. From this it can be deduced that although the law is silent 
regarding the age limit for viewing ‘soft’ pornography, such as the Mayfair magazine, the 
prohibitions set in Chapter 1 are applicable if the sexual image involves sexual activities
328
 or 
if the child is encouraged to view such material by a person, who is in a position of trust.
329
  
A dissimilarity to non-commercial sexual activities is the likelihood that the viewer may not 
be entirely aware of what he is consenting to view, or that the viewing may have an untoward 
consequence such as in R v Coutts [2005]
330
 where it was suggested that the consumption of 
violent pornography had ‘fuelled’ Coutts’ desire to murder Jane Longhurst.   
Nonetheless, the implicit consent by the viewer is given either by the purchase of the material 
or, for online pornography by either a consent button or an ‘over 18’ button which unless this 
is clicked the viewer may not progress. Once the consensual ‘over 18’ button is clicked, the 
nature of pornography becomes obvious to the viewer.   
Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2003 as amended by the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act 2015 criminalises the possession of extreme pornography and 
therefore a viewer cannot consent to viewing such because he/she is prohibited from 
downloading (or purchasing) extreme pornography.  Extreme pornography will be discussed 
further in sections 2.2 (the range of prohibited sexual acts) and 4.4 (constraints on visibility) 
In the following section to understand how the nature of the act equates to pornography, I 
look at the meaning of the word ‘pornography’ and how it relates to the judicial interpretation 
of obscenity.  
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Section 2 - The nature of sexual activities within pornography 
 
Today the two primary statutes regulating pornography are the Obscene Publications Act 
1959 and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 as amended by the Criminal Justice 
and Courts Act 2015.
331
 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 created offences for possessing 
prohibited (sexual) images of children but is not looked at as this thesis does not cover 
offences involving children.   
The Obscene Publications Act 1959 gives a definition of ‘obscenity’ but strictly speaking 
does not define ‘pornography’, the word being absent from the statute. Conversely, s63(3) 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008,
332
 which concerns only extreme pornography, 
describes ‘pornography’ as: ‘an image … of such a nature that it must reasonably be assumed 
to have been produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal’. Therefore, to 
understand the nature of the sexual activities performed by adults within pornography, I first 
consider, in both the literal and legal sense, the meaning of the term ‘pornography’ and 
‘obscenity’ (2.1). I then outline the key aspects of the nature of the sexual activities permitted 
by criminal law with regards to this section of the sex industry (2.2). 
2.1 The meaning of ‘pornography’ and ‘obscene’ 
The word pornography is taken from ancient Greek meaning ‘that which writes about 
prostitutes’ and could usefully be translated as the depictions of prostitutes333 and a 
pornographer someone who specialises in obscene writings.
334
  In England the term 
pornography was not used until 1842 and then only to mean the ‘lower classes of art’.335 A 
modern variant can be recognised in the interview between Shannon Bell and Candida 
Royalle, the Canadian feminist pornographer, who said that ‘pornography [is] like looking at 
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prostitutes. It [is] just another version of prostitution.  Instead of being with a prostitute … 
you look at a prostitute’.336 
By contrast, statute law favoured the word obscene. The legal interpretation of obscenity is 
narrower than the ordinary meaning, which, according to Ormerod, is ‘filthy, lewd or 
disgusting’.337 The Oxford English Dictionary, using the language of law, defines obscene as: 
‘offensively or grossly indecent, lewd; (Law) (of a publication) tending to deprave and 
corrupt those who are likely to read, see, or hear the contents’.338 The word obscene is of 
unknown origin but it is suggested that it stems from the Latin ob meaning ‘in front of’ and 
caenum meaning ‘filth’ in the sense that it is offensive to modesty or decency.339 The modern 
understanding of the word obscene is: ob meaning ‘in front of’ and ‘scene’ referring to the 
theatre stage
340
 or a view.
341
 Thereby defining something obscene as requiring an audience; 
the audience placed ob, in front of, a scene, the means of conveying the lewd or indecent 
depravity.  
The Obscene Publications Act 1857
342
 was the first Act of Parliament to directly legislate 
against obscenity but it gave no precise definition of obscenity and the test for obscenity was 
not laid out until R v Hicklin (1868)
343
 where Lord Cockburn commented: ‘I think the test of 
obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and 
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a 
publication of this sort may fall.’344 From this flows the test of obscenity. If the response to 
the question is ‘yes’ then the material would be declared to be obscene.  
The Hicklin test is not without criticism. It fails to address intention; instead it undermines 
‘the doctrine of mens rea’345 which is essential in any criminal case in order to promote 
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fairness. The Hicklin test ‘was largely ignored at common law’346 and the ordinary meaning 
of the word obscene was applied and ‘the tendency to deprave and corrupt was presumed’.347  
The Obscene Publications Act 1857, which Hicklin interpreted, was updated by the Obscene 
Publications Act 1959 in which s1(1) gives the test of obscenity as: ‘an article shall be 
deemed to be obscene if its effect or (where the article comprises two or more distinct items) 
the effect of any one of its items is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt 
persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the 
matter contained or embodied in it.’348  
DPP v Whyte
349
 established that the test was not based on the individual; instead the 
obscenity must affect a significant number of people. Section 4 provided the defence for the 
defendant to show that the publication was for the ‘public good’ and was ‘in the interests of 
science, literature, art or learning.’  This, in effect, affected the mass-produced materials and 
not the private collection of pornography. As per the Latin translation of the word obscenity, 
the mass-produced material created the stage for the public to view, whereas the private 
collection had no ‘public’ to view and fell outside Whyte and within s4 defence because it 
could be classed as ‘art.’ Ultimately, the interpretation of what is pornographic, the same as 
what is private or public sexual activity, is reliant upon the jury.  
To summarise, Hicklin
350
 provided the test for obscenity, which held that the purveyor must 
ensure that the content does not deprave or corrupt the viewer. It was the subsequent Obscene 
Publications Act 1959 that gave the Hicklin test a statutory footing. The Obscene Publications 
Act 1959 regulates the content in pornography, and the actions of the actors. The statute 
limited the pornographic performance by the test in s1 as to whether their actions would 
deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to view such content. A wide range of sexual 
activities could and can be covered under this definition. To understand what types of sexual 
acts the test captures and how the test fits within the new test implemented by the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008 as amended by Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 
solely for possessing extreme materials, the following section analyses the range of sexual 
acts prohibited. 
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2.2 The range of prohibited sexual acts  
For ease, this thesis divides pornography into four variants: erotica, softcore, hardcore, and 
extreme. Only the latter two potentially meet the obscenity test. There is no legal definition of 
the variants of pornography: erotica, softcore or hardcore. Instead, as this thesis suggests, 
there is a dividing line based on social mores that delineates erotica as being tasteful, the 
relatively harmless (softcore), content that is depraved or perverted (hardcore)  and extreme 
pornography contains material  prohibited by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 
as amended by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. 
 It may be noted that the jury is given the definition of obscenity as found within the Obscene 
Publications Act 1959 and the extent of extreme pornography found within the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008 as amended by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. 
From this yard-stick and the jury’s own moral code, pornography ‘is defined by the efforts to 
regulate’.351 As a result erotica does not expose genitalia in detail and an element of romance 
would be in the story-line. Therefore, it is suggested, erotica can be considered as artistic if it 
has an element of education and/or social awareness as per s4 of the Obscene Publications 
Act where if it cans be shown that the publication of an article is justified in the interests of 
art or learning a person shall not be convicted of an offence.   
 The definition of soft pornography has altered over time.  Prior to the British Board of Film 
Classification v Video Appeals Committee (2008)
352
 nudity was permitted although genitalia 
was covered with pubic hair. Today soft pornography shows genitalia without any pubic hair. 
Soft pornography is the socially acceptable Penthouse or Mayfair magazine and this in itself 
is a huge industry. Merskin argues that softcore pornography ‘typically presents women on 
their own with genitals covered’.353 This is accurate for the cover of the soft porn magazines 
but Mayfair and similar magazines use women with covered genitalia on the front cover, but 
inside show women exposing their (shaven) genitalia. The background lighting is usually 
‘soft and natural and attractive young women are romantically posed’.354 
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Conversely, hard-core pornography is images of sexual activities that fall within the 
boundaries of Obscene Publications Act 1957 and/or Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008 as amended by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. The lighting ‘draws attention 
to the fact that there is a photographer present’,355 which also draws attention to the fact that 
these are public sexual activities. The nature of heterosexual pornography can contain images 
of sexual intercourse between a man and a woman but ‘in contemporary pornographic videos 
anal sex and multiple penetration are common and virtually every sex scene ends with a man 
ejaculating onto a woman’s body’.356 The popular ‘high class’ pornographic magazines, such 
as Playboy now portray activities that would have fallen into the hard-core category given 
that jokes and pictures contain elements such as bondage and other actions that would have 
been considered as perverted by the courts on behalf of the public, as was Lady Chatterley’s 
Lover, the first major prosecution under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 or Kirkups poem 
in the 1970s.
357
 The question for a jury would be whether those sexual acts can be considered 
as obscene. 
The content of pornography is vetted by the British Board of Film Classification (herein 
BBFC) insofar as the Board sets a viewing age restriction or deems it only suitable for 
licenced adult shops. It decides on what is or is not allowed to remain in the film. If the film 
makers fail to comply with the decision of the BBFC, the film makers can be prosecuted 
under the Video Recordings Act 1984.   The sexual acts are subject to the same constraints of 
consent. The activity must be consensual and the actors must have the freedom and capacity 
to be able to consent by choice;
358
 consent must be voluntary and the actors must not be 
submissive or coerced,
359
 nor must they be rendered unable to consent.
360
 As established in 
the previous chapter, consent is a vital ingredient for permissible sexual activities.  
However, consent is not always sufficient. Hardcore materials may reach a threshold where 
the violence is prohibited and cannot be acted, recorded or possessed, even if the performers, 
pornographers and viewers consent.  
                                                 
355
 Merskin D Media, Minorities and Meaning: A critical introduction, (Peter Lang Publishing New York) 
(2011) p197 
356
 Dines G, Jensen B and Russo A, Pornography: The Production and Consumption of Inequality (Routledge 
2013) p63 
357
 See Kearns P ‘Sensational Art and Legal restraint’ New Law Journal (2000) 150 NLJ 1776 who suggests that 
‘art is distinguished from pornography according to its own mode of operating – legal or a matter of taste. 
358
 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s74 
359
 R v Olugboja [1981] 73 Cr App R 344 
360
 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s75 
99 
 
For example, one could argue that multiple penetration (fists in both vagina and anus at the 
same time) cause harm and therefore would breach the Offences against the Person Act 1861, 
given that vaginal ‘bleeding and abrasion’361 is an ‘inevitable’ harm. The performers could 
thus be liable under the Offences against the Person Act 1861, providing the victim 
complains and is in the UK. However, whether the pornographers would be liable under the 
test of deprivation or corruption of minds of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 may prove 
more difficult nowadays.  
In 2012, in R v Peacock,
362
 the Obscene Publications Act 1959 was used to test whether the 
distribution of DVDs containing homosexual activities that included fisting, BDSM and 
staged kidnapping and rape were violating the law. The jury were repeatedly warned not to 
convict on any homophobic disgust and subsequently took two hours to reach a not guilty 
verdict. Thus it was held that the content in Peacock was not capable of depraving or 
corrupting any viewer watching the DVD and referring back to Peacock, if fisting was not 
considered to be capable of depraving or corrupting any viewer, it is likely that the harm 
would be considered low enough to be consensual. That said, as pornography records actions 
performed by live human beings, some prohibitions mirror those established in the SOA 2003 
as analysed in Chapter 1.   
The same objective of mirroring the prohibition of harm between sexual partners for 
pornographic materials was adopted in 2008. Adults are protected subject to the level of harm 
caused by the activity. Sexual activities such as in R v Brown 
363
or R v Emmett
364
 are already 
prohibited by the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008 legislates against possessing materials where the recorded sexual 
activities threaten a person’s life,365 or results, or is likely to result, in serious injury to a 
person’s anus, breasts or genitals.366 The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, 
although primarily to prevent the above kind of injuries witnessed by a viewer, also gives 
additional protection to the performer. 
Before the amendments introduced by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008 did not include images of rape and so performers could 
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perform ‘fake’ rape if the performers consent to such sexual activities. Of course, a pretend or 
staged rape scene fits perfectly within the definition of obscene and could fall within the test 
of the Obscene Publications Act 1959. However, if prevention of harm was the rationale for 
the ban on possessing extreme pornographic materials, then the exclusion of rape scenes, fake 
or not, was at odds with Parliament’s aim. Rape Crisis South London wrote ‘an open letter to 
the Prime Minister on 7th June 2013’ suggesting that s63 of the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008 contained a loophole that failed to cover depictions of simulated 
rape.
367
 Professor Clare McGlynn argued in support of the open letter urging David Cameron, 
the Prime Minister, to close the loophole within the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008, saying that: ‘extreme pornography legislation is in urgent need of reform. The current 
law excludes the vast majority of pornographic images of rape’.368 The Ministry of Justice 
responded to Professor McGlynn by saying that: ‘In setting the threshold at a high level of 
serious violence, I wanted to ensure that what might be called mainstream bondage and sado-
masochist material would not be caught’.369 The Ministry of Justice made a clear delineation 
between ‘real i.e. non-staged, rape of women or men, and also “staged rape” depictions, 
which are clips or pictures where a rape is being “acted out” with the consent of all the 
participants’. The Ministry of Justice argued that to include ‘staged rape’ would require a 
redefinition of pornography or obscenity, something they wished to avoid. This argument was 
weak, because the onus is already placed on the viewer who downloads pornographic 
material containing child or extreme pornography that appears to be realistic and it would not 
have been such a stretch to include staged rape in the definition.   
The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 was a ‘lost opportunity’370 to include within 
its provisions the criminalisation of images of realistic rape scenes.   R v Walsh
371
 highlighted 
the need to ‘shift [the] debate’372 to focus on ‘pornographic images of rape which inexcusably 
remain[ed] beyond the law’.373  The Government, in response ‘based on work carried out … 
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in particular by Professor[s] McGlynn and Rackley…’374 proposed, by way of the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act 2015, to amend s63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 
to include possession of pornographic pictures depicting rape and other non-consensual 
sexual penetration.  The offence within the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 is designed 
‘to break the demand and supply cycle of rape pornography … and to prevent [children and 
vulnerable adults] from becoming desensitized to such acts of violence.
375
  However, how the 
prohibitions for possessing extreme pornography interplay with the prohibitions for creating 
or recording the materials is not clear.  The test for prohibiting the possession of these 
extreme pornographic materials differs from that of the Obscene Publications Act 1959. 
Whereas in the Obscene Publications Act 1959, the effect of the obscene image created must 
‘tend to deprave and corrupt persons who ... read, see or hear’ the obscenity, in the 2008 Act, 
the image possessed only needs to create ‘sexual arousal’. The 2008 definition appears 
morally neutral, focusing on the purpose of the sexual activities for the viewer, rather than on 
whether the image depraves the viewer as in the Obscene Publications Act 2009. Although 
the interplay between the two statutes was not the focus of the case of R v Peacock (2012), 
the decision in Peacock supports such interpretation of the test for pornography in the SOA 
2008. In Peacock, BDSM and staged rape were not considered obscene as per s1 Obscene 
Publications Act 1959. Yet, under the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, it could be 
argued that the materials would be considered as arousing the viewer and thus pornographic 
and thus illegal. The 2008 test seems broader than the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and to 
catch more pornographic materials that were possibly not illegal under the 1959 Act. It also 
allows for catching pornographic materials not where it is produced—since it is often outside 
the jurisdiction of the UK—but where it is consumed. The focus is thus on the consumer, the 
buyer of commercial sex, who is criminalised.   The focus remains within s37 of the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act 2015 which criminalises the possession of pornography that includes 
images of rape that are realistic.  This is an attempt to stop the demand for pornography but 
does nothing to protect the actors within the industry.   
To summarise, although consent is essential to the creation and viewing of pornography, it is 
not sufficient to render all pornographic materials legal. The Obscene Publications Act 1959 
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was devised to protect the viewer by prohibiting pornographic works from becoming public 
and to prosecute the publisher. The two cases Curll and Hicklin also show that obscenity (or 
the modern day term pornography) needs an audience. Curll and Hicklin show that audiences 
need to be protected from becoming depraved and corrupted if their minds are open to such 
immoral influences. Nowadays the Hicklin test, based on cultural understanding of what can 
deprave, is inadequate as illustrated in the case of Peacock where scenes of staged rape and 
BDSM practices were found not to corrupt.  Consent here takes precedence over the 
perceived impact of the sexual activities acted out.  Paradoxically, the apparently neutral 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, with its tests of pornography focusing on the 
purpose of the act (sexual arousal), would capture those materials of which possession is 
prohibited, when the materials possessed mirror a prohibition as to the sexual activities 
established in Chapter 1 (corpse, animal, realistically portrayed harm to a human being).  
Thus, the nature of the sexual activities is restricted by two means: the sexual behaviour 
within the material and the possession of it. The restrictions regarding viewing and 
possession is further discussed later in this chapter in the visibility section. 
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Section 3 - The purpose of pornography 
 
The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 defines pornographic material as being 
‘produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal’ but the purpose goes 
beyond that. The purpose of pornography also includes non-procreational sexual activities i.e. 
for pleasure and profit. This section solely covers the latter. 
The pornographic industry may have become, according to the Independent newspaper, 
‘shrivelled beneath the chill wind of online piracy’376  but it is still a profitable business.  For 
instance, Richard Desmond is said to be worth £1.9billion ‘with money made from 
pornography’377  Pornography therefore is produced ‘solely or principally for the purpose of 
sexual arousal’ in order to make a profit. To maintain profit, the viewing format is altered to 
keep up with the technological changes. Stag films and videos have made way for ‘pay to 
view’ available on both the television and Internet.   
Nevertheless, the financial objective behind pornography is hardly stated in the law. Only s47 
SOA 2003 mentions it, albeit it is about paying for the sexual services of a child and thus 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Per s47(2) ‘“payment” means any financial advantage, 
including the discharge of an obligation to pay or the provision of goods or services 
(including sexual services) gratuitously or at a discount’. This definition is worth mentioning 
because    the explanatory notes to s47(2) mentions situations reminiscent of our discussions 
on consent in section 1 of this chapter. Payment ‘includes the discharge of an obligation to 
pay (for example, B owes A a debt for a car but A agrees to waive the debt if B provides him 
with sexual services) and the provision of goods or services gratuitously or at a discount (for 
example, where A provides drugs to B at no or reduced cost on condition that B provides 
sexual services to A).’378 The situations described can easily be transferable to adults where 
performers, heavily in debt or in need of drugs, would consent to participate in pornography 
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in order to pay their debt or for drugs and to sexual acts to which they may not otherwise 
have participated (for example, unprotected sex). In other words, it is as if the law confronts 
the issue of profit and its impact on consent when a child is involved but remains silent when 
the same situation involves adults. It is not only the age of the performer that makes a 
difference in their ability to make a decision and to consent freely but as with drunken 
consent, it may be time for the law to recognise that certain situations call for the law to state 
what is not permitted. 
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Section 4 – the visibility of pornography 
 
I have shown that pornography requires consent from both the performers and the viewer.  
The consent is for the performer or viewer to participate in, or look at, commercial sexual 
activities that is akin to non-commercial sexual activities in nature.  The pornographers then 
make a profit and the viewer gains sexual satisfaction.  
In this section I demonstrate that the previous sections of this chapter interplay with visibility 
as, by regulating the content, legislation arguably seeks to protect the vulnerable from 
becoming depraved and corrupted from such immoral influences.   
The content, as previously mentioned is prohibited from containing extreme pornography as 
per the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 and regulating all other content falls 
under the auspices of whether the content is obscene, and as noted earlier, the test can be 
found in the Obscene Publications Act 1959, where s1 provides the test of obscenity: if the 
effect of the content, taken as a whole, would be capable of having the tendency to deprave 
and corrupt persons who are likely to read, see or hear the matter contained within. There are 
similarities and differences in regulating the viewing of commercial sexual activities and non-
commercial sexual activities. Both require an audience (or an accidental viewer) but the 
threshold for commercial sexual activities is that the content only needs to tend to deprave 
and the witnesses simply need to be likely to read, see or hear it, whereas for non-commercial 
sexual activities, as noted previously, the level of indecent behaviour must not only go 
‘beyond the susceptibilities of, or even shocking, reasonable people’ as per Knuller,379 it must 
also be intentional. The test for non-commercial sexual activities is whether the activity 
causes moral outrage that is greater than simply being shocked, whereas the test for 
pornography is whether it is likely to deprave and corrupt the public. Therefore, the question 
is, who is it that is likely to be depraved or corrupted? 
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The interpretation of the obscenity test relies on the obscenity ‘corrupting’ the viewer and 
pornography, unlike the sexual activities in Chapter 1, relies on technology, books, 
magazines, photographs, film and Internet. It is the dissemination of these technological tools 
that prompts the government to implement legislation in order to protect the morals of the 
young and vulnerable. 
In R v Reiter [1954] Cockburn CJ argued that: ‘everybody's mind goes to the depraving or 
corrupting of young people into whose hands they may fall. There may be dirty-minded 
elderly people, no doubt, but it is not to be expected that many elderly people would read this 
stuff. Younger people would, however…’   
4.1 Children, pornography and vulnerability 
Today, children under the age of eighteen are still considered to be particularly vulnerable.  
Legislation has been introduced to protect children from both being in a pornographic picture 
and from viewing pornography. The Protection of Children Act 1978 prevents ‘the 
exploitation of children by making indecent photographs of them; and to penalise the 
distribution, showing and advertisement of such indecent photographs’.380   
The SOA 2003 s10 and s17 also protects children from taking part in pornographic films as it 
is an offence to cause or incite a child to engage in sexual activities and the SOA 2003 s12 
and 19 prohibit anyone to cause a child under the age of sixteen to watch pornography.  It is 
also an offence to show or distribute such indecent photographs,
381
 or to possess with a view 
of distributing or showing such indecent photographs
382
 or to publish or cause to be published 
any advertisement of indecent photographs of children.
383
 Section 7 interprets a photograph 
to include an indecent film, a copy of an indecent film and a photograph comprised in a 
film.
384
  A film includes any form of video recording.
385
  
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s62 widened the scope by prohibiting possession of an 
image of a child that is grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise of an obscene character.
386
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These images may include acts, which include intercourse,
387
 oral sex,
388
 masturbation,
389
 or 
penetration (digital or with something).
390
  
4.2 Adults, pornography and vulnerability 
The constraints regarding visibility are designed to protect the viewer. Lord Campbell once 
described the pornography trade in London as: ‘a sale of poison more deadly than prussic 
acid, strychnine or arsenic’391 and the Obscene Publications Act 1857 was the first act to 
directly legislate against obscenity. As Juffer notes, it ‘established the legal precedent for 
protection of the private sphere’,392 in this instance the ‘private sphere’ referred to young 
middle-class women where in reality the “pornography” consisted of the romantic novel’.393 
Today the ‘deadly poison’ comes in the form of extreme and child pornography.   
The vulnerability of adults was further defined in Hicklin as to being those with ‘minds open 
to such immoral influences’ and the attitude that the persons who were more likely to be 
corrupted by such material were young women and easily influenced young men.  However, 
in R v Clayton and Halsey (1963)
394
 there was a distinct shift away from the harm only being 
directed at such a small selection of the populace and where an experienced police officer 
claimed he was ‘not susceptible to depravity or corruption…’395 the Court of Appeal 
disagreed saying: ‘that even a most experienced officer, despite his protestations, was 
susceptible to the influence’ of pornographic material.  Due to the increase in use of the 
Internet, the Court of Appeal held in R v Perrin [2002]
396
 that the content of a web page is 
capable of being the subject of prosecution under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and the 
test of obscenity is for the jury to determine whether the content is likely to corrupt and 
deprave the viewer. Although it remains unclear whether the law still requires obscenity to be 
assessed by reference to the ‘decently brought up young female of fourteen’397 although it is 
most certainly likely that Parliament and the courts consider vulnerability to have shifted to a 
wider audience as adjudged by the jury. 
                                                 
387
 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s62(7) (a) 
388
 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s62(7) (a) 
389
 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s62(7) (c) 
390
 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s62(7) (d) 
391
 Hansard, Vol 145 cc 120_4 HL Bed 11 May 1857 
392
 Juffer J At home with Pornography: Women, Sex and Everyday Life NYU Press (1998) p36 
393
 Ibid 
394
 R v Clayton and Halsey [1963] 1 QB 163 
395
 David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, (12
th
 Ed, Oxford University Press 2008) p 1042 
396
 R v Perrin [2002] EWCA Crim 747 
397
 R.v Martin Secker Warburg Ltd [1954] 2 All E.R. 683 
108 
 
The vulnerability of the audience is indirectly protected by the SOA 2003 prohibiting sexual 
activities with a corpse or an animal and the vulnerability of the unwitting viewer, insofar as 
someone accidentally seeing a film or pictures that is actually being watched  by someone 
else, is protected by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 as amended by the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 by criminalising the possession of extreme 
pornography as discussed in section 2.2 above and 4.4 below. 
The paternal protectionism toward young men (and women) who, as per Hicklin, have ‘minds 
open to such immoral influences’ widened to include people such as experienced police 
officers, as in Clayton and Halsey.  That protectionism is also encapsulated in the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008 as amended by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.   
The two Acts do nothing to protect the workers in the sex industry, but by prohibiting the 
possession of the prohibited material it reduces the risk of men becoming influenced by such 
immorality.  Socio-legal lawyer Anna Carline argues that the regulations regarding permitted 
and non-permitted visibility of pornography is based on morality and not on the levels of 
harm it allegedly protects. Much of the regulation, although promoted as being put there to 
protect women from harm, uses the feminist perspective as ‘a smoke screen to push an 
undebated moral agenda’.398   
4.3 Permitted visibility 
Permitted visibility includes ‘soft’ pornography and erotica. Although the Vagrancy Act 
1824, prohibited every person who wilfully exposed to view in any public place any obscene 
print, picture or other indecent exhibition, the publication of the materials was subject to 
common law.  In the 1800s the most common form of pornography was via published novels 
and pamphlets, and pamphlets were the forerunner to the ‘top shelf’ magazine. Such 
magazines are permitted to be on display, but many newsagents, such as WHSmith,
399
 wrap 
the magazines in ‘modesty bags’ with only the titles showing so as not to offend customers. 
The criminal law is silent regarding private pornography, where pictures or other materials 
are not made available for public perusal, on condition the content is not within s63 to 67 of 
the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 which prohibits possession of extreme 
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pornography. It is when the materials are made for public viewing that the criminal law 
becomes engaged in both the content and the effects of the content on unwary viewers. 
The private collection may contain fisting, BDSM, stage rape and kidnapping because these 
forms of sexual activities are outside the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 and, as 
per R v Peacock [2012],
400
 are deemed not capable of depraving or corrupting any consenting 
viewer.    
Visibility is also permitted under s4 of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 if it is proved that 
the ‘article in question is justified as being for the public good on the ground that it is in the 
interests of science, literature, art or learning, or of other objects of general concern’. This 
means that lecturers can discuss the content of pornographic literature, if it is in context with 
the lecture. Pornographic material is also permitted under the Local Government 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 in a sex cinema regulated as a ‘Sexual Encounter 
Establishment’ and pornographic films are also permitted to be visible, for instance at home, 
if they comply with the BBFC and the viewers are within the viewing age restriction. 
Under Schedule 3 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, a sex 
cinema is: a sex establishment, or sexual encounter establishment, and can consist of any 
premises used ‘to a significant degree for the exhibition of moving pictures…which are … 
intended to stimulate or encourage sexual activity’.401  The pictures may include acts of force 
or restraint
402
 that are associated with sexual activities (BDSM) and portray genital organs, 
urinary and/or excretory functions.
403
  The sex cinema, as with a Sexual Entertainment Venue 
as discussed in the next chapter, is regulated by the Local Authority. 
The cinema, although permitted to show pornography has, as with a Sexual Entertainment 
Venue, limitations regarding visibility from outside.  In other words, the public must not be 
able to see in from the outside, they can only see the film once they have entered the building.  
The Local Authority, by means of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1982 Schedule 3 s13 imposes the rules that the building must have compulsory warning 
notices on the outside of the building at each entrance to the premises clearly stating the 
following: 
                                                 
400
 R v Peacock Southwark Crown Court (unreported) 6
th
 January 2012 
401
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 Schedule 3 s3(1) 
402
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 Schedule 3 s3(1)(a)(ii) 
403
 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 Schedule 3 s3(1)(b) 
110 
 
WARNING 
Persons passing beyond this notice will find material on display which they may consider 
indecent.  
No admittance to persons under 18 years of age. 
 
The signage must be so that the word ‘WARNING’ must appear as a heading and the 
warning notice shall contain only the prescribed words as shown above. This regulation 
imposed by the Local Authority is the same for exotic dancing clubs as shown in the next 
chapter. Some Local Authorities, such as Southend,
404
 also operate a ‘challenge 25’ policy 
where anyone who appears to be under the age of 25 is required to provide proof of being at 
least 18 years of age by means of showing a drivers licence or passport. 
Viewing pornographic films in private is also regulated.  Although not prohibited, viewing is 
constrained by the BBFC who decides the viewing age restriction: either over eighteen for the 
sex cinema or subject to the content, will be given an age limit or R18 (restricted) certificate 
for private viewing.  The Video Recordings Act 1984, amended by the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994,
405
 also catches films containing sexual material
406
 but it is for the 
BBFC to determine the classification of the sexual content.  
A further, but somewhat contentious area of permitted visibility is viewing pornography in 
the workplace. The criminal law is silent regarding watching pornography at work unless it is 
in breach of either the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 or the Coroners and Justice 
Act 2009. To date the only punishment for accessing pornography at work is dismissal, but in 
order to dismiss staff for accessing pornography at work, employers must make it clear 
within the staff handbook or contract what is a prohibited act and what sanctions would 
result.  In Thomas v Hillingdon London Borough Council, [2002]
407
 the staff handbook said 
that accessing pornography would amount to misconduct.  The Employment Appeal Tribunal 
held that the dismissal was unfair because it was misconduct and not ‘gross misconduct’ 
which is actually the behaviour that would be appropriate for dismissal.    
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A second area of contention, which could be connected to viewing pornography in the 
workplace, is the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which allows  data on all personal Internet 
searches, either at home or at work, to be stored for a year by the Internet service provider 
who, along with the police and any security agency would be able to access it at any time.  
The information held would not give a full browsing history, but it would hold the basic 
domain address.  It is possible that employers could use the Investigatory Powers Act 2016  
to implement criminal proceedings against the employee and elevate the ‘misconduct’ to 
‘gross misconduct’ and subsequently the employee could be faced with both termination of 
employment and criminal liability.   
I have shown that there are certain limitations concerning permissible visibility of 
pornography and in the next section I show how visibility is further constrained regarding 
extreme pornography.   
4.4 Constraints on visibility 
Pornography is obscene material conveyed in a format that consists of the written word, 
pictures or actions
408
 and made available to the public. Today pornography is truly portable 
as it is also available through the Internet and can be downloaded onto a moveable device 
such as a laptop. Therefore, the portability of pornography creates the problem that the 
viewing may occur anywhere and there is a greater risk of it being viewed by someone who 
may be corrupted by the content. In Chapter 1 legislation aims to prevent sexual activities 
from being accidentally viewed. Similarly photographs and/or films of sexual activities are 
also prohibited from being shown in such a way.  
The essential difference between the visibility of sexual activities in Chapter 1 and the 
visibility of pornography, is that non-commercial sexual activities must be seen by more than 
one non-consensual viewer who only needs to be morally outraged, whereas for pornographic 
content the test set out in s1 of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 relies on whether it is 
likely ‘to deprave and corrupt persons’  and DPP v Whyte [1972]409 established that it must 
be a significant number of people likely to observe it.   The difference between the exposure 
of non-commercial sexual activities and commercial (pornographic) material starts with 
pornographic materials are mass produced for ‘gain’ and therefore are designed catch a wider 
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audience.  The differing values between the visibility of non-commercial and commercial 
offences was set out in the ‘Human Earrings’ case410 where it was held that there was a clear 
distinction between offences involving corruption of public morals and those involving 
outrange on public decency whether or not public morals are involved.
411
   
The first legislation to constrain visibility in order to prevent the exposure of obscene articles 
was the Vagrancy Act 1824 and amended by the Vagrancy Act 1838 to include legislating 
against exposing the public to indecent prints either on the side of a street or within a shop or 
house. Thus, the exposure of obscene articles became illegal and the offence lay in the 
publishing of such materials.  The offence exposing the public to indecent prints   was 
therefore developed to protect the morals of society from being corrupted by lustful 
desires.
412
 Originally pornography was portrayed either by pictures which were viewed in 
private, or sculptures viewed either in private if small enough to be portable, or publicly and 
consequently legislation had to consider both methods of viewing as well as the content. 
Visibility becomes an issue when, as found in the Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981, ‘any 
indecent matter is publicly displayed.’ Chapter 1 showed us that in criminal law a ‘public’ 
place is where the public have or are permitted to have access, and with regards to 
pornography it is where members of the public cannot avoid seeing the offensive material. I 
have shown that there are exceptions, but within those exceptions, such as a sex cinema, the 
visibility is permitted by consenting adults in such a place where accidental viewing is 
prevented on two counts: one, because of the signage warning the public that offensive 
material can be viewed within the building and two, there are no means of viewing such 
material from the outside.  A person must actually enter the building in order to view the 
pornography.  
 
Today, visibility, or to be more precise, the ability to view, is constrained by the criminal law 
because s63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 creates the offence of 
possessing extreme pornographic images that are grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise 
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of an obscene character.
413
 These may contain images where a person’s life is threatened414 or 
serious injury results to a person’s anus, breasts or genitals,415 or intercourse is performed 
with a human corpse
416
 or an animal (alive or dead).
417
  Section 160 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988 prohibits possession of indecent photographs of children. With the advent of the 
Internet and technology being able to ‘freeze’ and copy single frames from videos, the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s84 amended the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to 
include pseudo-photographs.   
One can see that the allowed and disallowed visibility of pornography is in direct correlation 
with the moral levels of the content. The more morally repugnant, the more ‘deadly 
poisonous’ the content of the pornography the greater the restrictions of the material not only 
being allowed to be disseminated and viewed but also possessed. Therefore, legislating and 
regulating pornography has taken an interesting if not critical journey that has moved from a 
public space: publishing obscene materials, to a more private sphere: possessing obscene 
materials. This is a result of an assessment conducted for the Home Office which concluded 
that there is an ‘existence of some harmful effects from extreme pornography on some who 
access it’. These include the increased risk of developing pro-rape attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviours, and committing sexual offences'.
418
  Although as McGlynn and Rackley
419
 note 
‘… there is no definitive evidence of a causal link between extreme pornography and 
carrying out acts of sexual violence … the harm comes from the promotion of unlawful acts 
of sexual violence’.420 
 
Prior to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 the criminal law was silent regarding 
the possession of adult pornography, instead criminalising the production and distribution of 
any material that was likely to deprave and corrupt the viewer. According to the Government, 
the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 was needed because reform was required to 
protect those who participate and to protect society, ‘particularly children’ from exposure to 
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such material. The fear being it ‘may encourage interest in violent or aberrant sexual 
activity’421 following the murder of Jane Longhurst. The argument that the pornography 
viewed by Coutts prior to killing Jane Longhurst, was causative to the murder was a potent 
argument presented by Jane Longhurst’s mother. Carline argues that ‘to maintain that the 
websites had causal influence gives too much power to such material and also removes the 
agency and, arguably, the blameworthiness of Coutts
422’.  To censor pornography on the basis 
that watching pornography leads to violence ‘will do little to prevent the deaths of women’423 
either in domestic settings or as with Longhurst where the violence is perpetrated by an 
acquaintance.  
But the Government argued that both prostitution (discussed in Chapter 4) and ‘extreme’ 
pornography garner harm and exploit women; stating that ‘there are hundreds of Internet sites 
offering a wide range of material featuring the torture of (mostly female) victims’ who may 
or not notionally or genuinely consented to take part.
424
 Yet the issue was not about consent, 
it was about the harm to women caused by such depictions described as ‘nasty’425 or 
‘abhorrent’.426 The Government was using a false logic to support the moral argument that 
exposure to violent pornography has a causal effect.  
The Government argued that there was a need for a possession offence, and ‘in the absence of 
any convincing empirical evidence’427 other than that based ‘on outdated research’428 
concluded that ‘extreme pornography’ may have a negative impact on some men when 
viewed and consequently implemented the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.  
In truth what the Government was doing by creating the strict liability crime of the 
possession of ‘extreme’ pornographic material, was to shift the focus away from the fact that 
it was a moral reform. In doing this, the Government ostensibly rejected the morality based 
arguments for arguments about potential harm.  However, the end result was the definition of 
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extreme pornography as being ‘grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise obscene’ and 
although being moralistic in tone belies the fact that although staged rape and kidnapping 
were debated during the passage of the Bill, and such content ‘should have no place in our 
society’429 nonetheless violent rape scenes were not included in the SOA 2008. 
Johnson, when talking about s63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act asks ‘how is it 
possible to determine where the limits of social toleration lie’.430 When one looks at the social 
mores and the acceptance of things that once would have given a feeling of ‘disgust’, such as 
Ann Summers shops flourishing in the high street, the question alongside Johnson’s question 
is ‘have I become more or less vulnerable’ since the invention of the Internet?  Although 
prosecutions were rare, the Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981 criminalised the exposure 
of obscene articles by prohibiting ‘any indecent matter [that] is publicly displayed’ and ‘the 
person making the display and any person causing or permitting the display to be made shall 
be guilty of an offence’. The Indecent Displays Act 1981 criminalised the person who 
displays the indecent matter. The advantage of the morally laden Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008 is that it criminalises the person who possesses the material—thus the 
crime remains within the jurisdiction whereas the person who displayed obscene material on 
the Internet may be outside the jurisdiction of the law.  Thus, the two Acts of Parliament are 
put in place to deter demand and therefore stop supply.  This method of preventing demand to 
stop supply can be seen in the way the government regulates prostitution.   The government 
has implemented an abolitionist system similar to the Nordic model where the client is 
criminalised and is discussed in Chapter 4. 
Conclusion 
This section has shown that the criminal law applies to pornography but rather than attracting 
systematic prosecution it is regulated by the BBFC which has the power to ban the film from 
being released in cinema’s or in digital formats. The BBFC scrutinises all films and decides 
what is permissible within the boundaries set by the various means of legislation shown 
above. It also sets a viewing age restriction and for pornographic films issues an R18 
certificate that only permits the film to be shown in special licensed cinemas or supplied to 
adults only in licenced sex shops. 
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 With regard to children, legislation protects all children under the age of sixteen by 
prohibiting pornographic material of children in any format to be produced and the SOA 
2003 s48 sets the age of maturity for a child at eighteen and consequently children are 
prohibited from working in the pornographic industry.   
The Obscene Publications Act 1959 in conjunction with The Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008 protects adults from being depraved by the content. But who are the 
vulnerable adults? The Hicklin test stated that it was ‘those whose minds are open to such 
immoral influences’431 and was prior to the Internet. In R v Clayton and Halsey [1963]432 
Lord Parker’s obiter shows that it is the jury who decides who is the vulnerable person, and 
whether the material is likely to deprave that person.  The Court of Appeal in Perrin held that 
the Obscene Publications Act 1959 is capable of including the content of a web page, and the 
test of obscenity is to be determined by the fact of whether it is likely to corrupt and deprave 
the viewer. This thesis contends that the vulnerability has shifted to a wider audience as 
adjudged by the jury. 
The vulnerability of the audience is further protected by the prohibition of possessing 
materials where actors perform sexual activities involving a corpse, an animal or which 
causes harm to each other as within the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. The 
nature of the sexual activities prohibited indirectly through the possessor of the materials 
rather than the pornographers or performers, mirrors prohibitions criminal law formulated in 
the SOA 2003 and seen in Chapter 1. The test introduced by the 2008 Act though is 
potentially wider than the Hicklin test in the Obscene Publications Act 1959. The case of 
Peacock (2012) shows that images of which possession would be prohibited by the 2008 Act 
are not considered to corrupt a person mind under the Obscene Publications Act 1959. 
Lord Chief Justice Campbell
433
 speaking out against the trade in obscene publications 
argued that the purpose of pornography was to corrupt the minds of young people, 
especially young women.  The statutory interpretation of the resultant Obscene 
Publications Act 1857, the Hicklin test, was broader and defined the purpose to be such 
that would deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral 
influences.   
The purpose of pornography creating sexual arousal belongs to the definition found in s63(3) 
of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 where it states that ‘An image is 
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“pornographic” if it is of such a nature that it must reasonably be assumed to have been 
produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal.’ 
The financial purpose inherent to pornography is hardly stated by the law. Payment is only 
mentioned, insomuch as the SOA 2003 criminalises payment for sexual services of a child 
and the potential use of children for pornography. Yet, payment is at the heart of a debate 
regarding whether consent can be free if fiscally driven.   
Thus criminal law expresses concerns regarding payment for children but shies away from 
the issue for adults involved in pornography, despite some situations of outside pressure 
being very similar if not identical to that of children. The SOA 2003 s43 creates the offence 
of inciting a child to become a prostitute or to be involved in pornography.  The law is silent 
with regards to an adult, this is someone over the age of eighteen, who can be incited to be 
involved in pornography.  Not all women ‘choose’ to perform in pornography, some are 
vulnerable to being incited in the guise of an invitation to perform for money because of her 
social or economic position.    
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Chapter 3 – Adult Live Sex Entertainment 
 
 Following on from pornography, this chapter shows how the criminal law curtails certain 
aspects pertaining to the live sex industry concentrating on: telephone sex, burlesque, strip-
tease, hostess bars, topless waitressing, exotic dancing, and peep shows. Within this section 
exotic dancing includes lap dancing, pole dancing and table dancing. There is little difference 
between the three genres of dancing other than a pole dancer uses a fixed pole and some 
clubs install the pole on a table and the dancer dances around the pole on the table whilst the 
customers sit at the table. Therefore, when discussing the purpose in conjunction with activity 
and space, the generic term exotic dancing will be used.  
This list of adult entertainment is far from exhaustive but the ones chosen shed significant 
light on the key issues the sex industry raises and how criminal law underpins the regulatory 
elements that controls the industry and provides a legal framework for the adult entertainment 
industry. The following areas of regulation are at stake: the sexual activity itself and its 
purpose as shaped by the space existing between performer and viewer, and the physical 
location where the sexual activities takes place. 
Therefore, drawing on Chapters 1 and 2, this chapter shows how criminal law underpins the 
regulatory elements that control the live adult entertainment industry both in relation to: 
consent, the nature of the activity performed, the purpose it aims for, as shaped by the level of 
participation allowed from the viewer, and the visibility both inside the location and the 
actual physical location of these forms. In particular, the concept of Sexual Entertainment 
Venue is looked at, as this 2009 framework constrains the visibility of three of the activities 
studied: burlesque/striptease, lap dancing and peep shows. Each section is sub-divided into 
the different forms of adult entertainment wherever necessary, as outlined in the previous 
paragraphs. 
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Section 1 - Consent 
Like pornography, live adult entertainment is by its very nature public and needs an audience. 
Thus both the performer and the viewer are required to consent in accordance with the SOA 
2003. The definition of consent is consistent with consent established in Chapter 1 where s74 
of the SOA 2003 provides that in all instances consent must be given by both the performer 
and the viewer and each must also have the freedom and capacity to make the choice. Choice, 
as held in R (on the application of F) v The DPP [2013]
434
 must be approached in a ‘broad 
and common sense way’435 and therefore live adult entertainment may not be performed if 
either the performer or viewer either refuses or withdraws consent, and in the knowledge 
that consent may be withdrawn at any time. Therefore, consent must be freely given without 
coercion or deception. Consent cannot be assumed either. For instance, silence is not consent 
as held in R v Olugboja, (1982).
436
 Nevertheless, as with pornography, there is a level of 
implied consent within the live adult entertainment industry. Furthermore, as per s45 of the 
SOA 2003, the participants who consent must be over eighteen years of age. However, this 
age of consent may rise according to the regulation of the venue where live adult 
entertainment takes place.     
This section utilises the elements of the framework by applying them individually to the 
various areas of the Live Sexual Entertainment industry as mentioned above. One area of 
consent that does not need to be treated individually is consent and management. This can be 
treated as a whole. Sex workers in adult live sexual entertainment, as with pornographic 
performers, work with, and for, management. The management also must consent to viewing 
(or listening to telephone sex workers) the sex workers whilst either at work or rehearsing 
for work. The consent, as with pornography, is tacit consent because the consent also forms 
part of the working contract. Similar to the pornographic performer, the fiscal pressure of the 
management teams begs the question whether the consent is truly made with free choice. The 
same comments made as to the suitability of s74 in pornography to deal with freedom to 
consent when payment for sex is conditional, apply to live sexual entertainment.   It is not 
to presume that the performer cannot consent freely, but to ascertain that the law may have to 
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acknowledge the pressures linked with the environment of the sex industry. For the live 
entertainment industry, this issue links with the visibility of the venue, as managers of Sexual 
Entertainment Venues, are under a legal obligation to make the performers and clients 
comply with the ‘no touching’ rule often associated with the additional ‘one metre’ rule. I 
come back to this aspect in section 4.  
1.1 Telephone sex chat lines 
In the context of telephone sex, consent is assumed by the operator, given that her services 
are advertised in such a way as to encourage the caller to contact her specific services. The 
operator may revoke consent should the caller go outside the agreed parameters of the call 
and simply terminate the call. The caller likewise gives assumed consent because he is paying 
for the service and controls the range of conversation. Should the caller mis-dial, the 
conversation would not be a consensual conversation and would be in contravention of the 
Malicious Communications Act 1988, where it is an offence to convey to another person a 
message, which is indecent or grossly offensive. Sex chat calls are also subject to s127 of the 
Communications Act 2003. In DPP v Collins (2006)
437
 it was held that s127 requires proof of 
an intention to send a grossly offensive message and Nick Taylor suggests that someone who 
is making a sex chat line call would have the prerequisite mens rea given that those involved 
would indeed have an intention to exchange obscene or indecent material.
438
 
Although theoretically for telephone sex, as there is no specific venue, age of consent is 
defined in the SOA 2003 only, and thus being sixteen years of age is sufficient to fall outside 
the realm of criminal law. However, most services require payment by credit card and add the 
proviso that all users must be aged over eighteen, given that credit cards are not issued to 
persons under the age of eighteen due to this being the minimum age in the law of contract. 
Should the caller go beyond the agreed parameters of the call, the operator is free to 
disconnect the call. However, if the caller then makes further calls to the operator, either in 
his own name or in assumed names and/or disguised voices, in order to continue the sexually 
explicit conversation, the question is whether the caller would be liable for breach of the 
Malicious Communications Act 1988 as amended by the Criminal and Justice Act 2001. 
Section 1 prohibits any person from sending any communication that conveys ‘a message 
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which is indecent or grossly offensive.’ It would also be in breach of the s39 Criminal Justice 
Act 1988 given that in R v Wilson [1955]
439
 it was held that words could amount to assault 
and in R v Constanza [1997]
440
 it was established that words can amount to assault. The same 
is applied with a mis-dialled call where the caller does not reach a sex line operator, but 
another individual who did not consent to a sexual conversation.  
It is contended that the SOA 2003 should be wide enough to protect the sex chat line operator 
with regards to deception or coercion. In R v Jheeta, [2007]
441
 deception prevents free choice, 
and in Olugboja if coercion leads to acquiescence then consent is vitiated. But, in both cases 
a sexual physical assault occurred whereas for a sex line operator the problem is that no 
physical assault occurs. Section 76 is used as a conclusive presumption for consent as defined 
in s74. However, s76 is designed for breaches of sections 1 to 4 where a physical assault has 
occurred. The argument is that s76 should be made wide enough to encapsulate malicious 
calls to a sex line operator under s76(2)(a) where the caller has been intentionally deceived 
…as to the nature … of the relevant act.  The hypothesis rests on the fact that although s76 is 
written in such a way that it pertains to shared physical activity, and although telephone sex is 
not a shared physical activity, it does consist of a consensual sexually explicit conversation 
between the caller and the sex line operator. Therefore, if the operator has refused consent 
and the defendant is aware of the consent being removed and then goes on to deceive the 
operator as to the nature and purpose of the call, it is suggested that it should fall within s76 
of the SOA 2003.  
1.2 Burlesque and strip-tease 
Strippers and burlesque dancers offer an implied consent. The consent is shown by the dancer 
being on stage and by the customer purchasing the ticket. The stripper can demonstrate 
refusal of consent when she refuses to dance the striptease. The consent is limited to the 
viewer watching the show and it does not include touching. This form of consent is 
conditional consent. The performer does not agree to anything other than being viewed. This 
element of consent, as shown with lap dancers, is now imposed by the Local Authority rules 
under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976.  The dancer has no 
option, but to refuse any form of contact with the viewer.  
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1.3 Hostess bars 
 
The law and circumstances relating to consent are exactly the same for both the hostess and 
the topless waitresses. Although hostesses work in a closer proximity to the viewer than 
telephone sex chat lines, and unlike telephone sex chat lines, the viewer and performer share 
the visual connection within the same physical space, there is no invitation for the viewer to 
have any physical contact. The hostess and topless waitress do not consent to any sexual 
activities other than mild flirting and, due to the nature of the advertising outside the venue, 
for as much of her breasts as on show to be looked at. Both hostesses and topless waitresses 
work in very close proximity to the customer and therefore touching and jostling are 
considered as part of the job. Nevertheless, the touching and jostling must not be sexual in 
nature, it may only be as described by Lord Justice Goff in Collins v Wilcock [1984]
442
 ‘to 
allow for the exigencies of everyday life’. 
Should the viewer inappropriately touch the hostess he would, at the very minimum, be liable 
for the common law offence of battery as shown in Collins v Wilcock, but he could also be 
liable for the offence of sexual assault under s3 of the SOA 2003. Section 3 states that a 
person commits an offence if he intentionally touches another person and the touching is 
sexual and the other person does not consent to the touching. It should be noted that 
inappropriate touching would not necessarily trigger s75 as the circumstances do not fit with 
the criteria unless s75(2)(a) or (b) could be used and, s75(2)(a) is not an unreasonable 
assumption to make. The hostess is scantily clad and the viewer has imbibed alcohol at the 
hostess’ behest and it would not be unreasonable for the hostess to fear violence.   
1.4 Exotic dancing  
As with striptease and burlesque, consent is implied and part of the exotic dancers’ contract. 
The performer is limited by the Local Authorities to providing a conditional consent where 
the ‘one metre rule’ is imposed so there is a minimum of one metre between dancer and 
viewer, and therefore lap/pole dancers give the same consent as strippers: a regulated form of 
consent where the audience may view but not touch, and where none gives consent for any 
physical interchange.  
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Therefore, the issue of consent is complex. The dancer, as with actors in pornography, gives 
contractual consent to dance as part of her employment agreement. She is bound by her 
contract to the ‘no touching’ rule. Consequently, she has no freedom or choice to make the 
decision to consent to any further activity than being viewed by the customer. Many dancers 
breach the rule if giving a ‘private’ dance, but the dancer is then deemed by the Local 
Authority who put in place the ‘no touching’ rule to be acting as a prostitute. The viewer 
consents in one of two ways: either by the purchase of a ticket at the start of the show, the 
same as striptease and burlesque shows that are performed in a theatre, or by the viewer 
paying money incrementally during the performance. With each payment, consent is re-
negotiated by both parties: the performer may refuse to dance and the viewer may forgo 
further payments if he has seen enough of the dance.  Consent is given by exotic dancers on 
the tacit understanding that it is withdrawn the moment the client is unable or unwilling to 
pay for the dance and the consent is limited to the restrictions set by the Local Authority with 
‘the focus being on the body parts of the female’ 443 dancer.  But there are several inherent 
problems with the issue of consent and exotic dancing.  Sir Igor Judge P, in the context of 
voluntary consumption of alcohol and rape, stated that s74 SOA 2003 ‘provides a clear 
definition of consent’444 but as Rook and Ward argue, ‘the concept of “free agreement” is 
capable of wide interpretation’445 and using their example of the ‘penniless employee’ it is 
argued that some exotic dancers do not have the ‘freedom’ to make the choice of giving or 
withdrawing consent.  In Chapter 1 it was noted that s74 does not specifically deal with 
drunken consent, and in this instance, it is contended that s74 also does not specifically deal 
with the issue of economic pressure and consent.  As Elvin notes ‘the statute is silent about 
this issue…’446  The Local Authorities create a situation where consent is limited to 
conditional consent (the no touching rule) but when that condition is broken, either by the 
client groping the dancer or by management (or for financial reasons) insisting, the dancer 
has little or no option but to break the LA rules and give a dance that involves sexual 
touching, it is the dancer who is marginalised.  Marginalisation can also happen when the 
Local Authority either places a complete ban on exotic dance clubs or only allows them in 
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certain ‘zoned’ areas.  Hubbard notes that ‘rights to run businesses or work in sexual 
entertainment are being over-ruled by local decision-making processes’447 and this can result 
in the exotic dancer being put into a far less secure position of having the freedom to 
withdraw consent because exotic dancers are reliant on ‘arm’s length’448 regulation overseen 
by the managers and door staff.   
1.5 Peep shows 
Unlike exotic dancing, early peep shows did not have ‘live’ women; instead the customer 
looked at photographs of women in provocative poses revealed by coin operated 
mutoscoptes.
449
 The mutoscopes were popular side-shows at the seaside and the content was 
titillating, but not obscene; otherwise they would have breached the Obscene Publications 
Act 1857 if, as per the Hicklin test discussed in Chapter Two, it had the capability to deprave 
and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences.  
Progressively, peep shows developed into places where real women were employed. As 
described in Lewstar Ltd and others v Secretary of State for the Environment (1985)
 450
 the 
venues are booths, often with a coin operated shutter, and the customer can look through an 
aperture into a room which is lined with mirrors. Today, as technology has advanced, 
peepshows are also available on television and the Internet. Consent of performers and of 
viewers is similar to lap dancing or striptease clubs. 
To summarise the findings on consent: consent from the viewer or listener is implicit and 
stems from the person entering the premises or making the call. Consent of the performer in 
adult entertainment is part of a contract and from a viewer point of view, is implied by the 
venue where the activity takes place. For striptease, lap dancing and peep show, consent is 
conditional to not being touched, a rule enforced by the Local Authority under the Local 
Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976. Only hostesses are to be touched, but in a 
non-sexual way. For telephone sex, the consent of the performer is implied by the 
advertisement and cannot involve touching by the nature of the phone call.  
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Section 74 of the SOA 2003 does not make any reference to consent given whilst working in 
the sex industry.  For women who work in the industry s74 needs to be more explicit as it 
lacks understanding of how sex workers can be fiscally coerced into consenting.    The 
workers are limited to what they can actually consent to and the next section will show how 
the nature of the sexual activity in each area of adult live sex entertainment differs from each 
other. 
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Section 2 - The Nature of Sexual activities within the Live Sexual 
Entertainment Sphere 
 
The nature or content of the sexual activities is also regulated. The peep show artiste is the 
most graphic, and the burlesque dancer the least. The allowable content of the sexual 
activities for entertainment is related to the expected level of sexual arousal, which is related 
to the level of privacy of the viewer. The viewer of a burlesque dance is not expected (or 
indeed permitted) to reach orgasm, whereas the sex chat line caller and the peepshow viewer 
are.  
2.1 Telephone sex chat lines 
Telephone sex consists of a consensual sexually explicit conversation between the caller and 
the sex line operator. The operator has a guideline script but the experienced operators’ 
repertoire includes many elements of sexual preferences such as sado-macochism or fetishes 
such as a foot fetish. These preferences are not acted out by the sex line operator, and so do 
not fall within the scope of criminal law.  
Flowers argues that modern society is well placed for telephone sex given the answering 
machine, Walkman and computer ‘increase the social as well as physical distance between 
communicating individuals’.451 She argues that this ‘indirect quality of communication 
creates a disembodiment, a distance between communication and self’.452 This disembodied 
connection between the operator and caller gives telephone sex its specificity in comparison 
with pornography. It is indeed dissimilar to pornography insofar as with pornography it is 
visual whereas in telephone sex lines the connection between the customer and the operator is 
only aural. 
The service offered by a sex chat line operator is also distinct from a prostitute’s services, 
despite adverts offering girls who ‘will talk you through to orgasm in a special way’ as 
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argued in Armhouse Lee v Chappel(1996).
453
 In Armhouse Lee v Chappel the Court of 
Appeal (Civil) was faced with the question of whether the contract was unenforceable as a 
matter of public policy because of the illegal nature of the advertisement.  Lord Justice Simon 
Brown argued that telephone sex operators were not prostitutes. He said: 
“For my part I would roundly reject the invitation. Consider the implications. Its acceptance 
would brand as prostitutes not merely these particular telephone women but also, for 
example, strippers. It would also result in many people involved commercially in such 
activities being instantly open to prosecution for living on immoral earnings. I see no warrant 
for any such extension of the criminal law. Rather, in my judgment, a finding of prostitution 
requires at the very least both that the putative prostitute be at some stage in her client's 
presence and that her offer, whether intended to be fulfilled or not, is at any rate of some 
direct physical contact of a sexual nature between them.”454  
However, the sexual content of the call could come under the scope of criminal law if the 
conversation can be heard by unwitting third parties. There is an interplay between the nature 
of the sexual content in the call and the fourth criterion of our framework, visibility. This 
aspect is analysed in section 4 pertaining to visibility.  
2.2 Burlesque and strip-tease 
The performer dances sensually to music whilst removing her clothes, choreographed in such 
a way that the ‘dance’ teases the viewer to want the dancer to take off even more garments; 
the difference between a striptease dancer and a burlesque dancer is that although both dances 
are performed for the titillation of the viewer, the burlesque dancer does not remove all her 
clothing. As the purpose of the activity is to sexually arouse the viewer, the activity is 
considered to be of a sexual nature. 
2.3 Hostess bars and topless waitressing,  
Legitimate hostess bars are largely unaffected by the Policing and Crime Act 2009 provisions 
which give further powers to the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 to 
empower Local Authorities to impose stricter regulations on venues that provide any live 
performance which involves nudity, and nudity can consist of a woman exposing her nipples. 
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Hostess bars, by their very nature, do not provide any form of nudity. However, if the bar 
employs topless waitresses, instead of hostesses, the premises would be regulated by s27 
Policing and Crime Act 2009 providing that the bar employs the waitresses eleven times or 
more per year. This issue is considered in section 4. 
2.4 Exotic dancing,  
Lord Justice Ward in Sutton v Hutchinson (2005)
 455
 said that one could only guess at what 
exactly lap-dancing involves but one could not faithfully describe it. His Honour Judge Purle 
noted in Hindu Religious Association Leamington and Warwick v Warwick District Council 
(2013)
456
 that ‘whatever else goes on in lap dancing establishments, it is not suggested that 
they could fairly be described as red light activities’. This distinction made between lap 
dancing shows and prostitution could be explained by the fact that there is in principle no 
touching between lap dancers and their clients. Indeed, the lap dancer has a restriction 
imposed by the Local Authorities, usually of one metre distance, that neither she nor the 
viewer may encroach. The viewer also has a restriction placed upon him: he must keep his 
hands by his side. Should the performer or viewer breach the one metre rule, then the licence 
holder would be taken to court for the criminal offence of breach of conditions. In some 
instances, if the performer should have intentional physical contact with the viewer, the 
licence holder may have his licence revoked and would also be liable to a fine.
457
 It is rare for 
the dancer to be charged with any criminal liability, as evidenced by R v Bowman where the 
manager was charged with allowing physical contact between the dancers and customers.
458
 
One could argue that Bowman by breaching the regulations had implemented a form of illegal 
self-regulation where, as with the topless waitressed mentioned earlier, the lap dancers are 
also employed as prostitutes offering extra sexual services that involve touching for reward. 
Despite the rules being clear, dancers and councillors both argue that the one metre rule is 
‘virtually unenforceable’,459 which raises in turn the validity of the distinction made by Judge 
Purle in Hindu Religious Association Leamington and Warwick v Warwick District Council 
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in 2013 between prostitution and lap dancing as shown in chapter 4.   Hubbard notes that 
there is ‘an association made between prostitution and lap dancing’460 by the general public 
and lap dancing venues were considered as ‘little better than brothels.’461  When taking a 
closer look at the nature of the sexual activity that occurs in a live sexual entertainment venue 
and the nature of the sexual activity of a prostitute (as discussed in Chapter 4) there is little 
difference and when the one metre rule is broken there is no difference. Hannah notes, the lap 
dance can consist of ‘standard bumps-grinds-shimmy’ moves 462 but as noted by Colosi, ‘lap-
dancers are governed by the house rules created by managers and owners.’463  Following the 
argument set out in the previous section, the nature of the sexual activity is governed by (a 
self-regulated) management.  There is a similarity between a prostitute being controlled by 
her (unregulated) pimp and a lap dancer being controlled by her self-regulated manager/door-
staff.  
2.5 Peep shows 
The performance in a peepshow is more sexually explicit than lap dancing or strip-tease. In 
Willowcell (1995)
464
 the courts noted that the women were naked or semi-naked and 
‘gyrating to loud music while caressing their breasts and vaginas with their hands’.465 The 
level of sexual activities within a dance can also be noted by Smakowski and Another v 
Westminster City Council (1990)
466
 where: women in various states of undress were seen to 
be performing acts which variously consisted of stroking the breasts, and vagina, raising and 
lowering wide open legs showing pubic hair, thrusting buttocks from side to side and visual 
display of breasts, vaginal area and anus. The acts were performed on top of a large bed
467
 
and from the ‘surrounding circumstances revealed by the evidence’468 from the viewers’ 
booth, one would be able to infer that there is sexual stimulation. Furthermore, when 
considering the content of a digitised peep show, in Smakowski the courts held that although 
the purpose was to sexually stimulate the viewer, it was ‘unnecessary to call any viewer to 
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say that he had been stimulated …’ and the provisions set by parliament ‘are plainly aimed at 
the performances and not the results of such performances’. Thus, the viewer is expected, as 
with telephone sex chat lines, to orgasm, and as with telephone sex chat lines, the performer 
is expected to keep the viewer stimulated to a level where he is prepared to pay more in order 
to reach orgasm.  
To summarise, apart from telephone sex, the viewer and performer share the same physical 
space. This shared space however does not translate into sexual activity that involves 
touching between viewer and performer. If a hostess is touched, the touching is likely to be 
considered not sexual as per s78 SOA 2003. For burlesque/striptease, lap dancing and 
peepshows, as well as topless waitresses if employed more than eleven times a year, there is a 
no touching prohibition enforced by the Local Authority, as part of the regulations of Sexual 
Entertainment Venues as shown in section 4 on visibility. 
The no touching prohibition is demonstrated by the space between the performer and viewer, 
and is interrelated with the purpose of the activity, as presented in the next section. 
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Section 3 - The purpose of the sexual activities in Live Sexual 
Entertainment 
Live adult entertainment is a commercial enterprise and has a dual purpose. The primary 
purpose behind all live adult entertainment is money. Live adult entertainment has a price 
attached to it in order for the management and entertainers to make profit.  Parliament does 
not shy away from this. Contrary to the situation for pornography, the Local Government 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 uses language such as ‘a significant degree of selling’ 
and twenty-seven years later Parliament is even more straightforward when it introduced the 
Policing and Crime Act 2009,
469
 which when talking about adult live entertainment in s27 
states that it is for ‘the financial gain of the organiser or the entertainer’ (my emphasis). 
The second purpose, and it is directly linked to the first purpose, is sexual arousal.  However, 
the level of arousal and the subsequent forms of sexual activities expected or possible for the 
viewer depends on the level of participation allowed between the viewer and the performer. 
3.1 Telephone sex chat lines 
Telephone sex chat lines are designed to keep the viewer stimulated to a level where he is 
prepared to pay more in order to reach orgasm, but for the operator this must not happen too 
soon as the number dialled generates money for the phone sex business or the self-employed 
operator. Profit is achieved by calls being routed through a premium rate number that can 
cost ‘typically between 6 pence per minute and £1.53 per minute/call for calls from BT 
landlines (incl. VAT)’.470 Although still popular, it is argued that telephone sex lines are in 
decline because it is now in direct competition with the more modern varieties of 
telecommunication such as the premium rated Internet based ‘Niteflirt’471 or ‘Sexy121’.472  
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The question of the purpose of telephone chat lines was raised in Armhouse Lee Ltd v 
Chappell and Another (1996)
473
 where the Civil Court had to consider whether the telephone 
operators were acting as prostitutes.  Simon Brown LJ distinguished telephone operators from 
prostitutes by noting that the putative prostitute must be, ‘at some stage in her clients 
presence’ and that her offer is of ‘some direct physical contact of a sexual nature between 
them.’  But what if the client has no need for direct physical contact and only wants the 
prostitute to “talk dirty”?  It is likely that the courts would reject the claim based on the dicta 
in Webb
474
 where it was said it does not ‘matter whether the woman masturbates the man or 
vice versa’ the distinction between prostitution and other forms of sex work is that ‘the 
woman has participated bodily in lewd acts for the sexual gratification of men.’  It is the 
bodily participation that prevents other sex workers such as strippers from being ‘branded’475 
as prostitutes and the implication being that it would result in ‘many people involved 
commercially in such activities being instantly open to prosecution for living on immoral 
earnings.’ 
The dicta in Armhouse Lee Ltd  and Webb show that although the purpose of the sex chat line 
operator is the same as a prostitute, to make a profit, the method of achieving that profit is 
different.  The telephone operator has no opportunity of physical contact and to maximise 
profit, the operator of a telephone sex chat line, unlike a prostitute, must neither reject nor 
disappoint a caller.
476
 Instead the operator must interact with the caller and develop an, albeit 
disembodied, intimacy
477
 and ascertain the caller’s fantasies and desires and encourage the 
caller to talk about them. 
 
3.2 Burlesque and strip-tease,  
The purpose of striptease and burlesque dancing is sexual arousal, which is of the same level 
as the hostess viewer. The viewer is expected to watch the show with a certain amount of 
decorum. However, it is doubtful that anyone in the audience would be alarmed or distressed 
if a viewer exceeded the level of decorum, and therefore the criminality connected to 
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disorderly behaviour with a public display of arousal or even masturbation that would breach 
the Public Order Act 1986 s4A(1)(a) is not likely to be reported.  
3.3 Hostess bars and topless waitressing,  
The purpose of a hostess is to encourage the prospective viewer to purchase expensive drinks 
prior to paying for the in-house adult entertainment such as a peepshow. Women who work in 
hostess bars are usually scantily dressed but would not reveal their breasts totally or their 
genitalia. Their activity consists of flirting and exuding the promise of sex, but they must not 
offer any encouragement for the viewer to be sexually aroused. Hostess bars are primarily 
situated in London and became popular due to prostitutes being driven off the streets as a 
result of the Street Offences Act 1959.
478
 However, unlike prostitutes, their role remains 
restricted to encouraging the viewer to pay for and use the other facilities on offer within the 
premises.    
Another area of employment that benefitted from the Street Offences Act 1959 was topless 
waitressing. Topless waitresses are employed in bars and corporate venues. The purpose of a 
topless waitress is to encourage more customers to use the venue and purchase food and 
drinks at an inflated price. To achieve this, a topless waitress wears a short skirt or shorts, 
high heels and nothing else. Their activity is similar to a hostess insofar as she is there to 
provide ‘eye candy’479 by providing a meet and greet service or serving and waiting on 
guests.
480
   
Within the boundaries as defined by traditional criminal law under the SOA 2003, hostesses 
and topless waitresses in bars can promote a sexual atmosphere that Parliament has 
acknowledged. Indeed, for the hostess bars in London regulated by Schedule 3 of the Local 
Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, as amended by s33 of the London Local 
Authorities Act 2007,
481
 a hostess bar is defined as ‘any premises’ where customers are given 
the impression ‘that a performance, entertainment, service, exhibition or other experience of 
sexual nature is available’. 482 Outside the London Borough, they are defined as premises that 
provide, either for a fee or not, companions for customers on the premises,
483
 or give the 
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impression that a service of a sexual nature is available. They are regulated as a sex 
establishment by the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 Schedule 3 in 
the same way as sex cinemas and sex shops. Lord Bridge of Harwich defined sex shops and 
sex cinemas as:  
‘Put shortly sex cinemas are those where sexually stimulating films are shown and sex shops 
those which sell articles in connection with the stimulation of sexual activities’.484  
Therefore, a sex shop is a premises that, as a significant degree of its business, consists of 
selling sex articles for sexual arousal. A sex cinema is a cinema that is ‘used to a significant 
degree for showing of films which are concerned primarily with, or relate to, or are intended 
to stimulate sexual activity’.485 Similarly, there is an expectation of an ‘experience of sexual 
nature’ within an organised swingers club, as mentioned in Chapter 1. Swingers clubs are 
also considered as sex establishments, but the level of regulated sexual activities within a 
swingers club and a hostess bar are vastly different. In swingers clubs touching is permitted, 
indeed sexual intercourse is often the ‘experience of a sexual nature’, whereas within a 
hostess bar touching is prohibited other than in an accidental manner.  
Bars are not the only venues where topless waitresses work. Other adult live entertainment 
venues use topless waitresses in the same way as hostesses. The women are expected to serve 
(expensive) drinks and flirt with the customer in order to get him sexually stimulated enough 
to want to partake in the in-house entertainment, which can be a strip show, lap dancing or 
peepshow.   
3.4 Exotic dancing  
Exotic dancing clubs are identified through the Policing and Crime Act 2009 as ‘a distinct 
form of night life’486 whose purpose is to make a profit by creating sexual arousal. The 
purpose of sexual arousal must be viewed considering the nature of the sexual activities. The 
no touching prohibition is demonstrated by the space between the performer and viewer, but 
may not always be easily enforceable within some Sexual Entertainment Venues where no 
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physical separation exists.  By means of CCTV management can control the dancers ‘which 
in turn affect both dancers and customers within this space.’487  
In order to fulfil the purpose of making a financial profit, exotic dance clubs ‘have different 
organizational cultures based on distinctions made by the perceived social class of customers’ 
and to be able to ‘construct sexuality to be consistent with client class norms’ ‘the stripper 
seduces the customer by manufacturing a believable relationship.’488  The purpose of the 
manufactured relationship is to ensure the customer will pay for more dances because they 
‘feel like they are somehow special or unique.’489  However, as Hubbard notes, there was a 
‘widespread anxiety’ about exotic dancing clubs and the clubs were identified as ‘needing to 
be controlled differently from other licensed premises.’490  
3.5 Peep shows. 
The purpose of the peepshow, as for exotic dancing, is interlinked with the nature of the 
sexual activity.  Thus, the purpose is twofold: to sexually arouse the viewer and get him to 
pay for further arousal to financially profit management.  The viewer pays for the privilege of 
being sexually aroused, but the level of arousal in peepshows is different in nature to 
striptease or lap dancing because the nature of the sexual activities is far more graphic than 
that of the striptease or lap dance. The viewer, watching the peepshow performer using both 
aural and visual stimulation, masturbates to orgasm.  But is the purpose of profit obtained at 
the cost of the human dignity of the dancer?  In Germany it was held peepshows ‘violate the 
dignity of women who voluntarily expose themselves’ but O’Mahony offers an alternative 
view that the peep-show has ‘nothing to do with dignity properly so-called; all that is 
happening is that the right to personal autonomy and self-determination is being restricted, 
and this restriction is being dressed up as a protection for human dignity so as to justify what 
in reality is a decision reached on moral or paternalistic grounds.’491 
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Section 4 - Visibility 
In the live adult entertainment industry, the law chooses to regulate this participation which 
can vary hugely, from an audience distantly engaged as with pornography, to a viewer 
sharing the same physical and visual space as the performer. Breaching these regulations, as 
shown, constitute criminal offences.  
Furthermore, to avoid the accidental onlooker of sexual activities performed in a public 
space, something criminal law forbids as I have shown in Chapter 1, the law regulates the 
physical location of live adult entertainment so that the entertainment is not viewable from 
outside the property where the performance takes place. Should there be a breach of these 
regulations, then criminal law steps in again, although its role differs according to the set of 
regulations at stake. 
The sexual activities within Sexual Entertainment Venues and the space between the 
performer and viewer change in accordance to the purpose of the different types of Sexual 
Entertainment Venue. For instance: telephone sex chat lines operators, similarly to 
prostitutes, do not operate from a venue that is open to the public whereas other venues are.  
Consent put aside, the issue behind live adult entertainment is how legislation permits sexual 
activities within a public space. I have shown in Chapter 1 that criminal law as such does not 
prohibit private sexual activities in a public space, but is concerned with protecting the 
accidental viewer. However, with live adult entertainment, as much as with pornography 
studied in Chapter 2, viewing is rarely an accident, but rather the very objective of the 
activity. Should there thus be any restriction imposed by criminal law? There is no 
criminality in this; indeed, the very act of selling is acknowledged by the law as the purpose 
and considered legal, as I have shown in the previous section. Strictly speaking, criminal law 
does not prohibit anything directly. Live adult entertainment is mainly subjected to regulatory 
requirements and criminal law reappears only if there is a breach of these regulations. There 
are however some significant differences as to the visibility or invisibility requirements, 
according to the activity considered. Telephone sex activities are not regulated as 
hostess/topless waitressing are, and in turn, they both differ from burlesque/striptease, lap 
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dancing and peepshows, the last three being classified as a Sexual Entertainment Venue. 
Therefore, I consider them each individually, before looking at the concept of Sexual 
Entertainment Venue. 
4.1 Telephone sex chat lines 
For telephone sex the restrictions regarding visibility are aimed at the caller and less at the 
operator. Although the caller, with modern technology, is able to make the call from 
anywhere, the operator is confined to working within a building where no eavesdroppers can 
overhear the conversation. The operator is invariably out of sight—either in a call centre or at 
home. Moreover, the operator rarely performs any sexual activities (although it would not be 
prudent to say they never do). Therefore, visibility is not the issue but the likelihood that the 
conversation (as with the caller) would be overheard is. 
Though it is a commercial sexual activity, the caller and the operator agree to a private 
conversation. Telephone sex thus has an expectation of privacy. Therefore, should the sexual 
content of the call be overheard in the middle of a busy street or restaurant, the caller would 
fail the Crunden
492
 test, as shown in Chapter 1, where the public/private locus depended on 
the presence of people. If in addition, it could be shown that the overheard conversation 
caused alarm or distress, then the caller would be in breach of the Public Order Act 1986 
s5(1)(a), which states that a person is guilty of the offence if he ‘uses threatening, abusive or 
insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour within the hearing or sight of a person 
likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby’.   
4.2 Hostess bars and topless waitressing  
The essential difference between a hostess bar and a swingers club is that a swingers club is  
a member’s only club and is not open to the general public; therefore there is a much reduced 
risk of any nudity being viewed by a non-consensual viewer as discussed in Chapter 1. 
Whereas the very nature of a hostess bar is public, it relies on the fact that is it not a club—all 
customers are free to enter during opening hours, and the regulations are set to prevent any 
accidental viewing of nudity or sexual activities. 
The key difference between hostess bars and topless waitress bars are that topless waitressing 
is considered as an activity of an adult sexual nature. The topless waitress must remain within 
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the building and not be in such a position as to be seen from outside so there is no risk that 
the unsuspecting passer-by is likely to be alarmed or distressed, whereas the hostess is often 
‘front of house’ standing just outside the building. This is ironic given the Street Offences 
Act 1959 was implemented precisely to eradicate commercial sexuality from view. However, 
a scantily clad woman would not cause enough alarm or distress to either breach the Street 
Offences Act 1959 or the Public Order Act 1986. Therefore, it is permissible for the hostess 
to stand outside in order to encourage the customer to enter the bar and after spending money 
with her to watch a live adult entertainment such as a strip show. 
Topless waitresses, because they show their breasts, are considered to provide a live display 
of nudity and thus fall within the parameters of s27(2A) (2)(b) of the Policing and Crime Act 
2009 and the concept of Sexual Entertainment Venue. However, s27(2A)(3)(b)(i) states that 
if the relevant entertainment, in this instance topless waitressing, is provided for less than 
eleven occasions within a period of twelve months, then the venue would not require 
regulating by the Policing and Crime Act 2009. Because of the clause within s27, bars often 
limit the use of topless waitresses to less than eleven times a year in order to circumvent the 
stricter regulations set by the Policing and Crime Act 2009. The venue is then regulated by 
the Licensing Act 2003. The Licensing Act 2003 simply delegates the power to Local 
Authorities to issue licences to venues where alcohol is sold or provided. Consequently, it 
would be an offence not to possess a licence to provide or sell alcohol. However, the 
Licencing Act 2003 does not delegate control or regulation to the Local Authority by means 
of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982; thus the bar on the occasions 
that it offers topless waitressing is only licensed through the Licensing Act 2003 and would 
be self-regulating. This is open to abuse and as Sanders and Hardy note, although referring to 
strip clubs:  ‘ [there] is already a detectable unregulated strip scene occurring in London … 
which could lead to the development of a two-tiered system: one which is regulated and the 
other left to self-regulation’.493 Self-regulation, when abused, not only ignores the ‘no 
touching’ rule, but often invites further sexual activities such as prostitution to occur. This 
issue is also considered in Chapter 4. 
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4.3 Burlesque and strip-tease  
A striptease show requires an audience, although this can be an audience of one as per the 
Policing and Crime Act 2009;
494
 but unlike the hostess, the proximity between the performer 
and the viewer is further distanced. The audience is seated in a public space, which is not 
capable of being viewed from outside, whilst the performer is live on stage. There is thus no 
issue of visibility, apart from the rules that govern any visible space within a Sexual 
Entertainment Venue. 
4.4 Exotic dancing  
The performer and viewer share the same physical space, like the strip tease dancer who 
works in bars. The regulation of visibility is through the venue, i.e. the Sexual Entertainment 
Venue. 
4.5 Peep shows 
Unlike other forms of live adult entertainment other than telephone sex chat lines, the viewer 
can communicate with the performer but is physically disconnected from the performer by 
means of a window, or in the case of television and Internet peepshows, a screen. The sexual 
activities within a peepshow are the most sexually explicit of the forms of live adult 
entertainment in this thesis. It is parallel to pornography. And, as with pornography, the 
barrier of either the glass window or physical distance for electronic peepshows prevents any 
further interaction. The more modern version of peep shows is where the performance is 
viewed on a computer screen or television set, which is akin to pornography although the 
viewer is also the director.  
Although performed in a private space, with the viewer also in a private space, the sexual 
activity is open to an audience, which must pay, and is thus public. This is the opposite of 
swingers’ parties as discussed in Chapter 1. Swingers meet in a private space, usually a 
house, and create a public environment. The sexual activities are consensually performed and 
viewed by each other. As with the sexual activities of swingers being seen by an accidental 
viewer, if the kind of entertainment in peep shows be witnessed by any sensitive member of 
the community it would be deemed as lewd and subject to criminal liability either under the 
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common law of outraging public decency or by causing alarm or distress as per the Public 
Order Act 1986. 
4.6 Sexual Entertainment Venues 
From this analysis, it is clear that the three forms of adult live entertainment: striptease, lap 
dancing (including peepshows), and bars employing topless waitresses more than eleven 
times a year, are sexually explicit and aim at sexually arousing the viewer.  
Until 1982, the commercial sex industry in the form of strip shows, lap dancing and 
peepshows, were unlicensed venues and subject to regulation only with regards to traditional 
criminal law and to the selling of alcohol. As noted by the House of Lords in McMonagle v 
Westminster City Council (1990,)
495
 the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1982 intended to introduce other forms of control than that of criminal law: ‘para 3A of Sch 3 
[of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982] is to require any premises 
… where live nude entertainment is provided to be licenced …’. The venues, initially referred 
to as Sex Encounter Establishments, operated under a Public Entertainment Licence, with a 
Special Nudity Provision issued by the Local Authority. If alcohol was served a separate 
liquor licence issued by the local magistrate was also required. The venues were a precursor 
to the Sexual Entertainment Venues introduced by the Local Government (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1986 which replaced the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1982. 
In 2003 the government introduced the Licensing Act 2003 in order to simplify and improve 
the licensing process by replacing the complicated system of regimes for different forms of 
licence, governed by different licensing authorities to a single licensing authority.
496
 This 
regime effectively devolved licensing decisions away from the courts to local councillors. 
The Licensing Act 2003 was intended to promote a ‘café bar’ culture and to encourage more 
diversity in the high street by facilitating the opening of new ‘family friendly’ cafés and café 
bars, thus acting as a means of stopping lager louts brawling.
497
 The Licensing Act 2003 was 
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supposed to be a bold, impressive and modern regime,
498
 stemming from the fact that 
professionals and academics suggested that attitudes were more liberated with regard to 
nudity, so the café culture could also include ‘entertainment’ in the form of venues offering 
lap dancing. What happened was instead of a family friendly café culture, there was a 
proliferation in pole dancing venues in certain towns which, licensed under the Licensing Act 
2003, ‘colonised the British High Street’.499 The level of opposition encountered in its 
implementation demonstrated that the sex industry was not considered the same as other 
types of industry. There was a rising concern among the public and residents began to object 
to clubs. Groups such as ‘Object’ argued that a more rigorous form of regulation of such 
venues should be implemented. Notably lap dancing and pole dancing prompted ‘significant 
policy debate’500 because of the sexual content involved within. The government, and the 
liberal academics, had misjudged the reaction of civil society when lap/pole dancing was 
categorised the same as cafés and bars. Residents started to object to clubs opening using the 
four grounds for objection within the Licensing Act 2003: that it is a proven nuisance, causes 
harm to children, public safety and causes crime and/or disorder. But the Licensing Act 2003 
had no specific provisions to give Local Authorities extra powers to control the live adult 
entertainment clubs.  
Jacqui Smith, the then Home Secretary admitting that the law had been ‘left behind’ said "I 
don't believe lap-dancing clubs fall into the category of mainstream entertainment and 
therefore they shouldn't be regulated in that way either." She then went on to say ‘We will 
give communities a stronger say in stopping lap-dancing clubs opening in their areas’,501 but 
it was not until 2008 that Dr Roberta Blackman-Woods MP, in response to concerns voiced 
by the media and pressure groups such as ‘Object,’ introduced a Private Members Bill. The 
Bill, entitled ‘The Sex Encounter Establishments (Licensing) Bill’ was put before Parliament 
on the basis that ‘at present the law is simply inadequate to deal with lap-dancing club 
issues’502and it ‘appears that too many lap-dancing clubs [were] gaining licences where local 
residents, the police and others deem them to be totally inappropriate’.503  There was no 
criminality involved regarding the sexual activities within the venues. The sexual activities 
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could not be seen by the unsuspecting passer-by and the viewers, by means of purchasing the 
ticket or paying the dancer had tacitly consented to view. Should any of the activity be 
generally viewable then the dancers would be liable for public indecency and obscenity and 
the managers would be liable for permitting indecent displays. The test of decency would 
depend on the viewers and whether or not the exposure was intended as per the SOA 2003 
but the argument was not so much as what could be seen as the proliferation of lap dancing 
clubs, and the seemingly impossibility to prevent further clubs from opening within the 
vicinity. What was needed, according to Blackman-Woods’ supporters were for the venues to 
be considered as sexual activities venues
504
  and not, as the narrative suggested by the media, 
on moralistic grounds of social ‘pornification’.505  
The Sex Encounter Establishments Bill failed for lack of time, despite it being publicly 
supported in the Houses of Parliament. However, the Policing and Crime Act 2009, supported 
by Dr Blackman-Woods MP, addressed some of the concerns. The Policing and Crime Act 
2009 introduced a new definition: the Sexual Entertainment Venue. A Sexual Entertainment 
Venue is any premises in which any live performance or live display of nudity which is 
provided solely or principally for the purpose of sexually stimulating any member of the 
audience. Section 27 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 includes peep shows within the 
definition of a Sexual Entertainment Venue.
506
 
The Policing and Crime Act 2009 extends the powers of Local Authorities to regulate Sexual 
Entertainment Venues by way of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1982. The consolidation of powers to control all forms of sexual entertainment by Local 
Authorities offers an approach that is more suitable to the needs of each locale. This approach 
however, creates inconsistencies in decisions made by each Local Authority. For instance, 
one Local Authority might permit a club to stay open until the early hours of the morning 
whereas another might insist on a midnight curfew.  
Another issue arises as to the enforcement of the ‘no touching’ rule and the ‘one metre’ rule 
set by the Local Authority. Officially, all those involved: performer, client and manager of 
the venue, must comply with the rule. The question is whether the existing mechanisms at 
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law allow for complaints to be formulated, investigated and upheld. The client may not be the 
one complaining, but the performer may have grounds for concerns.  At stake is her ability to 
say ‘no’ to a manager asking for her to take part in sexual activities that would involve 
touching with a client. If the performer cannot complain, in a system similar to that of 
whistle-blowers, she is unlikely to be able to say ‘no’, especially if the threat is to lose her 
job. Her freedom to consent would be diminished, whilst it may be difficult for her to prove 
where the coercion lies. As noted in Chapter 1, it is easier to prove lack of freedom to consent 
when physical violence is exerted than when other forms of implicit threats and violence take 
place. 
Another issue regarding live adult entertainment venues is location: the positioning of the 
venue within any given district, i.e. its impact on the vicinity and integration within its 
environment. The issue is interrelated with that of the advertising of Sexual Entertainment 
Venues. Prior to the implementation of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1982, live adult entertainment often went largely unadvertised and was held in 
workingmen’s clubs thus bringing little attention to either the police or the public. With the 
introduction of licensing in 1982, the practice of advertising clubs either within the vicinity of 
the club or beyond arose. The adverts had to comply with the Indecent Displays (Control) Act 
1981. Although the wording was originally intended specifically for a sex shop, it now 
applies to all sexual entertainment venues and each venue must carry a warning notice, as 
enforced by the Local Authority, that contains the following words, and no others: 
“WARNING Persons passing beyond this notice will find material on display which they 
may consider indecent. No admittance to persons under 18 years of age.” 507  
Section 1(6)(d) of the Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981 states that the notice must be 
situated so that no one could reasonably gain access to the venue without being aware of the 
notice. Should the person who advertised not comply with the legislation, s4 of the Indecent 
Displays (Control) Act 1981 states they may be liable to a summary conviction, although 
they are not likely to have the licence revoked as the Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981 
does not provide for such a penalty, but the Local Authority does have the power to revoke a 
licence under para 17 using the grounds in paragraph 12(3)(a) in Schedule 3 of the Local 
Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982. By restricting advertisement and displays, 
criminal law introduced indirect control on live adult entertainment. The warning notice is in 
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compliance with the minimum age set by the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1982 para 23 Schedule 3, which states a licence holder would be guilty of an offence if 
they permit a person under eighteen years of age to enter the establishment or employs a 
person under the age of eighteen in the business of the establishment. This is not to say that 
the only permitted sign is the warning notice as each venue may advertise the entertainment. 
Adverts in the media such as ‘Learn how to pole dance, step-by-step’508 do not fall within the 
realm of the Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981. This is because the advert is aimed at 
adults (persons over eighteen) and the dancing has been de-sexualised by rebranding it as a 
form of fitness.
509
 Home videos of children ‘twerking’510 posted on public platforms such as 
Facebook or Youtube are also outside the realm of the Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981 
because they fall below the obscene threshold.   
Although such activities do not cause offence and therefore are not considered as obscene, 
they add fuel to the moral complaints
511
 against the ‘pornification’ created by the Sexual 
Entertainment Venues. Nonetheless, Liza Tsaliki notes that schools ‘found it imperative to 
regulate against’ twerking.  But these objections are not applicable for the rejection or 
foreclosure of a Sexual Entertainments Venue licence. The objections must be within strict 
objective criteria set within the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982.  
Arguably, to control the vicinity of the venue on the only grounds of performing sexual 
activities as defined above is at law difficult. Performing sexual activities in striptease clubs, 
lap dancing venues and peepshows is not per se illegal let alone criminal. They would be if 
they were linked with prostitution emanating from the venue, as per the Street Offences Act 
1959, but the statute would not apply if the complaint is just about noise issues such as when 
the viewer leaves the premises late at night and the slamming of car doors. This could 
constitute a statutory nuisance under s79 and 80 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 
which defines noise nuisance as noise emitted from or caused by a vehicle so as to be 
prejudicial to health or a nuisance. In this instance the Local Authority would be under a duty 
to inspect the area and should the authority find that the nuisance is or is likely to be taking 
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place, it must serve an abatement notice. With regard to noise emanating from the venue 
between the hours of 11pm and 7am, s3(b) of the Noise Act 1996 gives additional powers to 
the Local Authority to issue a warning notice to any person who is responsible for the noise 
which is emitted from the dwelling. Section 4 creates the offence where noise exceeds the 
permitted level after service of notice and under s4(3) would be liable to a fine. But it is more 
likely that a certain amount of tolerance would be expected given the venue is in a business 
area.   
Thus, the law does not allow objecting to Sexual Entertainment Venues solely on the grounds 
of the sexual content of the activities. So, when residents or various bodies such as 
‘Object’512  complain on the basis that they do not approve of the activities performed in the 
Sexual Entertainment Venue for the sole reason that the activities are sexual, their objection 
falls outside the scope of reasons to refuse a licence. With regard to the objections petitioned 
by ‘Object’ the reasons are considered as an expression of morals and in the key case R v 
Newcastle upon Tyne City Council [2001],
513
which was concerned directly with paras 
12(3)(c) and (d) of Schedule 3 (as applied, in that case, to ‘sex establishments’ as defined at 
the time) confirmed that although objections could not be based on moral grounds, it would 
also be unlawful for a Local Authority to refuse a licence to a Sexual Entertainments Venue 
based on its own view that such venues should not be allowed at all. Indeed, the Home Office 
‘Sexual Entertainment Venue’ guide for England and Wales incorporates the Newcastle case 
and states: ‘objections should not be based on moral grounds/values and Local Authorities 
should not consider objections that are not relevant to the grounds set out in the Local 
Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982.’514  Surely the very fact that a lap-dancing 
club can be refused a licence because it is within the vicinity of a church is in itself based on 
a moral foundation?  
Therefore a way to restrict the Sexual Entertainment Venue is if the objections can be based 
on the following two grounds within Schedule 3 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1986: the uses to which nearby premises are put and the character of the local 
area.
515
 This may seem very constraining, but the Local Government (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1986 does not make a definition of how nearby the premises must be or what 
constitutes as local. Nonetheless, the objection must show how the venue affects ‘the use to 
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which any premises in the vicinity are put’ or how it can relate to layout, character or 
condition of the premises. There is no explicit provision in Schedule 3 of the Local 
Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1986 for objectors to be heard but a Local 
Authority is under a duty to consider any objections as was held in Quietlynn [1988]
516
 when 
Quietlynn were held to be operating without a licence.  
Furthermore, licences can be refused without an objection being lodged. The Local 
Authorities can refuse further licences if: ‘… the number of sex establishments in the relevant 
locality at the time the application is made is equal to or exceeds the number which the 
authority considers is appropriate for that locality.’517 Many Local Authorities make use of 
this proviso and set the new application limit to nil, which in effect can reduce the number of 
venues to nil should any of the existing ones close. Thus Schedule 3 of the Local Government 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1986 provides the legitimate solution to the objections based 
on moral grounds by the local residents and the Local Authorities can also support the moral 
compass by refusing to grant licences. Another way their objections can be taken into account 
would be if they can prove the licensee violated the conditions of their licence, such as the no 
touch rule imposed by most Local Authorities. But as seen earlier, it is very unlikely this 
would happen, and even if they succeed, and the rule of no touching is enforced, the sexual 
content of the activities would remain. 
Conclusion 
The performers and viewers in live adult entertainment, give tacit consent: the performer by 
her/his very presence and the viewer by paying. The consent given by the performer is 
conditional to the nature of the sexual activities, insofar as it only permits someone to view 
and not to touch.  A ‘no touching’ rule is set out by the Local Authority and should be 
enforced in the premises of the Sexual Entertainment Venue.  
The level of arousal for viewers at lap dancing clubs and the space between the performer and 
viewer is restricted by the Local Authorities as per the Local Government (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1982.  The type of dance is also restricted by the Local Authorities and acts 
of intercourse (or simulated intercourse) are not permitted. This contrasts with Chapter 1 
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where sexual activities can include consensual touching and intercourse, and partially in 
contrast to Chapter 2 where the commercial sexual activities of pornography can and indeed 
does include touching and intercourse between the performers. However, as in pornography, 
there is no physical contact between the performer and viewer but unlike pornography the 
viewer does share the same space.  
Should physical sexual activities occur then the performer is considered to be a prostitute 
instead. Consent may be refused at any time by the performers. Of course, if the performer 
does not consent to being viewed, then the likelihood is that the performer would not receive 
any payment from the employer. How the purpose of the sexual activities to make a profit 
influences the freedom to consent for the performer is hardly explored in law; yet, the 
question arises again when it comes to the enforcement of the ‘no touching’ rule in Sexual 
Entertainment Venue. 
The nature is linked to the purpose: to create sexual arousal for money. The nature, although 
varies in the different types of entertainment, is concomitant to the level of arousal. However, 
the arousal is not intended as a precursor for sexual activities, it is simply a means of making 
a profit by getting the viewer to spend more and more money. Regarding visibility, live adult 
entertainment is public but the space within is quasi-private, insofar as it is a private space 
shielded from unintentional viewers and shared with intentional viewers. Regulation of 
visibility takes place by regulating where the venue can take place and by the warnings a 
venue must comply with to avoid the unwitting viewer.  
In line with protecting the unwitting ‘partner’ as per Chapter 1, each venue must comply with 
the Local Authority to clearly warn the prospective viewer by virtue of the provisions of 
Section 1(6) of the Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981 that the viewer must be over 
eighteen. The Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 also prohibits people 
under eighteen to be admitted to any Sexual Entertainment Venue. Thus, the regulatory 
warning and minimum age requirements must be complied with by the management of each 
venue. The warning must also inform any prospective viewer if they pass the warning sign 
they may find the content indecent. The constraints on visibility are clearly set because of the 
nature of the sexual activities, which, if seen by an unintentional viewer, would certainly be 
deemed as indecent if, as per s66 of the SOA 2003 the performer intended for the viewer to 
see. If the activity is unintentional, then it would fail the common law test as outlined in R v 
Hamilton [2007] where Lord Justice Thomas stated that the act not only had to be lewd, 
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obscene or disgusting but capable of outraging the minimum standards of public decency as 
judged by contemporary society. 
Those constraints on the venue once the venue has been authorised are of lesser importance 
that the constraints put on obtaining the authorisation for a venue. The Local Government 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 by virtue of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 offers a 
more localised approach as to which venue to allow or not. It has effectively decentralised 
regulating sexual entertainment venues. The Policing and Crime Act 2009 also reflects a less 
liberated view than the government had anticipated when it created the special spaces that are 
the Sexual Entertainment Venues. Many Local Authorities now limit the amount of venues to 
be licenced and in some instances are reducing the number to nil. In effect, the moralistic ‘not 
in my back yard’ attitude was legitimised by Schedule 3 of the Local Government 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 by virtue of the Policing and Crime Act 2009. It gave a 
legal voice to complainants against Sexual Entertainment Venues applying to open in areas 
that were once considered by the residents as family areas and therefore free of any sexual 
overtones. The complaint could now be legitimately posited as the venue would be situated 
amidst nearby premises and would not be in character with the local area.   
These influences exercised by the local community in relation to the location, that they 
perceive should be acceptable for legal commercial sex to take place, apply only to Sexual 
Entertainment Venues. Bars that provide strippers or topless waitresses less than eleven times 
a year would not be regulated by the Policing and Crime Act 2009 or the Local Government 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982; instead they would be subject to the Licencing Act 
2003 which does not provide for the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 
to regulate the bars.  This creates a reliance on self-regulation. The concern with self-
regulation is, as shown in Chapter 4, that if the no touching rule is flouted and these venues 
can become a breeding ground for prostitution. 
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Chapter Four – Prostitution 
 
Governments in the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries all refer to prostitution as a ‘problem’, whereas 
other forms of sex work, such as pornography (Chapter 2) and the live entertainment industry 
(Chapter 3), are not presented and regulated as being an issue that needs to be eradicated. 
Thus, the question is by what means is prostitution a problem when compared with other 
parts of the sex industry?  
At this juncture, it is important to remember that partaking in sexual activities for money is of 
itself not a criminal action whichever type of sex work is considered. Furthermore, each area 
within the sex industry, pornography, live sexual entertainment and prostitution, have some 
form of management team to ensure the safety of the sex worker and in return to benefit from 
the money the sex worker generates from the clients. Albeit in prostitution the management is 
unofficial since it is illegal as per s53 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to control prostitution 
for gain. 
Commercial sexual activities discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 contain lewdness but such 
lewdness is not considered as a problem to the government on the understanding it stops short 
of sexual intercourse with the paying customer.   De Munck
518
 defines acts of lewdness as 
being any acts that promote sexual gratification.    
The issue of prostitution is the very fact that the sexual activities paid for are not only lewd 
but there is a likelihood of sexual intercourse. To determine whether prostitution is indeed 
different from the other forms of sex for payment as seen in Chapters 2 and 3, I use the same 
criteria as the previous chapters, namely consent, nature, purpose and visibility. 
With regards to consent I consider whether the definition of consent and rebuttals in the SOA 
2003 apply to prostitutes. The nature of prostitution, the actual sexual activities a prostitute 
engages in, is discussed and compared to both other forms of commercial sexual activities 
and non-commercial activities to demonstrate that there are strong overlaps between them all. 
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Payment also plays a major part in the purpose of prostitution. Lastly, I demonstrate that 
where criminal law intervenes most and sets apart prostitution from other forms of sex work 
is with regards to the visibility, not of the sexual activity itself, but of the behaviours that 
precede the sexual activities and that constitute the act of selling and buying sex.   
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Section 1 - Consent  
 
The first aspect of consent to consider pertains to the individuals involved in the sexual 
activities. The client and the prostitute must consent to the sexual activities in compliance 
with the SOA 2003 s74, where the person ‘agrees by choice, and has the freedom and 
capacity to make that choice’. Capacity and age restrictions apply as well. However, when it 
comes to age restrictions, the threshold is higher for the prostitute and her client. As for 
pornography, instead of the age of consent being set at sixteen, in line with the minimum age 
of marriage, the threshold is eighteen-years old. Section 47 SOA 2003 expressly criminalises 
any person from paying for sexual services of a child who is defined in s48 as being under 
eighteen. Thus the prostitute cannot be under eighteen. Furthermore, any sexual activity, 
whatever the purpose, involving a child under thirteen is an irrebuttable presumption of lack 
of consent. Therefore, all participants must be over the age of eighteen. These age restrictions 
established, there remains to be understood whether consent is provided according to s74 
SOA 2003.  Section 1.1 will therefore address consent with regards to an adult prostitute. 
Moreover, as within pornography and the live entertainment industry, prostitution rarely 
involves just the two persons engaged in the sexual activities: the client and the prostitute. 
Often, there is a third party in the shadows referred to commonly as the ‘pimp’ or ‘madam’. 
A client can engage in sexual activity with a child; nor the pimp can cause or incite a child 
under eighteen ‘to become a prostitute’ according to s48 SOA 2003. However, the 
prohibition goes further than causing a child to enter prostitution. Criminal law also prohibits 
any person to work as a ‘pimp’ and is therefore indifferent as to whether the third party (pimp 
or madam) consented or not to making a profit out of the sexual activities of the prostitute. 
This prohibition sets the manager (pimp or madam) of a prostitute apart from the 
management team present in pornography and in the live entertainment industry. In addition, 
the basis of the prohibition is that the pimp controls the activities of the prostitute and 
consequently criminal law presupposes that the prostitute cannot consent freely if the pimp 
runs the prostitute’s sexual services. In section 1.1.5 as part of the issue of consent for the 
prostitute, I will consider how pimping may influence the prostitutes’ consent. 
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1.1 The prostitute and consent 
The legal presumption was that consent was permanent because a prostitute ‘offered her body 
commonly for lewdness for payment in return’519 and so she could not be raped.  This 
specific position, established at common law, was removed in 2004 but despite the 
disappearance of this presumption to consent for the future, difficulties remain as to how a 
prostitute can consent freely. 
1.1.1 The presumption of permanent consent for all future sexual acts until 2004  
Sir William Blackstone
520
 suggested in the ‘Commentaries on the Laws of England’ that 
prostitutes have, in theory, the same legal protection as any other woman with regards to non-
consensual sexual activities. However, criminal law in practice did not reflect Blackstone’s 
commentary. 
Evidence of ‘loose character’ 521 or prostitution was admissible in court to show the ‘general 
character’ of the prosecutrix and again in R v Bashir and Manzur (1969)522 where it was held 
that ‘there is a difference between the woman who has acts of sexual intercourse with men 
and a prostitute who regularly sells her body’.523  As Barbara Sullivan524 suggested, 
prostitutes  were seen at law as ‘commonly available to men, as always consenting to sexual 
activity and thus, as not able to be raped’.525   
The bias extended to assessing whether prostitutes could suffer trauma, and again a clear 
distinction was made.   In R v Shaw (1997)
526
 the trial judge said that ‘intercourse was not as 
traumatic to the [prostitute] as to most victims raped by strangers’.  The argument that 
prostitutes are not like other women or not like any other sex worker, still resonates. 
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Professor Wertheimer uses similar language to that of Shaw when he argues ‘… the rape of a 
prostitute is less likely to cause PTSD than the rape of a non-prostitute …’527  
The dicta in White
528
  by removing the presumption that a prostitute could not withdraw 
consent offers a welcome change of attitude by noting that ‘It should today be a simple 
commonplace that a prostitute is as much entitled to say no as any other woman… [and a 
woman who] is or was a prostitute is no reason on its own to suppose that she might have 
been any more ready than the next woman to say yes’.529 Criminal law at last is applied 
without introducing an additional criterion. Consent by a prostitute must be given by the 
prostitute for each transaction; it cannot be presumed to have been given prior to the 
transaction on the sole basis that a prostitute has regular encounters with various men in 
exchange for payment. 
1.1.2 Consent beyond the now abolished presumption  
A prostitutes’ consent, as for other forms of commercial sex, is contractual. Theoretically, she 
has the opportunity prior to any sexual activities to simply walk away from the job should it 
contain any element that she does not want included. The difference between a performer or 
dancer and a prostitute is that it can be argued that contract law partially protects the 
performers; whereas, because pimping is criminalised, there is no civil law protection. The 
similarity here is of course that should the actress or prostitute deny consent then they would 
not get paid. But the performer is free to deny or withdraw consent given that she is in a 
‘safe’ working environment. In that sense, the prostitute can be said to be in a far more 
precarious position when refusing consent. 
Section 74 of the SOA 2003 is supposed to protect all persons engaging in any form of sexual 
activities. The definitions of rape and sexual assault in the SOA 2003 are dependent on the 
lack of consent by the victim and do not incorporate any reference, implied or explicit, to the 
context of prostitution. Rape is about a woman not consenting to sexual intercourse, and 
assault is about a woman not consenting to be touched. Whether she is a prostitute or not is, 
in black letter law, irrelevant. However, difficulties of interpretation of s74, notably freedom 
and capacity of a prostitute to consent, remain. The debate focuses on whether payment 
vitiates the prostitutes’ consent and the next section (1.1.3) will further elaborate on the 
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following issue: whether a prostitute can consent against payment noting that the argument is 
hardly made with regards to other sex workers, and some academics consider that the 
prostitute cannot consent against payment.   
1.1.3 The academic discourse on prostitutes’ capacity and freedom to consent 
The academic discourse regarding consent and prostitution is complex and ranges from those 
who take the view that prostitutes cannot consent
530
 to an approach
531
 in which consent 
means the same whether it is for commercial or non-commercial sexual activity.
532
 The 
question of whether ‘liberated western whores who are free to choose their profession’533 are 
also free to choose whether to consent depends on the political position of the author.   
Radical feminists Dworkin
534
 and MacKinnon
535
, argue that prostitutes cannot consent 
because sex is equated with male power.   Through patriarchal oppression female sexuality 
becomes both objectified and commodified, thus, no woman can give consent because the 
consent itself is nothing more than a product of a patriarchal society. The government does 
not quite echo this argument but MP Fiona MacTaggart relates to it, in a Parliamentary 
debate, by making the comment that prostitution would ‘destroy human relations and create a 
grossly unequal society’.536   Dworkin, MacKinnon and MacTaggart see the social contexts in 
which prostitution takes place as  ‘reducing the degree to which women … may be seen [to 
be]freely consenting.’537  But Sutherland argues that ‘changing ideas about sex can change 
sex itself and with it the balance of power in society’.538 This position eschews the arguments 
supported by government which argues that prostitution ‘is not a matter of career choice’539 
and that being paid for sexual services dehumanises women. The debates in government have 
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resulted in casting prostitutes as victims who have ‘been “re-made” in law as women 
vulnerable to rape.’540 However, this thesis argues that the sex industry should be legitimised 
and prostitutes are equal to all other women insofar as their moral and legal right to be able to 
withdraw or refuse consent.
 541
  This right should not be censured for being irresponsible and 
prostitutes should be recognised as ‘individuals able to give and withhold sexual consent.’542 
The question then centres on what level of control a prostitute has if she is subjected to 
pressure by the client or by the pimp to be able to freely consent.  This argument becomes 
obfuscated when both Parliament and academics link prostitution with trafficking. There is a 
clear distinction between a trafficked prostitute who has no freedom of choice and a prostitute 
who is not trafficked.  One can argue that the Parliamentary debates and subsequent 
legislation were set up to protect the prostitute who aside from all others participating in 
sexual activities is more vulnerable.  But this argument fails when one considers situations 
such as the very drunk young woman in the Evans case;
543
 her vulnerability equates to that of 
any prostitute when with a client and in the Evans retrial the young woman’s intimate details 
about her sexual preferences and the language she used during sex were questioned in open 
court.  This precedent gives little confidence for a ‘fair hearing’ for a prostitute who has been 
raped.   
In Chapter 1 the issue of stereotypes and myths was touched upon, and again needs to be 
addressed regarding women who work in the sex industry.  One myth is that sex workers are 
viewed as an appropriate object for violence against them because they are the ‘quintessential 
"bad" woman.’ This furthers the argument that all sex-workers, whether in the pornographic 
industry or prostitutes, are subject to ideas regarding sex and although Sutherland argued the 
balance of power in society needs change, it is the power behind negative stereotyping that 
needs to end.     
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Following on from an academic discourse regarding whether prostitutes can consent to paid 
sexual activity, the problem of freedom to consent at law emerges: when the prostitute has 
not been paid, despite payment being conditional to sex.   
1.1.4. Consent conditional upon payment 
I have shown in Chapter 1 that recently consent could be subject to conditions expressed by 
the person as to the use of condoms or the lack of ejaculation inside the woman’s body. 
Conditions could also be set as to the taking of a photograph or video and to its (non) 
distribution to third parties. Consent by the prostitute, like for performers in pornography and 
live sex industry, is conditional upon payment by the client. The issue arises if the client does 
not pay the prostitute but has engaged in sexual activity with her.  Two modern cases, R v 
Linekar (1995)
544
 and Attorney General’s Reference (no 107 of 2007) re Bouguenoune545 
distinguish between fraud and rape. 
In R v Linekar (1995) a young woman had sex with a man who afterwards ran away without 
paying. The question for the jury to consider, as directed by the judge, was if he had forced 
himself upon her or if he had tricked her and obtained her consent by fraud. In both instances, 
this would amount to rape, but if he had intended to pay but simply changed his mind 
afterward, then he should be acquitted of rape. Linekar was, from the outset charged with 
rape as per s1 of the SOA 1956 on the basis of the statement of the complainant. The Court of 
Appeal noted that s3 of the SOA 1956, which makes it an offence to procure a woman by 
false pretences, was the appropriate part of the SOA 1956 to charge him with but then the 
question remained whether the fraud of not paying is enough to vitiate consent. In Linekar, 
this was avoided by the courts concentrating on the issue of when the intention not to pay 
arose: before or after the sexual activities. 
In the Attorney General’s Reference (no 107 of 2007) re Bouguenoune, the defendant agreed 
to pay £25 for sexual intercourse and oral sex. He took her to a secluded spot and ‘stood 
squarely in front of her, refused her request for cash payment immediately and instead said: 
“Am I scaring you?” He told her that she was going to die’.546 He beat her and then 
proceeded to have full intercourse with her on two occasions and she performed oral sex once 
on him. In Bouguenoune, the SOA 2003 was in force and although s76 offers a conclusive 
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presumption where deception is involved,  s76 of the SOA 2003 does not offer any scope if 
the client has no intention to pay the prostitute: he can be guilty of rape only if he had the 
intention of not paying prior to negotiating payment with the prostitute.. Section 75 offers a 
rebuttable presumption that consent has not been given when violence is used
547
 or there is a 
fear of violence being used.
548
  Whether the intention was formed before or after the sexual 
activities is for the jury to decide  
In both cases the prostitute was not paid by the client. The two cases had apparently different 
approaches because of two issues: Linekar pleaded not guilty to rape whereas Bouguenoune 
pleaded guilty; and Linekar was pre SOA 2003 and therefore prosecution did not have the 
conclusive presumption of fraud to rely on. Thus, the Court of Appeal upheld the appeal that 
Linekar was not guilty of rape, whereas Bouguenoune had pleaded guilty to rape. 
In Linekar the Court of Appeal held that just because the woman had consented to intercourse 
in return for a promise that she would be paid, it did not mean that there was a lack of 
consent. The essential element was the intention of the client: should he have decided not to 
pay from the start, then it would have been rape, but the courts held that he had simply 
changed his mind. Whereas in Bouguenoune the intention not to pay was clear. His intention 
not to pay, and moreover, his violence toward the prostitute clearly indicated rape.  
Both cases relied on the absence of consent to establish rape and not the existence of fraud. 
This is because, as in R v Clarence (1866)
549
 it was held that the general proposition that 
‘…consent obtained by fraud is no consent at all is not true … either in fact or in law. If a 
man meets a woman in the street and knowingly gives her bad money in order to procure her 
consent to intercourse with him, he obtains her consent by fraud, but it would be childish to 
say that she did not consent.’550  
As per Stephen J. in the same case, to argue that fraud would negate consent within the 
meaning of consenting to sexual activities would mean that ‘many seductions would be rapes, 
and so might acts of prostitution procured by fraud’.551 Therefore, modern courts have moved 
the responsibility by establishing the point of intention and this in effect has the capability of 
removing the fraud element, to become a rape issue and thereby keep the matter within the 
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criminal courts. Payment thus can influence how a prostitute is considered to consent. 
Conditional consent to sexual activities by a prostitute can be recognised by the courts at 
criminal law when the client’s intention has been never to pay, as part of what is now s74 
SOA 2003. It obviously begs the question as to how to prove the client’s intention not to pay 
if no outside violence is manifested, but at least the elements of the transaction are 
recognised.  
The question that remains, since Bouguenoune pleaded guilty, is whether s76 as to fraud 
applies. Section 76 establishes a conclusive presumption when the defendant deceives the 
victim ‘as to the nature or purpose of the relevant act’. The sexual act by the prostitute has 
been agreed to, so it would be difficult to argue that the prostitute has been deceived as to the 
nature of the act. As stated by Ormerod, ‘it might be argued that the deception as to payment 
alters the ‘purpose’ of the act for the prostitute’.552 However, s76 is a conclusive 
presumption. As I have shown in Chapter 1, in two important cases of deception, (Jheeta
553
 
where the defendant sent a message to the victim as though it was from a police officer 
saying she needed to have sexual intercourse so that the defendant does not commit suicide, 
and McNally, where the victim was said to be deceived as to the gender)
554
 the courts refused 
to apply s76, and considered the fraud under s74. Thus, I come back to our starting point 
about s74 and the timing of the intention to deceive. When the client has the intention to pay 
before or at the time the sexual activities takes place, but does not do so afterwards, criminal 
law would consider that the prostitute has not been raped or assaulted. Effectively, it would 
become a civil law matter in order for her to enforce the contract unless violence, or the threat 
of violence, is involved and then s75 of the SOA 2003 can be used. 
Violence, or the threat of violence, can also come from another quarter.  The next section will 
consider consent with regards to the behaviour of the pimp. 
1.1.5 The effects of a pimp regarding consent 
A pimp does not actively engage in the sexual activities and therefore consent to the sexual 
activities does not apply. However, there is a tacit contractual consent between the prostitute 
and the pimp. A pimp is usually a man who ‘manages’ the prostitute. It is the pimp’s 
responsibility to ensure the prostitutes safety and provide the clients. Women who work in 
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collectives also use the same system and when using a woman as the manager she is known 
as a ‘madam’. Like the manager of a Sexual Entertainment Venue, or the publisher of 
pornography, the pimp benefits from the money the prostitute makes out of the sexual 
activities. The pimp can be paid either by the client or by the prostitute once she has received 
the money from the client. In any case, the pimp plays a role in the prostitution of the woman 
and profits from her engaging in commercial sex. 
However, the criminal law treats the pimp very differently from the manager in a Sexual 
Entertainment Venue or the publisher of pornography. The publisher would be criminally 
liable only if the pornographic materials fall within the definition of obscenity and ‘deprave 
and corrupt’ the audience, a test now hardly satisfied in light of Peacock where even 
sadomasochistic acts were not considered obscene. The manager of a Sexual Entertainment 
Venue has even less constraints than the publisher of pornography as they simply have to 
apply for a licence to open the venue. By contrast, the simple fact of living, even partially, off 
the payments made to the prostitute, and to have control over ‘any of the activities of’ the 
prostitute is a criminal offence. 
Indeed, the SOA 2003 created the gender neutral offence
555
for a person to ‘intentionally 
control any of the activities of another person relating to that person’s prostitution in any part 
of the world
556
 for or in the expectation of gain for himself or a third person,
557
 and thus 
removed two gender specific offences in the 1956 Act: s30 prohibited men from living, partly 
or wholly on the immoral earnings of a prostitute and s31 prohibited women from exercising 
control over prostitutes.  
The interpretation of the term ‘control’ within the meaning of the SOA 2003 s53 was 
considered in R v Massey [2008].
558
 The Court of Appeal, held that the word ‘control’ should 
be given its ordinary dictionary meaning. ‘Control’ was not restricted to ‘one who forces 
another to carry out the relevant activity’ and force and coercion are ‘not necessarily required 
in order for a sex worker to be controlled for the purposes of gain’.559 The complainant just 
had to prove that they had been directed to do so. Therefore, s53 is wide enough to 
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encapsulate both pimps who traffic by means of coercion and pimps who use voluntary 
prostitutes. 
The problem is precisely that Massey makes no distinction as to managers of prostitution who 
are violent or exercise pressures and those who do not use the proceeds of prostitution to 
coerce the prostitute or threaten the prostitute in any way. If managers are presumed to 
exercise some form of violence or coercion in one-way or another, when looking at the whole 
of the sex industry, the decision appears controversial as it really casts aside management of 
prostitution by third parties, compared to management of venues and pornography. 
The decision is nonetheless in line with the government’s intention to include not only 
trafficked prostitutes, but other prostitutes who are subject to exploitation. The portrayal of 
the pimp in the government review Paying the Price,
560
 makes a distinction between different 
types of pimp; including men described as ‘classic pimps’. The political discourse regarding  
the classic pimp echoes the Wolfenden report which commented that pimping is ‘usually 
brought about at the instance of the woman, and it seems to stem from a need on the part of 
the prostitute for some element of stability in the background of her life’561 and that the 
association ‘operates to a mutual advantage…’562 However, Paying the Price makes a 
connection between drugs and prostitution and moves away from the ‘mutual advantage’ 
theory put forward by Wolfenden.  Instead the official discourse introduces the ‘new style 
pimp/partners’ and in Paying the Price noted that the boyfriend pimp with a drug habit is 
increasingly common. This links pimping to terms such as ‘coercion’ and ‘control’ by 
making several references such as ‘…crack use means increased violence …’563 to show how 
drug dealers and pimps use violence and drugs to control prostitutes. In practice, this 
association may well be true, but it does not mean that pimping is solely about a drug dealer 
profiting from a prostitute, who often would be a drug addict herself. If the law acknowledges 
the team management aspect of commercial sex for pornography and adult entertainment 
venues, why can’t it acknowledge it for prostitution? In pornography and venues, managers 
‘control’ the sex workers by a contract, and yet the law considers they exercise a legitimate 
activity, whilst they remain criminally liable if they were dealing with drugs or exercise other 
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forms of coercion so as to break for example the ‘no touching’ rule. Arguably it may be a fine 
line between the two types of pimps; but it does not mean the law cannot draw a line. It is 
argued that the visibility of prostitution through regulated brothels may be the essential 
difference between forced prostitution and consensual voluntary prostitution. 
Thus, part of the answer lies within Dworkin and MacKinnon’s564 argument that penetrative 
sex is, by its nature, violent but not all sex is rape. Reciprocal sexual activities where the 
woman is not in the subordinate position is not an act of violence or rape. Moreover, when 
one considers the subordinate position of the prostitute, then surely the argument here is that 
the unfettered prostitute is in a reciprocal position because she sets the boundaries and the 
price, but those who are trafficked are in a subordinate position to both the client and the 
pimp. 
1.2 The client and consent 
Consent is intrinsically linked to the nature of the sexual activities and its purpose. The client 
consents to both paying for the sexual activity, and the sexual activity itself, but nothing else. 
As I have shown in Chapter 1, section 2.3, criminal law sets the prohibition that the nature of 
the sexual activities cannot include activity that harms the person. This means the client 
cannot consent or consider he has consented to harming the prostitute when he consents to 
the sexual activities. I come back to this issue of harm in section 2 on the nature of the sexual 
activities. 
The client is the one who invariably sets the arrangement with the prostitute—he would ask 
for certain types of sexual activities, thereby offering tacit consent. It is then for the prostitute 
to either agree, giving consent, or disagree, denying consent to the sexual activities and/or to 
the amount offered for payment. The criminal law does not regulate payment directly. 
However, the question arises indirectly, through the concept of conditional consent, as I have 
shown with the prostitute. In effect, failure to pay the prostitute, if it cannot be established 
that the client had no intention to pay before the sexual act, belongs to the realm of the civil 
law of contract, except that I see, in the purpose of the activity, that the civil law is reluctant 
to uphold ‘immoral’ contracts.  
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Another aspect of the consent of the client relates to the strict liability offence of making or 
promising payment for sexual services of an exploited prostitute as set out in the SOA 2003 
s53 amended by s14 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009.  The original draft was overly broad 
making the offence ‘paying for sexual services of a prostitute controlled for the purposes of 
gain’. The broadness of s14 in its original form combined with the Massey judgment could 
also capture women who worked together as a collective and those who worked in brothels 
with a ‘madam’ leading to the question whether the initial wording intended to be used 
against all prostitutes thus using a ‘back-door’ ban on prostitution. Vernon Coaker  argued 
that this was certainly not the aim of the offence, but s21 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 
makes provision for a closure order for ‘premises used for activities related to certain sex 
offences’ which include pornographic offences where a child is involved, but the crux of s21 
is that it provides, under s136B (2) of the SOA 2003, powers for a police officer ‘who has 
reasonable grounds for believing’ that either the premises are used for prostitution or 
pornographic offences, to apply to an ‘authorising officer,’ a police officer ‘not below the 
rank of superintendent’ to authorise a closure notice.  The Policing and Crime Act 2009 
certainly does contain a possibility for a ‘back door ban’ and could thereby force prostitutes 
back onto the streets. 
Nonetheless, the amended version of s14 is narrower than the original. It defines ‘exploitative 
conduct’ as a third party to the client and the prostitute ‘us[ing] force, threats (whether or not 
relating to violence) or any other form of coercion, or practis[ing] any form of deception’. 
However, Massey raises issues as the wide definition of ‘control’ might still capture the client 
paying for services of a prostitute working for a pimp. Thus there is no difference in consent 
between a prostitute and a non-commercial woman consenting and the criteria explained in 
Chapter 1 should apply equally to the prostitute and to her client, with no distinction to be 
made according to the financial context in which sexual activities takes place. However, 
when a woman chooses to engage in prostitution, the question remains whether she consents 
to sexual activities and how this consent should be defined. The terms of the various statutes 
defining sexual assault and rape never distinguished between a prostitute and a woman 
engaging in sexual activities without reward. 
In addition to the difficulties of treating a prostitute as an ‘ordinary’ woman who should not 
be presumed to consent to all sexual encounters; there are other factors that the prostitute may 
need to consider before consenting, such as the type of activity she is consenting to and the 
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payment for that specific type of sexual activity. The question remains whether a prostitutes’ 
consent is made within the confines of s74 of the SOA 2003 insofar as she actually has the 
freedom (and capacity) to make that choice. It can be argued here that any prostitute who has 
a pimp or is part of a collective still falls within the range of being exploited by a third person 
who would gain from her payment. 
The criminalisation of the client was introduced in Sweden. In England, the government, 
having raised the issue of harm to the prostitute in its series of reports, had two options; 
follow Sweden and the abolitionist ‘Nordic model’; or New Zealand and its liberal toleration 
of prostitution. English law fails to recognise the intrinsic and extrinsic value of prostitution, 
instead relying on the abolitionist argument, put forward by radical feminists which in turn 
appeals to politicians who already have a moral opposition to prostitution. Such abolitionist 
policies for further criminalisation of the client were suggested by Harriet Harman MP, whilst 
referring to the Swedish model. She said to the BBC ‘…we don’t want this sort of organised 
crime in this country’.565 She argued that the Swedish model would ‘protect’ the prostitutes, 
at a time when the government was ‘dragging its feet over legislation …to legalise small 
brothels’.566 The government ultimately failed to legalise small brothels or indeed any 
brothels but gave the green light to lap dancing clubs and peep shows. Another suggestion 
that removed the focus from the client was the introduction of licenced red-light zones but 
this was rejected because they ‘could send out the wrong message’.567 The policies are based 
on, as Nussbaum argues, ‘prejudices and misunderstandings [that] mask where the true 
problems lie in sexual exchanges for money’.568  The issues surrounding demand will be 
discussed further in section 4 (4.2.3.5).    
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Section 2 - Nature of the sexual activities within prostitution 
The founding definition of a prostitute was first given by Justice Darling in R v De Munck 
(1918).
569
 The facts of De Munck are that a fourteen-year-old girl went to a room with a man 
for money at the behest of her mother. It was also recorded that over five months, the mother 
and her daughter had been seen accosting men in the street in the West End of London, and 
the daughter had taken men to the house where the appellant was living. The mother was 
found guilty of two offences: that of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 s2(2) 
criminalising any person who procured or attempted to procure any girl or woman under the 
age of twenty-one to become a common prostitute; and that of aiding and abetting 
prostitution, contrary to the provisions of the Vagrancy Act, 1898, as amended by s7 of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1912. On appeal, the counsel for the defence contended that 
the appellant, the mother, could not be found guilty because the girl was a virgin, implying 
that a ‘common prostitute’ has to engage into full intercourse in order to be considered so. 
Consequently, the question for the courts was to decide what exactly a common prostitute 
was and did the child’s activity equate to that of a common prostitute. Until that point there 
was no statutory definition, and Justice Darling set the precedent: a common prostitute is a 
‘…woman who offers her body commonly for lewdness for payment in return.’570 The 
definition in De Munck was intended to clearly delineate prostitutes from other women.  
The following two cases show how the courts, following the De Munck principle, relied on 
the issue of lewdness and not sexual congress to define prostitution.  
In Webb(1964)
571
 the issue was whether the women who worked in a massage parlour were 
prostitutes if they only masturbated the male clients. The question then was did the definition 
depend upon whether the female was physically active or passive? Lord Parker C.J. said: 
‘From a purely practical point of view, it would be artificial, to say the least, to draw a 
distinction between the case of a woman who takes a passive role and one in which she takes 
an active role. Indeed, it can be said with some force that some activity on her part is of the 
very essence of prostitution. It cannot matter whether she whips the man or the man whips 
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her; it cannot matter whether he masturbates himself on her or she masturbates him. In our 
judgment, the expression used by Darling J., a woman offers her body commonly for 
lewdness,' means no more and was intended to mean no more than 'offers herself,' and it 
includes, at any rate, such a case as this where a woman offers herself as a participant in 
physical acts of indecency for the sexual gratification of men.’572 
The courts again distinguished the need for intercourse in McFarlane (1994).
573
 Indeed, no 
physicality was evident where the husband lived off the earnings of his wife who offered 
sexual services with no intention of performing them. Such women are known as ‘clippers’. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the judge in the Crown Court who directed the jury by 
saying: ‘There are prostitutes who are honest and prostitutes who are dishonest. Miss Josephs 
tells you that she is a dishonest prostitute. But she is a prostitute, members of the jury’.  
And dismissing the appeal added ‘For a man to live off the earnings of a woman who offers 
sexual services, takes the money and then reneges on the offer, if she does, is in our view to 
live off the earnings of prostitution, or, as it used to be termed, immoral earnings. Indeed, 
most people would consider such earnings doubly immoral’. 
The two cases mentioned, each important in their own right, show that the need for sexual 
congress or indeed any physicality, is not a necessary ingredient in prostitution. The essential 
ingredient that defines the sexual activities of a prostitute is twofold: she must offer her body 
‘commonly [and] for lewdness’. In R v Morris-Lowe (1985)574 the term ‘commonly’ was 
defined in order to ascertain whether the defendant had indeed procured women based on the 
material facts that he had placed an advertisement for young women to train as masseuses for 
excellent pay. Each girl was told that she would be expected to perform ‘relief massage,’ a 
euphemism for masturbation, on male clients and at one interview he invited the girl in 
question to masturbate him then and there in the hotel room. The offence of procurement as 
per s22(1) of the SOA 1956 is for a person to procure a woman to become, in any part of the 
world, a common prostitute. Lord Lane was of the opinion that the answer turned on what 
constituted a ‘common’ prostitute and held that: ‘[T]he performance by a woman of a single 
act of lewdness with a man on one occasion… does not make her a woman who offers herself 
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commonly for lewdness. That must be someone who is prepared for reward to engage in acts 
of lewdness with all and sundry, or with anyone who may hire her for that purpose.’575  
Hence, a woman who engaged in sexual activities with one man for reward would not be 
considered as a common prostitute. Similarly, a woman who participates in regular sexual 
activities for reward with one client to the exclusion of all other clients would not be 
considered as a prostitute, as per the De Munck definition. 
When considering sexual activities in Chapter 1 it was established that sexual intercourse was 
associated with marriage, where one woman ‘gives’ herself to one man, to the exclusion of 
all others, in matrimony. Any and all sexual activities were to remain in the province of 
marriage. Prostitution is the antitheses of marriage, when one considers the edicts of the 
church, the civil law definition of consummation, and the Wolfenden Report. Indeed, 
prostitution involves sexual activities with more than one man, and this is similar to the 
requirements of adultery where sexual activities occur with more than the husband. In 
addition, prostitution is the repetition of the sexual activities with various men for the purpose 
of payment, as shown infra section 3.  
What this repeated sexual activity entails is referred to by the expression ‘for lewdness’ and 
‘lewdness’ does not have a legal definition, but the ratio decidendi in De Munck is that any 
act of lewdness would suffice. The literal interpretation of ‘lewdness’ would mean as little as 
being lascivious or unchaste.
576
 Indeed, in De Munck, although the sexual activities that 
happened between the girl and the man were not recorded, it was held to be a fact that the girl 
remained a virgin. In other words, there was no vaginal intercourse, and yet the court 
considered the facts fulfilled the definition of a ‘common prostitute’. Consequently, the 
sexual activities a prostitute performs do not need to be sexual intercourse; she can also 
perform any other form of sexual activities that does not necessarily involve touching. 
This echoes the definition of ‘obscene’ as seen in Chapter 2 given that ‘obscene’ includes 
reference to lewdness. It could be argued that pornography falls, in that respect, within the 
definition of prostitution as per De Munck, and actors in pornographic films could be called 
prostitutes. Candida Royalle made a very similar comment, as discussed in Chapter 2, when 
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she noted that that ‘pornography [is] like looking at prostitutes. It [is] just another version of 
prostitution. Instead of being with a prostitute … you look at a prostitute’.577 
Furthermore, in light of the De Munck definition, the prostitute can perform the same sexual 
activities as in a Sexual Entertainment Venue. Of course, the sexual activities of a prostitute 
go beyond that of someone who works in a Sexual Entertainment Venue, because touching is 
forbidden in a Sexual Entertainment Venue. Each Local Authority imposes set regulations 
with regards to the distance between the performer and the viewer with the most common 
distance being one metre. Nevertheless, a prostitute may also act in a similar way to a peep 
show worker insofar as she may be required to perform a sexual display, such as self-
masturbation, and as within a peep show there would be no touching. As in these venues, the 
expectation of the client is that he would be sexually aroused to a certain degree – depending 
on the type of entertainment and the regulations set by the Local Authority. It could be 
argued that the client in De Munck wanted to be sexually aroused, but there is nothing in the 
facts to confirm this other than the girl remained a virgin. This also means that women who 
work in Sexual Entertainment Venues fulfil the De Munck criteria of prostitution in that they 
offer their body commonly for lewdness, as would a prostitute who does not engage in 
touching, and with both doing it for ‘payment in return’. 
The elements of the previous chapter, such as striptease, pole dancing and certainly 
peepshows all fall within the category of lewdness. Therefore, when considering the 
definition of ‘lewd’ the sex workers equate to the same level of lewdness as prostitutes and 
should therefore be considered as ‘common prostitutes’. The De Munck definition of the 
sexual activities a prostitute engages into contradicts Judge Purle’s assertion, as seen in 
chapter Three, that ‘whatever else goes on in lap dancing establishments, it is not suggested 
that they could fairly be described as red light activities’.578  The cautious approach taken by 
the courts to separate prostitution from other aspects of the sex industry, can be seen in Webb 
and McFarlane as previously mentioned, where the courts defined prostitution as something 
beyond adult sexual entertainment.  
The courts, when considering the de Munck facts, applied the law from a literal interpretation 
and when following this reasoning I see the sex industry as a whole with prostitution being no 
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different to pornography and live adult entertainment sexual activities. In that regard, logic 
would dictate that the prostitute should be treated in the same way as the people working in a 
Sexual Entertainment Venue or on a pornographic set. Yet, the regulatory regime of 
prostitution is fundamentally different, as shown. The question remains whether it is the 
possibility of actual touching and intercourse in prostitution that justifies the difference in 
regulations and whether this difference is an objective criterion to establish different 
regulatory regimes. To answer this question, I need to look at the purpose of prostitution. 
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Section 3 - The Purpose of Prostitution 
3.1 Payment 
Payment, outside the element of consent, is a civil law matter, not a criminal law issue and as 
such, should be excluded from this thesis.  Yet, the civil law on payment informs the debate 
on criminal law as soon as I start to compare how civil law treats payment for sexual 
activities in Sexual Entertainment Venues and within the framework of prostitution (section 
4.3.1). Payment can also be considered as expressing the prostitute’s control over her body. 
Given that prostitution is not illegal, we might surmise that the prostitute has in that sense 
bodily integrity, a right that criminal law does protect (section 4.3.2). 
 3.2 The ambiguous position of the civil law regarding payment in prostitution  
A prostitute by the De Munck definition is not only one who offers her body commonly for 
lewdness, but also for ‘payment in return’. Considering this element of prostitution, some 
have argued that it would not be possible to differentiate wives from prostitutes as both 
prostitute and wife offer economic ‘goods’ in the form of sexual activity.  This argument 
stands, unless I take into consideration another factor, i.e. the additional purpose of the sexual 
activities. For example, Edlund and Korn
579
 suggested the main difference between a wife 
and a prostitute is reproductive sex and not payment; wives both offer and expect it whereas 
prostitutes do not. This explanation holds some elements of truth for the past, as indeed 
sexual activity in marriage was expected to be for the purpose of procreation; however, today, 
with the availability of contraception, sexual activities within or outside marriage are not 
confined to procreation only, and what distinguishes a woman engaging in successive 
relationships (casual sex) or sexual encounters from a ‘prostitute’ is the payment.  Those who 
engage in consensual casual sex and the prostitute allow sexual touching.  But those engaging 
in consensual casual sex are not prohibited by law on the basis that they allow sexual 
touching but the nature of the sexual behaviour, if it takes place in a public space, is 
criminalised, whereas prostitution seems to attract prohibition on the basis of payment for 
sexual touching. 
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In Lloyd v Johnson (1798),
580
 the connection between prostitution and an immoral contract 
was considered by the courts, as it was held that the contract must be directly related to the 
activity of prostitution to be unenforceable. In this instance the maid employed to wash the 
prostitute’s clothes could show by means of the unpaid bill that the articles washed consisted 
principally of expensive dresses, and that there were also some gentlemen's night-caps. The 
witness swore that the former were for the purpose of enabling the Defendant to appear at 
public places, and that the latter were worn by those persons who slept with her mistress.   
Justice Buller commented ‘what do you mean by the expression of clothes used for the 
purposes of prostitution? This unfortunate woman must have clean linen, and it is impossible 
for the Court to take into consideration which of these articles were used by the Defendant to 
an improper purpose, and which were not.’581 And so Lloyd won her petition on the grounds 
that no such immorality in the contract had been proved, as ought to defeat the action.  
A second case that had similar difficulties as to whether the contract was immoral was 
Appleton v Campbell (1826)
582
 where the defendant, who was in rent arrears, used her 
lodgings to receive male visitors to the knowledge of her landlord. Justice Abbot explained 
how the contract depended on whether the prostitution occurred within or outside the 
property:  
‘If a person lets a lodging to a woman, to enable her to consort with the other sex, and for the 
purposes of prostitution, he cannot recover for the lodging so supplied. But if the defendant 
had her lodgings there, and received her visitors elsewhere, the plaintiff may recover, 
although she be a woman of the town, because persons of that description must have a place 
to lay their heads; but if this place was used for immoral purposes, the plaintiff cannot 
recover.’ 
In Pearce & another v Brookes (1866),
583
 a prostitute hired a brougham, (a horse-drawn 
carriage) but failed to pay the hire fee.  The case was a contract issue and so came before the 
civil court where the connection between immoral contract and prostitution was again made.  
The court noted the jury’s ‘intelligent appreciation’584 that the woman was a prostitute and 
both repeated and applied Justice Piggots comment that ‘the principle of law is contained in 
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the legal maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio
585,’ and consequently the owner of the 
brougham
586
 could not enforce the prostitute to pay the hire purchase or damage caused to the 
brougham. Per Branwell B: ‘There is no doubt this woman was a prostitute, and that the 
plaintiffs knew it … and of which the jury shewed their intelligent appreciation …’ Justice 
Piggot added to the moral argument by applying the legal maxim ‘ex turpi causa non oritur 
actio’587 saying: ‘… there is no doubt that where persons engage to be parties to immoral 
contracts, they must not come to Courts of Justice and seek to enforce them’. In effect the 
courts said that the fact that the owner had lost out financially was his loss and not the 
problem of the courts because the contract was immoral.   
Therefore, within civil law, morality plays a role.  For an immoral contract to be voided two 
factors must occur: there must be knowledge that the other party was a prostitute as per 
Pearce v Brooks
588
 and the knowledge that what was supplied under contract would be used 
for prostitution as shown in Appleton v Campbell (1826)
589
 where it was held that it was 
unlawful to provide accommodation to a known prostitute to be used to conduct her 
commercial sexual activities.   
Consequently, a contract or agreement between a client and an escort would clearly be caught 
within the rule if sexual services were included. In today’s modern technological era, 
contracts occur between prostitutes and website hosts. The prostitutes, by paying the website 
hosts by credit card, or clients who make payments by credit card, become part of contract 
law that is outside the remit of this thesis but show how the implications of contract law and 
morality within prostitution pervades all areas. 
By contrast, payment for a dancer in a Sexual Entertainment Venue is part of the definition of 
a venue in the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 as amended by the 
Policing and Crime Act 2009. Dancers are considered to be in a legitimate employment, and 
are entitled to protection under the Employment Rights Act 1996
590
 as held in Quashie v 
Stringfellows Restaurants Ltd [2012].
591
 Both the management and dancer make a legitimate 
profit from the client and unlike for a prostitute, the contract would be honoured in court. 
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The principle of ex turpi causa non oritur actio with regards to prostitutes and contracts still 
stands today and extends to company law. In R v Registrar of Companies ex parte Attorney 
General [1991],
592
 Miss Whiplash, who had by then changed her name to Lindi St Clair, 
registered her company as Lindi St Clair (Personal Services Ltd). The Court quashed the 
decision to allow the registration. Relying on Section 1 of the Companies Act 1948, which 
allowed any two or more persons associated for any lawful purpose to form a company, Lord 
Justice Akner said: 
‘It is well settled that a contract which is made upon a sexually immoral consideration or for 
a sexually immoral purpose is against public policy and is illegal and unenforceable… the 
purpose is a sexually immoral purpose and … if that is the position, as indeed it clearly is on 
the authorities, then the association of the two or more persons cannot be for ‘any lawful 
purpose.’593  
Conversely, all owners of Sexual Encounter Venues are at liberty to register their club as a 
company, despite the sexual activities being identical in all but touching, and being within the 
definition of Sexual Entertainment Venues. Ironically a year prior to the decision to quash 
Lindi St Clair’s registration of her business the Inland Revenue demanded any unpaid taxes 
due from her in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Aken [1990]
594
. As Professor Graham 
Scambler
595
 notes: ‘the paradox…persists: earnings from prostitution are taxable but the 
British Government will not condone prostitution as a lawful trade for the purposes of 
registration’. 
Civil law thus differentiates between sections of the sex industry, casting prostitution aside 
from the rest of the industry. The problem with this line of reasoning is that it supposes an 
inherent difference between prostitution and the rest of industry. However, I have 
demonstrated that payment is the same across the industry and that the only possible—but not 
constant—variation is the sexual activities. Once this variant disappears, when the prostitute 
engages in the same sexual activities, for example as a woman in a peep show, there is no 
objective difference between prostitution and other parts of the sex industry. In this case, 
prostitution and peep shows are an identical activity that should be regulated in exactly the 
same terms.  This means there are two options: either all sexual activities, in a SEV or outside 
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(i.e. prostitution) should be banned.  Alternatively, sexual activity inside and outside a SEV 
can be accepted equally.  If a difference is maintained between activity within a SEV and 
activity outside a SEV, when the sexual activities are the same, then the difference can only 
be framed in moral terms, which is exactly what the regulation of Sexual Entertainment 
Venues tries to avoid by prohibiting morality as a ground for Local Authorities to refuse 
licensing. Civil law is not consistent and coherent. It is little wonder that criminal law, which 
often reflects what a civil society considers to be important, also struggles to be coherent. 
Would the argument work however when the variation between the sexual activities in 
Sexual Entertainment Venues and that of prostitution is reinstated?  In other words, when the 
sexual activities involve touching—prohibited in Sexual Entertainment Venues, expected in 
prostitution, should the law set the two apart? Is it objectively justifiable to separate 
prostitution on the basis of touching? It is difficult to answer the question positively without 
relying on moral grounds, especially prior to the sexual liberation of the 1960s. Indeed, in the 
past, it was not morally acceptable for sexual touching to take place outside the sacred 
contract of marriage. Prostitution runs counter to the idea of marriage and sexuality 
admissible within marriage. Again this harks back to the definition within De Munck 
whereupon the wife only chooses one partner to engage in sexual activities whereas the 
prostitute is common to all.  But today, in light of social changes and the regulation of Sexual 
Entertainment Venues implemented in the Policing and Crime Act 2009, should prostitution 
still be considered as inherently and constantly different?  The Offences against the Person 
Act 1861 protects the person (body) from harm but there remains an unjust prejudice 
stigmatizing prostitution.
 596
   The question leads whether social change could bring about a 
right to sexual autonomy.  There are limits to bodily autonomy as the selling of body parts is 
criminalised, but if there was a right to sexual autonomy or sexual integrity
597
 rather than 
autonomy, the prostitute would not be considered as a sexual commodity and therefore not 
‘different’ or ‘other.’ 
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Section 4 - Visibility  
So far this chapter has established that prostitution is legal, consent is required and the 
prostitute’s bodily integrity does not prohibit her to sell her services. So what is the ‘problem’ 
with prostitution? As with non-commercial sexual activities, there is an expectation of 
privacy. A Sexual Entertainments Venue is regulated in order to contain the sexual activities 
performed by several ‘dancers’ within the venue. In contrast, two or more prostitutes are not 
permitted to perform any type of sexual activity within a building and so often practice their 
trade on the streets or in client’s cars, which makes them liable to various criminal offences 
as discussed in section 4.1 while section 4.3 considers the fact that specific venues for 
prostitution, such as brothels or massage parlours are prohibited.  
Prior to the SOA 1985, with regard to men who approach street prostitutes, the criminal law 
was restricted to the public nuisance offence of soliciting. However, the SOA 1985 
introduced the summary offence of ‘kerb crawling’ which in effect was two new offences 
within s1: where a man persistently
598
 ‘solicits a woman for the purpose of prostitution’599 
either ‘from a motor vehicle while it is in a street or public place’600 and ‘in a street or public 
place while in the immediate vicinity of a motor vehicle he has just got out of or off.’601 
Kerb crawling under the 1985 Act was not an arrestable offence; instead the client would 
receive a letter ordering him to attend the Magistrates’ Court. He was given an option of 
paying the fine immediately thus avoiding the court appearance. A second Act, the Powers of 
the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 gave the Magistrates further power under s146(1) 
to ‘order him to be disqualified’ from driving ‘for any offence’.   
During the 1980s and 1990s, in conjunction with the offence of soliciting, a ‘name and 
shame’ campaign was launched. The local newspapers were provided with the names of all 
men convicted of soliciting. This campaign also coincided with the SOA 1985. The anti-
client momentum continued to increase when the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 made 
kerb crawling an arrestable offence if the kerb-crawler causes annoyance or disturbances to 
people in the neighbourhood or if the soliciting is persistent behaviour. 
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The police and local media used the ‘visibility’ of the client and inverted it to ‘name and 
shame’ the client, and the criminal law implemented to eradicate kerb-crawling was a move 
from criminalising prostitutes to criminalising men as well. By making it a ‘male issue’, it 
highlighted the supply and demand aspects of prostitution and the criminal law in place was a 
move to break the ‘vicious cycle of prostitution’.602 By attempting to cut off the demand, it 
created an abolitionist configuration of reducing prostitution with a view to putting an end to 
prostitution altogether. This particular abolitionist approach fails on two fronts: it ‘understates 
the vital role in the law in structuring the marginal position of [prostitutes]’603 and does not 
take into account that the increasing criminalisation of men ‘may not lead to a corresponding 
reduction in [the prostitutes] punishment’.604 Indeed, the anti kerb-crawler legislation served 
as a two-pronged attack on street prostitution. Although there was a strong focus on the kerb 
crawling offences, it also created a ‘zero tolerance’ abolitionist reaction to prostitution by 
means of applying an Anti-Social Behavior Order (ASBO) on the prostitutes who were also 
arrested and found to be persistently soliciting.
605
 A prostitute with an ASBO would then be 
expected to exit from prostitution. Ironically to work in a Sexual Entertainments Venue is 
legitimate work, therefore would it be possible for a prostitute to gain employment in a 
Sexual Entertainments Venue and ‘exit’ prostitution? A sauna or massage parlour is classified 
as a Sexual Entertainments Venue and the County Council of The City and County of Cardiff 
noted in their report, ‘A Review of Multi-Agency Approaches to Tackling 
SexWork/Prostitution in 2012’,606 that ‘saunas and massage parlours… are often used as off-
street sex work/prostitution establishments’.  It is argued that the whole exercise in producing 
the ‘Review of Multi-Agency Approaches to Tackling Sex Work/Prostitution in 2012’ report 
‘was largely symbolic; it was designed to send a normative message about right and wrong 
types of sex’607 which can be shown by the disparity in the large number of prostitutes 
arrested and punished against the ‘small numbers’608 of men arrested.  
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4.1 The streets and public spaces 
4.1.1 Soliciting 
Unlike the client who approaches the prostitute, prostitutes are said to solicit in many ways, 
from the direct approach to advertising. The essential ingredient was that for soliciting to 
occur the prostitute must be present. The public element is also present because the prostitute 
must publicly solicit with other members of society. 
The difference between advertising and soliciting blurs, but it was enough in Behrendt v 
Burridge [1976]
609
 for the prostitute to be ‘sat silent and motionless behind a bay window, 
illuminated by a red light’610 to be found guilty of soliciting. The standard definition of 
soliciting
611
 is different to advertising;
612
 soliciting uses direct contact whereas advertising 
has an element of space between the client and the seller.  Soliciting is a form of physical 
advertising and is prohibited by means of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 which amends the 
Street Offences Act 1959.  
Sexual Entertainment Venues use advertising regulated by the Local Government 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 and the Obscene Publications Act 1959. The London 
Local Authorities Act 2007 make it an offence under s72 to solicit for a hostess bar in 
London, but there are no provisions other than the Local Government (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1982 for other provincial towns or villages.     However, hostess bars outside 
London employ hostesses to stand outside the bar to attract customers and it could be argued 
it is soliciting clients to enter the premises and view lewd acts. This shows a dichotomy 
between urban and provincial Sexual Entertainment Venues.    
For prostitutes, soliciting is criminalised by the Street Offences Act 1959 as amended by the 
SOA 2003 and the Policing and Crime Act 2009.  Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 
makes it an offence for common prostitutes to either loiter or solicit in a street or public place 
for the purposes of prostitution. The Street Offences Act 1959 does not define loitering or 
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soliciting for the purposes of prostitution but does define ‘street’.  The result of the Street 
Offences Act 1959 was that prostitutes had to find a new way of contacting the client. 
 In Smith v Hughes (1960)
613
 the prostitute sat tapping inside her window to attract the 
attention of men in the street below.  Lord Parker noted that the Street Offences Act 1959 was 
introduced to ‘clean up the streets’ by prohibiting female prostitutes from soliciting and 
applied the Mischief Rule to s1(1) and (4) of the Street Offences Act to include the inside of 
windows as forming part of the street.   
Although to date only female prostitutes have been discussed, men were not liable for 
soliciting because prior to the SOA 1967, the act of homosexuality was illegal. Either as a 
commercial enterprise or as private sexual activities, the defendant would be subject to the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885.  In 1962 the question was again raised with regard to 
s32 of the SOA 1956 which created the offence ‘… for a man persistently to solicit or 
importune in a public place for immoral purposes’. In Burge v DPP,614 it was held that a man 
does not solicit within the meaning of s32 of the SOA 1956 unless he is physically present. 
Although a man is capable of soliciting, in DPP v Bull
615
 it was held that the term ‘common 
prostitute’ in s1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1959 applied exclusively to female prostitutes.  
The term ‘common prostitute’ was introduced by way of s3 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 which 
stated ‘every common prostitute wandering in the public streets … shall be deemed an idle 
and disorderly person.’  The Vagrancy Act 1824 and the subsequent  Contagious Diseases 
Acts of 1864, 1866 and 1869 did nothing to define ‘common prostitute’ but enabled ‘the 
authorities to retain broad discretionary powers about what could constitute 
a common prostitute.’616 The ratio in De Munck (1918) said that the definition of ‘common 
prostitute is not limited so as to mean only one who permits acts of lewdness with all and 
sundry … prostitution is proved [when] a woman offers her body commonly for lewdness for 
payment in return.’617   
The label ‘common prostitute’ was applied to any woman if she received a police caution for 
loitering.  The police officer needed no other evidence to issue the caution.  Once labelled the 
“common prostitute” becomes liable under Section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1959 
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which echoed the Vagrancy Act 1824 stating ‘it shall be an offence for a common prostitute 
to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.’  Sagar and 
Wright note that ‘any woman appearing before the Bench does so already stigmatized by that 
label.’618  The stigmatizing label was not removed from statute until s16 of the Policing and 
Crime Act 2009 amended s1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1959 and replaced the term 
‘common prostitute’ with ‘person’.   
The Policing and Crime Act 2009 introduced the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO), as a 
‘tool of zero tolerance’619.  ASBOs were initially intended to ‘tackle nuisance neighbours 
[and]street thugs’620 in conjunction with local interagency ‘holistic initiatives.’621 Instead sex 
workers were almost immediately targeted with ASBOs seen as ‘the effective deterrent to on-
street sex work’622 to exclude prostitutes from residential areas.  An example of such ‘urban 
cleansing’623 is London’s Kings Cross where prostitutes were driven out prior to re-
development.  However, as Sagar notes,  implementing an ASBO to drive prostitutes out of 
an area does nothing to tackle the causes of on-street sex work; it simply relocates the 
problem and as a strategy it ‘lacks longevity.’624  The reason the use of ASBOs are an 
‘inappropriate response’ is because  although an ASBO is supposed to work in tandem with 
joint agencies, in practice poor relationships can exist between the police and social 
services
625
 to the point where reactive policing works against longer-term problem-solving.
626
  
This leads to two problems: if a prostitute breaches her ASBO then she faces up to five years 
in prison and  the lack of incorporating an inclusive inter-agency exit strategy incurs hidden 
costs to the State: the cost of incarcerating the prostitute and if she has children, state child 
care whilst she is in prison. 
This section has shown the criminality attached to soliciting by the prostitute and the client. A 
prostitute soliciting consists of the prostitute being visible and by her visibility she can 
directly offer her services to a prospective client but her very visibility is again threatened by 
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the criminalisation of the client soliciting. By criminalising soliciting, the law criminalises the 
actions necessary to conduct a commercial activity such as prostitution. The criminalisation is 
not based on the obscenity of the conduct as no sexual act has yet taken place. 
4.1.2 Advertising 
During the medieval period Richard II, using the same reasoning as Edward II that ‘many 
men have been slain and murdered, by reason of the frequent resort of, and consorting with, 
common harlots, at taverns, brewhouses … and other places of ill-fame’ made the 
proclamation that: ‘ … any such women shall go about or lodge in the said city, or in the 
suburbs thereof, by night or by day; but they are to keep themselves to the places thereunto 
assigned, that is to say, the Stews… and Cokkeslane; on pain of losing and forfeiting the 
upper garment that she shall be wearing, together with her hood….’ The proclamation gave 
‘every officer and serjeant of the said city [the] power to take such garments and hoods, in 
manner and form aforesaid…’ 627 The result of the proclamation was twofold: one that 
prostitution was regulated insofar as it was restricted to certain areas and second that as a 
consequence of the punishment the woman was made to wear a striped hood and have her 
upper garments removed, thereby creating an advertisement. The removal of the upper 
garment and hood for a woman moved prostitution to a public entity, similarly to the Romans 
and Greeks where the prostitutes, although not legislated against, were set aside from the 
community by their garb.   
During the Victorian era many prostitutes had no need to directly solicit; instead they wore 
cheap silk and would walk out bonnet-less and without a shawl,
628
 creating a ‘uniform’ that 
advertised in much the same way as the prostitutes of Richard II’s era. Some became more 
discrete in London areas such as the West End and handed out business cards to passing 
gentlemen who milled about the theatres.   
A modern form of advertisement, originating during the 1960s, was by means of ‘tart cards’ 
whereby prostitutes advertise by means of a card placed in a telephone box.  This is not 
dissimilar to the business cards distributed by Victorian prostitutes outside theatres or the 
discrete advertisements in newsagent’s windows offering ‘private tuition’ or ‘French 
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lessons’. Tart cards or vice cards as they are also known, were once a common sight in 
London.   
In Felix v DPP (1998),
629
 Felix affixed a prostitute’s card inside an enclosed telephone box.  
The telephone box was designed with a six-inch gap at the bottom to allow the circulation of 
air.  The legal issue was whether this constituted littering a ‘public open space’ as per s87(4) 
of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 which defined a public open space as: ‘any place 
in the open air to which the public are entitled or permitted to have access without payment; 
and any covered place open to the air on at least one side and available for public use’.  On 
appeal, Justice Blofeld criticised the wording of the summons and opined that the summons 
should have used the generic term ‘public open space’ to satisfy either definition, whereas the 
summons actually said ‘from a place in the open air’ which only satisfied part of the 
definition. The court held that the phone box did not satisfy the first part of the definition of 
s87(4) as it was not a place ‘in the open air’ although it was a place to which the public were 
entitled to enter and leave without payment. The Court also held that it did not come within 
the second part of the definition because it was not open on at least one side, it had a door 
that was normally closed, and the six-inch gap at the bottom did not satisfy the definition of a 
‘public open place’. The result of this case was that a lacuna appeared within the law and 
prostitutes within London (and Brighton and Hove) began the practice of putting cards in 
telephone boxes. The number of cards placed in a telephone booth is estimated to be 
approximately fourteen million per year
630
 and subsequently the Criminal Justice and Police 
Act 2001 s46 criminalised ‘tart cards’ in public telephone boxes. Section 46(3) defines the 
tart card as an advertisement which a reasonable person would consider to be an 
advertisement relating to prostitution and a public telephone is defined in s46(5) as any 
telephone located in a public place and made available for use by the public. It is not only the 
iconic red telephone box which is restricted as advertisements in or around any telephone 
made available to the public would breach s46 (5). The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 
does not include advertisements by swingers or doggers as described in Chapter 1. 
Swingers congregate within buildings for the purpose of sexual activities and can advertise 
their parties, subject to the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and the Criminal Law Act 1977. 
Doggers can also advertise subject to the same restrictions set within the Obscene 
                                                 
629
 Felix v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1998] Crim LR 657 
630
 David Hirshel et al, Criminal Justice in England and the United States (Jones and Bartlett Publishers, USA, 
2008) p49 
181 
 
Publications Act 1959 and the Criminal Law Act 1977. Conversely, the Criminal Justice and 
Police Act 2001 criminalised the placing of advertisements (tart cards) in or in the vicinity of 
telephone boxes and any other form of advertisement is subject to the Obscene Publications 
Act 1959 and the Criminal Law Act 1977.   
The prohibition of soliciting and other forms of advertising is at odds with the permitted 
advertising of Sexual Entertainment Venues and the pornographic industry. The legislation 
that surrounds soliciting and advertising prevents the prostitute from plying her trade and 
therefore creates an abolitionist means of dealing with the ‘problem’ of prostitution. A Sexual 
Entertainments Venue is allowed to advertise as noted in Chapter Three. The advertisements 
are regulated by the Obscene Publications Act 1959 and the venue has a statutory obligation 
to have a warning sign outside the premises. A prostitute must carry out her business in a 
clandestine manner.   
With the rise in modern technology, prostitutes other than street prostitutes advertise via the 
Internet and this part of the section will discuss the advertisements of off-street prostitutes.   
The Wolfenden report, which gave rise to the Street Offences Act 1959, suggested that 
prostitution should be kept ‘off the streets’: an ‘out of sight out of mind’ answer to the 
‘problem’.  Many women chose to work alone from their accommodation; this in itself is not 
illegal.  They relied on telephone calls from their clients in order to arrange times for the 
client to visit the prostitute. These women became known as ‘call girls.  The modern variant 
of a call girl is an ‘escort’. Escorts and call girls use a loop-hole within the law because they 
argue that they are not advertising sexual activities for reward.  The sexual activities are 
simply a bonus. However when one looks at Eve Escorts Agency
631, ‘Katy’ whose photo 
depicts her bikini clad, charges £99 for the first hour for services that include GFE (Girl-
Friend Experience), domination, overnight stays and euphemistically ‘extra’ services.632  
Erin, photographed in leather bondage, charges £120 per hour but offers: striptease/lap-dance, 
erotic massage, couples, foot fetish, domination, overnight stays and ‘extra’ services. 633 Katy 
and Erin’s services are at complete variance with the ideology of an escort—one who 
accompanies someone to somewhere. They are prepared to offer their body ‘commonly for 
lewdness for payment in return’634 and are prostitutes in accordance with the de Munck 
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definition, therefore one could argue that not only both women work for a third party as 
prostitutes, but advertise as prostitutes.   
A second area of prostitution that uses the Internet for advertising are brothels that pose as 
massage parlours. Sandy’s Superstars Massage Parlour in Manchester635 similarly to Eve 
Escorts, gives the body measurements of the prostitutes and a list of sexual activities that 
each girl offers. For example: ‘Claire’ offers ‘Girlfriend Experience, OWO, CIM, Kissing, A 
Levels, Reverse O, Reverse A, Facials, Fantasies, Mild Domination, 2 Girl Scene, 2 Guys, 
Couples, Foot Worship, Face Sitting and is a non-smoker’.636 The charge is £50 per 30 
minutes.
637
 Given the de Munck argument, every girl who works for either Eve Escorts or 
Sandy’s Superstars fulfil the criteria of being a prostitute, which means that Katy or Erin and 
the management are also liable for advertising. The management within Eve Escorts and 
Sandy’s Superstars are also liable for controlling for gain prostitutes as per s53 of the SOA 
2003.  
The (Internet) advertisements of the off-street prostitute are far more descriptive than the 
ambiguous ‘I like my job’ tart card638 of the street prostitution and yet neither Eve Escorts nor 
Sandy’s Superstars have been prosecuted for prostitution or obscene advertisements as per 
the Obscene Publications Act 1959 or the Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981. It is the 
street prostitute that, because she is most visible, criminal law prohibits soliciting and 
advertising. Without soliciting or advertising, the street prostitute becomes more dependent 
on third party involvement.       
4.2 Visibility and the nature of prostitution 
Prostitutes often practice their trade in cars and it could be argued that the prostitute and 
client believe that a vehicle would fulfil the expectation of privacy, but it is not the private 
ownership of the vehicle, as explained in Chapter 3, that defines privacy when it comes to 
sexual activities. Indeed, the elements of what is private or public depend on what can be 
seen.  Thus, if the sexual activities inside a car can be seen by a passer-by, it becomes a 
public activity and is an offence under the SOA 2003.    
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Nevertheless, it is not only sexual activities, but  any public activity such as begging, being 
drunk or riotous that is criminalised in order to prevent a public nuisance. The legislation that 
surrounds street prostitution effectively seeks to control and punish acts that are associated 
with prostitution in order to protect the moral interests of the public; yet prostitutes were not 
recognised in statutory legislation.  Until the Vagrancy Act 1824, prostitutes were 
collectively caught under the Vagabonds Act 1609 and the Vagrancy Acts of 1713 and 1744 
with any other citizen who fell into the ‘idle and disorderly’ class of persons. Section 3 of the 
Vagrancy Act 1824 introduced the term ‘common prostitute’ and prohibited prostitutes as 
well as vagabonds from ‘wandering in the public streets or public highways, or in any place 
of public resort, and behaving in a riotous or indecent manner.’ It added the element of 
indecency to distinguish morally upright women who were simply out for a walk from 
prostitutes who were accosting men as shown in R v Duke (1909),
639
 that unless there is 
evidence of indecency in her words or gestures, she is not within the meaning of s3 of the 
Vagrancy Act 1824.  The Act, by creating a stricter element of public nuisance effectively 
prevents street prostitutes from soliciting. In Duval v Denman (1901)
640
  it can be shown how 
the Vagrancy Act 1824 was used to prevent soliciting. The prostitute, having approached 
several men and ‘taking hold of them by the arm and walking a short distance with them’ was 
convicted for behaving in a riotous and indecent manner within the meaning of the Vagrancy 
Act 1824 s3 after one of the men complained to a police constable. 
Furthermore the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 created the offence for common prostitutes to 
assemble in any ‘place of public resort’. The Vagrancy Act 1824 in conjunction with the 
Disorderly Houses Act 1751 prohibited both the keeper of the premises and the prostitute, 
and therefore abolished prostitution within public spaces. Regulating location was reviewed 
in the Wolfenden Report and consequently in the subsequent Street Offences Act 1959 
created the offence for prostitutes to ‘loiter or solicit’ (my emphasis) in a street or public 
place for the purpose of prostitution. The intention of this Act was to abolish street 
prostitution. 
The ‘problem’ of prostitution was at this point seen as the prostitutes being a public nuisance 
in public spaces.  The Acts narrowed the space where prostitutes could go: from being riotous 
in public to simply loitering as per the Street Offences Act 1959. Although there is no offence 
for having sex for money the above Acts restricted the movement of a prostitute in public 
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spaces. The prostitute is now restricted from working on the street and any other public 
space, thus no longer being visible.    
In addition, the location can be inside a building if the prostitute is a nuisance to the public.  
As noted above, in Smith v Hughes
641
 the prostitute was advertising her profession from 
inside a closed building by tapping on a closed window.  Lord Parker said ‘it can matter little 
whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a 
balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half open’.642 He was 
clearly responding to the ideology purported by the Wolfenden Report of clearing the streets 
of prostitution.    
Having restricted the whereabouts of a prostitute, the second ‘problem’ of prostitution was 
the public nuisance caused by clients. The SOA 1956 and the Street Offences Act 1959 were 
implemented with the intention of prohibiting street prostitution. Section 32 of the SOA 1956 
provided: ‘it is an offence for a man persistently to solicit or importune in a public place for 
immoral purposes.’ The purpose was to reduce the nuisance of men who directly approached 
the prostitutes. In Crook v Edmonson [1966]
643
 the court of first instance dismissed the case 
but on appeal from the Crown the central question was whether the defendant had solicited 
for immoral purposes. The Divisional Court held that although he had solicited, it was not for 
‘immoral purposes’ based on the fact that a request for consensual sexual intercourse is not a 
crime in itself.
644
 The difficulties of s32 were again reviewed in Goddard [1991]
645
 where the 
defendant had approached a 28-year-old woman and a 14-year-old girl. It was held that the 
incident with the 28-year-old did not fall within s32 as it was no more than a request for 
intercourse, but the incident with the 14-year-old did fall within s32 as it amounted to 
importuning for immoral purposes. The Court of Appeal held that it was for the jury to decide 
on the evidence, by applying contemporary standards of morality, whether the act involved 
an immoral purpose. 
The unsatisfactory position of s32 in the SOA 1956 where importuning could occur in a 
single incident was amended in s2 of the SOA 1985 which created the offence of persistent 
solicitation of a woman (or different women) for the purpose of prostitution by a man. The 
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SOA 1985 also introduced the new offence of kerb crawling: whereby it became an offence 
under s1(1)(a) for a man to solicit a woman for the purpose of prostitution ‘from a motor 
vehicle while it is in a street or public place’ or if he has ‘just got out, or off, of the vehicle … 
in such manner or … circumstances …[as] to cause … nuisance to other persons in the 
neighbourhood’.646 
The common law public nuisance offence was therefore encapsulated within the SOA 1985 
and removed the opportunity for prostitutes to supply a service. Men could not approach on 
foot because of the SOA 1956 and now could not drive by and slow down or indeed leave the 
vehicle, to ascertain whether the prostitute was willing to have consensual sex for money.  
The Acts circumnavigated the fact that requesting consensual sexual intercourse was, and is, 
not a crime by creating a statutory nuisance of blocking the streets and roadways in order to 
do so.   
The definition of soliciting as per the SOA 1985 was central in Ollerenshaw v Director of 
Public Prosecutions [1991].
647
 The crux of the issue was that although Mr Ollerenshaw was 
in the vicinity of prostitutes he did not approach them. Instead one approached him by calling 
to him from the pavement to ask if he ‘wanted to do business’. He replied ‘yes’ and invited 
her into his car. The Court held that ‘the mere acceptance of an offer, no matter how well the 
man knew the district and no matter how anxious he was to have sexual intercourse with a 
prostitute, did not amount to soliciting’.648 Justice Owen stated: ‘there has been no soliciting 
here by the appellant because there was a prior agreement. Once there was a prior continuing 
agreement, there was no need to beg a favour, to ask or to importune. Accordingly, I would 
find that there was no soliciting’.649 However, Justice Owen made the proviso that ‘it is 
necessary to say that that conclusion does not mean for one moment that if a woman does 
make the first approach a man cannot be guilty of soliciting thereafter. That would be a false 
conclusion as I have endeavoured to indicate’.650 The most modern legislation, the Policing 
and Crime Act 2009, repaired the mischief in Ollerenshaw. It created an offence ‘for a person 
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in a street or public place to solicit another’ (my italics), including a person in a vehicle in the 
street or public place, for the purpose of obtaining sexual services.  This is distinguished from 
the Nordic Model,  which will be discussed in Chapter 5, which only criminalises the client.      
The above Acts are mostly designed to prohibit street prostitution by prosecuting the client as 
well as the prostitute.  The above shows that criminal law treats prostitution differently by its 
external presence. The criminality considering the visual element above has consisted of how 
prostitution is perceived on the streets or thoroughfares, either pedestrian or in cars by 
concentrating on the soliciting of prostitutes and clients. A second element is when 
prostitution is criminalised but not so visual: toilets, brothels and massage parlours. 
4.2.3 Specific enclosed spaces  
The expectation of privacy does not include toilets, brothels or massage parlours. Sexual 
activities are prohibited within brothels and massage parlours, although they are enclosed 
spaces but for different reasons to toilets.   
Toilets are considered to be public spaces and, as shown, the concept of privacy does not 
include toilet cubicles. It is understandable, from a moral viewpoint, for sexual activities to 
be prohibited in a public toilet if it is frequented by members of the public who do not wish to 
participate directly or indirectly in sexual activities.  But the question is why is there a need to 
prohibit sexual activities within brothels and massage parlours?  
4.2.4 Public toilets 
The first enclosed space, where a minimum of privacy could be expected, is the public toilet. 
The SOA 2003 s71 prohibits sexual activities in a public lavatory. However it was never 
intended to specifically target prostitutes. Prior to 1967 homosexuality was illegal and 
homosexuals have traditionally met for sexual activities in public toilets in order to be: a) not 
aligned with prostitutes and b) unnoticed by the general public and police.  Under s13 of the 
SOA 1956 it was an offence ‘for a man to commit an act of gross indecency with another 
man whether in public or private’. The SOA 1967 removed the private element of 
homosexual sexual activities by stating in s1 that ‘a homosexual act in private shall not be an 
offence …’ and although the 1967 Act gave homosexuals new legal rights s1(2) states that 
any sexual activities would not be a private act ‘when more than two persons take part or are 
present … in a lavatory’.  This legislation, although written in neutral language, and therefore 
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applicable to all, was intended to be a continuation of s13 of the SOA 1956. It remains in the 
wording of s71 of the SOA 2003: A person commits an offence if he is in a lavatory to which 
the public … have access … and he intentionally engages in sexual activities as a reasonable 
person would consider it to be sexual. Section 71 of the SOA 2003 is distinct from other 
public nuisances as no one else needs be present or is likely to be present.   
As prostitutes have ever decreasing areas in which to ply their trade they are, as a result,  now 
starting to use public toilets as a venue for sexual activities as noted in the Bath Chronicle 
where it reported that ‘police and council chiefs are investigating reports that public toilets in 
Bath are being used for drug taking and prostitution’.651 The prostitutes, if arrested, would be 
liable under s71 of the 2003 Act. Section 71 of the SOA 2003, ostensibly a device to prohibit 
homosexual sexual activities, also criminalises prostitution in quasi-private areas such as 
toilets.  Section 71 of the Act is a public order offence and not a sexual offence; it is 
purportedly to protect the public so they can have the freedom ‘to use public lavatories for the 
purpose for which they are designed…’652 ASBOs, as discussed earlier, are also used as a 
means of preventing drug use, prostitution and ‘cottaging’ in public toilets. The criminal law 
here is treating two ‘marginalised’ groups of people differently to others by creating a law 
that affects them more than it is likely to affect non-prostitutes or men who do not ‘cottage’.     
Brothels are also visual but any sexual activity is internal.  Brothels are prohibited by the 
SOA 2003 s55 which causes it to be an offence for ‘a person to keep … manage … or assist 
in the management of a brothel …’ However, brothels are on a par with Sexual Entertainment 
Venues that are regulated by Local Authorities. Therefore, why does the criminal law want to 
treat brothels differently from Sexual Entertainment Venues?  It cannot be payment because 
as stated earlier women who work in Sexual Entertainment Venues are paid.  It cannot be the 
activity because the activity is similar except that in a Sexual Entertainment Venue touching 
is prohibited whereas the activity of a prostitute permits touching.   Is this difference so great 
that prostitutes should be treated differently? 
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4.2.5 Massage parlours 
A massage parlour is simply an acceptable name for a brothel. In certain towns the police do 
not close down parlours although the police are aware that the masseuses offer ‘extras’ and 
the parlour is no more than a brothel. The police treat them in much the same way as Sexual 
Entertainments Venues, making infrequent checks to ensure that the women working within 
the massage parlour are not trafficked. In Manchester a Mr Richard Carvath
653
 sent several 
emails to the Greater Manchester Police regarding the previously mentioned massage parlour 
known as ‘Sandy’s Superstars Massage Parlour,’ to which he received a reply that stated that 
the premises had been visited in February 2014, not by the police but by Manchester Action 
on Street Health and ‘during this visit there were no concerns raised’ and subsequently the 
police were not going to investigate or close the massage parlour. Conversely, the Guardian 
newspaper
654
 reported in February 2014 that eighteen brothels were closed during ‘Operation 
Companion’ in Soho.  As noted earlier, Sandy’s Superstars advertise on the Internet—one 
could argue that Sandy of Sandy’s Superstars is in breach of s52(1) of the SOA 2003 because 
Sandy is ‘causing, inciting and controlling prostitution for gain’. Sandy’s defence could be 
that no illegality has happened because the sex worker is not involved in management or 
control of the brothel.  But this a poor defence, given that the name of the massage parlour 
and the advertising implies that Sandy of Sandy’s Superstars controls the prostitutes for gain. 
There is no specific offence for placing advertisements in newspapers and this includes 
adverts on the Internet; however the newspaper or ISP may be liable to prosecution ‘for 
money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002’.655 Yet if Sandys 
Superstars massage parlour was a Sexual Entertainments Venue, it would be allowed to 
advertise and so long as the massage parlour did not offer ‘extras’ as it is euphemistically 
known, then the women would be permitted to touch the customer but not indulge in any 
sexual activities.  
Having established that criminal law treats prostitution differently by its external presence, 
this section has shown that criminal law for a specific enclosed space is not only limited by 
the expectation of privacy but it is also dependent on the activity within.  The criminal law 
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contains a variety of different regulations and prohibitions with regard to specific enclosed 
spaces.   Although not intended to target prostitutes, sexual activities within a public lavatory 
is prohibited. The prohibition set within s71 of the SOA 2003 is gender neutral and is 
therefore applicable to everybody. 
It is the distinction between brothels and Sexual Entertainment Venues that raises the 
question of why one is prohibited and yet the other is licenced and therefore regulated by the 
State. The argument in Smith v Hughes (1960)
656
 gives a clear indication of how it is the 
possibility of visibility as well as the activity within an enclosed space that creates the 
grounds for prohibition of prostitution. However, Sexual Entertainment Venues can be 
located in retail areas that are on the streets. Yet, the Local Authorities have a very strict 
criteria set out in Paragraph 12 of Schedule 3 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1982 for refusing a licence, and cannot refuse a licence on moral grounds.  
The Street Offences Act 1959 made it an offence to solicit in a public place, In Smith v 
Hughes the judicial ‘mischief rule’ was applied and it was held that a window or balcony 
were within the definition of “street”.  Following the logic in Smith and Hughes a legal 
difference was created between a brothel and a Sexual Entertainments Venue based on 
visibility. Lap dancers may be seen outside the venue so long as they are not being lewd or 
obscene and yet a prostitute may not be seen at all. The argument regarding Smith v Hughes 
is that the prostitute was not engaging in sexual activity in the window.  It is the level of 
sexual activity that separates prostitutes from women who work in Sexual Entertainment 
Venues: the prostitute can on occasion engage in touching and intercourse although this is not 
always necessary.       
4.2.6 Brothels  
The Government has remained steadfastly resolute in criminalising brothels.  The Wolfenden 
Report,
657
 as part of its remit, considered whether brothels should be licensed but concluded 
that due to fundamental objections the suggestion could not be countered.  The Government, 
although in haste to rid the visibility of street prostitution, agreed with the Wolfenden 
conclusion and failed to introduce licenced brothels.    
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Brothels remained illegal and it was for the courts to decide what constituted a brothel.  The 
courts defined a brothel as a place where two or more prostitutes participated in physical acts 
of indecency for the sexual gratification of men.  It was ‘not essential to show that the 
premises are in fact used for the purpose of … payment for services rendered’.658  Nor was it 
essential to show that ‘normal sexual intercourse’ was provided in the premises as it was 
sufficient to prove that more than one woman offered herself ‘as a participant in physical acts 
of indecency for the sexual gratification of men’.659   
Despite calls to legalise brothels by the Green Party
660
 in 2002, the Home Office report ‘A 
Coordinated Prostitution Strategy,’661 relying on the ideology that prostitutes are victims, said 
‘[t]his can encourage women to work in isolation and inhibit their ability to protect 
themselves.’662 It was also stated that ‘off street prostitution may seem safer than operating 
on the street but respondents to the review have provided significant evidence of violent 
crime (and robbery) taking place in brothels.’663 Conversely Egan664 notes that in lap dancing 
venues management use CCTV as a means of controlling both the dancers and clients, and 
for brothels, as Sanders outlines, management can implement precautions to avoid robbery 
and violence, such as the use of CCTV, peepholes, banning men in groups and alcohol and 
drugs.
665
   
The Home Office Coordinated Prostitution Strategy noted that some felt decriminalising 
prostitution and permitting brothels  sent ‘the wrong message to young people, and the wider 
public, about the acceptability of prostitution’ and yet that very body of respectability, the 
Women’s Institute passed a resolution in 2007 calling for ‘local authorities to provide safe 
working spaces for the operation of brothels.”666   However, the British Government 
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continued to promote the abolitionist ideology similar to that of Norway and Sweden. The 
Government promoted criminalising the client and any suggestions to create managed areas, 
licensed and regulated brothels, or enable two prostitutes to work from the same residence 
were quietly abandoned.  Instead, to further reduce the visibility of prostitution the 
Government implemented the Policing and Crime Act 2009 which increased police powers to 
arrest and detain sex workers.  By means of issuing an ASBO the sex worker was obliged to 
enter a ‘rehabilitation’ programme or go to prison.  This thesis suggests that the drive to 
abolish prostitution and the implementation of the ASBO drives prostitution further 
underground and puts prostitutes at a greater risk of violence and exploitation.   
The Policing and Crime Act 2009 in conjunction with the Sexual Offences Act 2003 remain 
the two primary sets of legislation criminalising most aspects of prostitution and the Modern 
Slavery Act 2015 s3 criminalises trafficking for sexual exploitation.  However, because of 
further calls to decriminalise prostitution, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 
provided their first inquiry into prostitution.
667
 The Committee produced a report 
recommending that ‘at the earliest opportunity, the Home Office change existing legislation 
so that soliciting is no longer an offence and so that brothel-keeping provisions allow sex 
workers to share premises,’668 with the proviso that the ability to prosecute those who use 
brothels to control or exploit sex workers is not lost and that there must be zero tolerance of 
the organised criminal exploitation of sex workers.
669
  The committee made the 
recommendation on the basis that it would help make the industry safer for those who operate 
within it. 
The Government yet again stalled against making a decision to legalise brothels because of a 
lack of ‘robust evidence regarding the scale and nature of prostitution’670 which would 
require a particularly careful consideration of the link between brothels, trafficking and 
organised criminal gangs
671
 before the merits and demerits of any policy changes and their 
potential implications were to be considered.
672
  The Government’s reluctance to legalise 
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brothels may also fit with James Morton’s comment that ‘there is something inherently 
unattractive about the concept of the State as pimp.’673  
There are other elements that also give rise to arguing against legalising brothels.  Nina 
Lopez-Jones argues that calls to legalise/decriminalise brothels are ‘usually aimed at 
protecting men's right to sex without risk to their health, reputation or career prospects, rather 
than at protecting women's right not to be criminalised for earning a living.’674  Other 
arguments include the complaint that the police do not take attacks against sex workers 
seriously,
675
 the stigma remaining attached to prostitution,
676
 and the licencing and profiting 
from brothels still equating to ‘the degradation of women.’677   
The arguments against legalising brothels are legitimate when looking at the problems in 
Nevada or Australia.  Nevada is the only state that permits brothels and in Australia 
legislation differs from state to state with brothels remaining illegal in the Northern Territory 
and South Australia.  This thesis contends that because there are differing legislative systems 
that reflect the political and moral compass of each area, the areas where brothels are legal 
take on a different perspective where the outside influences appeal to the commercial aspect 
but lack in promoting tolerance toward the prostitutes.  Another aspect is that the outside 
influences cause prostitutes to be considered as nothing more than sexual commodities and 
this in turn creates poor working conditions with little support from external agencies such as 
the police.   
Thus, the conditions prostitutes work in can vary from collaborative to abusive and 
exploitative and to understand this further the relationship between the prostitute and the 
client needs to be explored.  
The client plays an important role in this discussion because as Janice Raymond notes ‘a 
[heterosexual] prostitution market without male consumers would go broke.’678  Nonetheless 
the reduction of demand by criminalisation is not the answer.   The issue of demand with regards 
to heterosexual prostitution is, as Swedish law suggests, gendered.  Sullivan and Jeffreys argue 
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that ‘women in prostitution are suitable objects for…  unwanted remarks, … whilst their female 
workmates in factories and offices are not.’679  Sexism, in the form of ‘unwanted remarks’ is not 
restricted to the sex industry and men grab and harass women whether they have ‘paid for it’ or not.   
It is because demand is gendered that legalising brothels makes prostitutes available to more 
men
680
and this negative aspect can be shown by the Australian super brothels.  Sullivan and 
Jeffreys noted that in 2001 the population of Victoria consisted of 3.5 million people of 
whom 60,000 men visited the bigger brothels each week.
681
  This does not provide a reason to 
stop legalising brothels but it is an example of how the novelty of a legal brothel has an 
impact on the local society.  If prostitution was legal country wide in Australia (with the 
benefit of brothels) then the novelty value would diminish and prostitution would be treated 
with greater respect as it is in New Zealand.   
If the ‘novelty’ of prostitution is destroyed by legalising brothels, then the next step would be 
to change the language of the ‘thousands of men who use women in the sex industry’682 to a 
more understanding concept.  Men will pay for sex but not use prostitutes for sex.  
The UK version of the Swedish/Nordic model has been implemented primarily to abolish 
street prostitution and multi-use brothels, however the law is silent if a prostitute works from 
home on the condition that she works alone, without the protection of a manager/pimp or 
fellow prostitute.  The criminal law does restrict advertising for the prostitute who works at 
home but if Lord McColl’s Advertising of Prostitution (Prohibition) Bill had not failed due to 
lack of time, the law would have criminalised any advertising of prostitution online or in 
newspapers.    This would have caused prostitutes to either risk prosecution for advertising or 
be driven onto the streets and risk prosecution for soliciting.   
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Chapter 5 - The proposal: improving all performers’ working 
conditions by better regulating the commercial sex industry  
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis suggests that when looking at the nature of the sexual activities, prostitution is 
treated differently to other sex work by social attitudes and the law.  Social attitudes  perceive 
a prostitute to be ‘other’ because she can engage in sexual intercourse with a client, whereas 
the performer in pornography does not have contact with the viewer/audience, and a 
performer in the adult entertainment industry is bound by a ‘no touching’ rule.  
However, in law, an individual just needs to behave in a manner that outrages the minimum 
standards of decency and creates a public nuisance towards various persons for payment to be 
considered a prostitute. The De Munck definition was established on facts that leave no doubt 
as to the need for lewdness but not sexual intercourse, since a young girl of 14 years of age 
who was still a virgin was considered a prostitute. Therefore, in contradiction to the ruling in 
Hindu Religious Association Leamington and Warwick v Warwick District Council (2013), 
and following the logic of the DeMunck definition in the literal sense, surely the prostitute is 
the same as performers in pornography and the adult entertainment industry and should be 
treated   no differently to other sex workers and vice-versa.   
The main issue that cuts across the three areas of sex work are the repeated difficulties to 
ensure at law that all sex workers consent freely, without physical coercion, fiscal pressure, 
deception as to payment and sexually transmitted diseases. The difficulties are most obvious 
with prostitution, but they are not absent in other areas, even if less acute. Criminal law is ill-
equipped to protect effectively individuals, and in particular sex workers, from sexually 
transmitted diseases. Sex workers in adult entertainment venues should not be concerned as 
the ‘no touching’ rule applies, but for the prostitute and the performer in pornography, the 
issue is present. At criminal law, not informing a sexual partner of a risk of infection does not 
vitiate consent to the sexual activities under s74 SOA 2003. It may only lead to a charge 
under s18 or s20 Offences against the Persons Act 1861. Paradoxically, to require the use of a 
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condom—that protects against the transmission of diseases—is recognised as part of the 
newly developed concept of conditional consent, where should the condition (of a condom) 
be breached, the criminal law would consider that the consent was vitiated and rape can 
occur. In practice, the sex worker in the worst position is the prostitute who is in a vulnerable 
position if her client does not want to wear a condom or informed her (without lying) as to his 
risk of infection. For the performer of pornography, if a sexually transmitted disease is 
discovered, the constraints established on the set lead to the closure of the studio until 
everybody has been tested. By contrast, the prostitute, being on her own, and often on the 
streets without protection, is unlikely to have any recourse, and is also less likely to be 
shielded from physical coercion if the client does not agree with her request regarding sexual 
health.  
Furthermore, consent interplays with the purpose of the activity, i.e. making a profit. For each 
area of the sex industry, the effect of payment, or lack of payment, on consent arises in 
different situations. For the prostitute, payment by the client is integral to her consent to the 
sexual activities. Yet, for the client’s lack of payment to vitiate her consent under s74, one 
must prove that the client intended never to pay her, which would be particularly difficult 
unless physical violence occurred. Lack of consent is not considered under the new concept 
of conditional consent with the condition being payment, despite the use of condoms or 
information about gender being accepted. For performers in pornography, and the adult 
entertainment industry, any lack of payment or threat of withdrawal of payment by their 
managers/employers remains solely within the realm of the civil law of contract. The 
irrefutable presumption at criminal law—as there is no offence if a manager of a venue 
applies a fine- is that the sex worker has consented and the consent is not vitiated by lack of 
payment. For the prostitute, the criminal law deals with this issue by taking the exact opposite 
stance, and criminalises pimping or management of prostitutes, as well as brothels, on the 
implicit understanding that if the pimp ‘controls’ the prostitute, she cannot consent freely to 
the sexual activities. 
These difficulties as to consent show that the location and surroundings of the sex work – 
linked to the visibility of the activity—can also play an important role in safeguarding the sex 
worker. Pornography locations and adult entertainment venues are all legal and regulated, 
with advertising possible even if strictly constrained. Conversely, the prostitute, who cannot 
join a brothel, is on the street at the mercy of the violence from her clients, and faces in 
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addition the risk of arrest for soliciting and so is unable to advertise her services. The 
criminal law blurs the distinction between the voluntary prostitute and the trafficked 
prostitute—and although the focus is put on the client, it continually refers to the links 
between prostitution and crime.
683
 Her client is also at risk of arrest for soliciting with the 
criminal law having adopted a ‘steady trajectory towards arresting men’ and the ‘subsequent 
naming and shaming in the local media’. 684 By contrast, the client of pornography (for 
instance a cinema licenced to show sex films) or of a Sexual Entertainment Venue can 
approach the premises without fear of committing a criminal offence. For the client of 
pornography who views at home, the only offence would be that of possessing extreme 
pornography, which would be committed after having purchased the pornographic material, 
not before the purchase.  
Therefore, the key questions are how to protect all sex workers equally with regards to 
consent, the nature of the activity to which they consent, and the purpose (payment); as well 
as to establish regulated advertising for all areas of sex work. To do so, I argue that 
prostitution needs to be decriminalised entirely along the NZ model and that the model needs 
to be extended to include all other sex workers who are not ‘prostitutes’. 
In stark contrast to England implementing the Nordic model, this proposal offers a different 
strategy that is in line with the NZ model;  a model which already paved the way for a 
proposal presented in Scotland by Jean Urquhart MSP in 2015
685
. 
This Chapter will move away from the four contextual connectors:  consent, nature of the 
sexual activities, purpose and visibility as shown in the previous chapters and will instead 
outline the NZ model followed by criticisms and rebuttals before leading into the proposal for 
legislation to legalise brothels and solicitation in the United Kingdom.  The proposal will 
then be criticized and the criticisms will be rebutted.   
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1.2 The New Zealand model 
The Prostitution Reform Act 2003, supported by the New Zealand Prostitutes Collective, 
decriminalised prostitution and is referred to as the New Zealand model. Promoting the 
opposite approach to the Nordic model, it provides all sex workers with a legal framework 
that upholds safety and rights including labour rights. The Prostitution Reform Act 2003 is 
for nationals of New Zealand only and non-citizens may not apply for a visa to work for the 
purposes of sex work—either as a prostitute or as an operator.  Any non-citizen of New 
Zealand working as a prostitute or operator are liable to have their visa revoked and be 
deported under s157 of the (New Zealand) Immigration Act 2009.
686
 Prior to the Prostitution 
Reform Act 2003, the law, much like that of England, prevented soliciting for the purposes of 
prostitution, keeping a brothel, living on the earnings of prostitution and procuring persons 
for the purposes of prostitution.  
The purpose of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 was to legalise prostitution so as to: 
safeguard the human rights of sex workers and protect them from exploitation;
687
 promote the 
welfare, health and safety of sex workers
688
and prohibits the use in prostitution of persons 
under eighteen years of age.
689
 Sections 20 and 21 specifically prohibit persons under the age 
of 18 from being employed by a operator or hired by a client. 
Brothels in the NZ model are defined in two different ways: small owner-operated and 
operator run brothels. Local Authorities can make bylaws controlling both the location
690
 and 
signage
691
 of the brothel. The advertising of the brothel is prohibited on radio, television and 
cinema
692
 but classified advertisements are allowed in a newspaper or periodical.
693
 
Small owner-operated brothels are where not more than four sex workers work and each sex 
worker retains control over earnings from prostitution carried out at the brothel.
694
 For more 
than four prostitutes, it is any premises kept or habitually used for the purposes of 
prostitution
695
 that is run by an operator who owns, operates, controls or manages the 
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business.
696
 The operators are required to have an ‘operators certificate’697 issued by the 
Registrar of the District Court.
698
 Sex workers in small owner-operator brothels are exempt.  
Once registered, all operators of the brothels, small or large, must promote safe sex practices 
and the workers and clients must adopt the safe sex practices. Prophylactic sheaths and/or 
other appropriate barriers must be provided and safer sex health information must be 
prominently displayed.
699
 It is the responsibility of both the sex worker and the client to 
ensure that the sheath or other barrier is used and both the sex worker and client must not 
imply that they are not infected with a sexually transmitted disease when in fact they are.
700
  
However, all sex workers have the right to refuse consent
701
 for whatever reason. They are 
protected from any coercion to consent by the operators, either by violence or by a form of 
fine and the client even if he has already paid. Such refusal does not affect the right for the 
client to recover damages,
702
 nor does it affect the sex workers entitlements under the (New 
Zealand) Social Security Act 1964.
703
 Should the sex worker decide to leave work, their exit 
strategy is not impeded by having their entitlements affected because they now refuse to do, 
or continue to do, sex work.
704
 In effect, the reform establishes legal boundaries so as to 
avoid deception as to sexual health, fiscal pressure by managers or by client, and physical 
violence. 
1.2.1 Criticisms and rebuttals to the criticisms of the New Zealand Model  
The principle behind the PRA was to safeguard prostitutes by decriminalising prostitution. 
This section will show that since 2003 there have been criticisms of the model including the 
level of violence against sex-workers; little or no reduction in street prostitution; and the 
stigma against prostitution remaining. 
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1.2.2 Violence toward prostitutes did not reduce 
Alex Penk, researching for the Maxim Institute,
705
 states that the PRA fails because there is 
‘no recognition of the abuse that purchasers of sex are subjecting prostitutes to’706 and 
Melissa Farley agrees that the violence against prostitutes has continued despite prostitution 
being decriminalised.  She believes that the PRA does not offer ‘any specific protection from 
the violence that is intrinsic to prostitution’707  and that ‘the NZ law keeps the names of 
brothel owners secret, thus making public health inspections of brothels an impossibility.’708  
Instead of the PRA protecting prostitutes from violence she argues that ‘in fact, the law 
protects the privacy of pimps and generally represents the interests of johns.’709 She also 
suggests that some brothel owners are refusing to allow the prostitutes to reject customers
710
  
and consequently the women prefer to work as street prostitutes because they feel safer than 
when working in brothels.  She noted that prostitutes when working on the streets could 
‘refuse dangerous appearing or intoxicated customers’ and their friends could ‘make a show 
of writing down the john’s car license plate number, which they considered a deterrent to 
customer violence.’711  This was also an added protection against the client because a ‘john 
could be easily traced using such methods, whereas a brothel customer’s identity would likely 
be protected by the brothel owners, making it difficult to prosecute him for violent 
behaviour.’712 
1.2.2.1  Rebuttal re: Violence toward prostitutes did not reduce 
Contreras and Farley state that ‘legalising prostitution does not decrease violence against 
women in prostitution’713 and if taken literally this is true.  No statute in written form can 
protect a person but the change in law does help toward the change in attitude and gives the 
victim redress.  This can be shown when a prostitute was awarded substantial damages for 
sexual harassment by a brothel owner in a Human Rights Review Tribunal.   The New 
Zealand Prostitutes Collective told Fairfax News that ‘it could never have happened when sex 
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work was illegal.  It indicates the massive change (the industry) has gone through.’714 The 
change in legislation empowered the prostitute to be able to seek compensation and the result 
sends a message to brothel owners and clients alike that the women who work in brothels are 
not there to be abused.   
1.2.3 Little or no reduction in street prostitution  
Street prostitution has an inherent problem of ‘under-employment’715 which creates low 
incomes for the sex worker.  However, because they ‘desire autonomy from brothel owners’ 
they work without security or protection by ‘frequenting the docks and truck stops.’716  These 
prostitutes are at risk of violence due to the very nature of them having either very limited or 
no security from friends or police.  Violent behaviour toward prostitutes has been recorded as 
happening in Christchurch (NZ) where members of the public ‘regularly drove to the area … 
to shout and harass sex workers as well as throwing eggs at them’ and in Manukau residents 
held campaigns to remove street prostitution from the area.
717
 
1.2.3.1 Rebuttal re: Little or no reduction in street prostitution 
Alex Penk suggests that the Committee’s718 research shows that the PRA 2003 has failed.  In 
the “Scoop”719 media release he states that ‘worryingly there are still significant numbers 
working on the streets …’ and that ‘the numbers of street prostitutes have failed to drop.’   He 
criticises the PRA by saying that the PRA fails to provide alternatives for those caught up in 
prostitution.  It offers no pathways to help sex workers to change their lives. 
This is to suggest that ‘exit’ strategies as with the Nordic system, are put in place to abolish 
prostitution   but in New Zealand any exit strategies would need to eradicate ‘the barriers to 
women exiting prostitution.’720  As there is a lack of reliable data about the scale and 
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operation of prostitution in New Zealand
721
 it is difficult for critics such as Penk to assert 
whether the PRA has indeed failed.   The Report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee 
makes no mention of an intention to reduce the numbers of prostitution but it does state that 
although numbers are difficult to assess, there is a ‘perception that there has been an increase 
…[which] may be due to sex workers working more visibly in some areas.’722  
1.2.4 Stigma against prostitution remains 
Contreras and Farley suggest that the ‘social stigma of prostitution persisted five years after 
decriminalisation in New Zealand’723 implying that social prejudice remains and prostitution 
is shameful.  Contreras and Farley say that the inequality can be shown by the fact that 
although ‘johns are legally and socially protected’ as per s4 of the PRA 2003, no one ‘wants 
the business of prostitution operating in his or her community’724 and therefore prostitution 
still carries a stigma.  Because of the stigma prostitutes are socially ‘invisible as full human 
beings’725 and subsequently ‘those in prostitution often internalize toxic public and private 
contempt directed against them.’726  Social prejudice can also be seen by the attitudes 
regarding the belief that it is prostitutes who are responsible for the spread of sexually 
transmitted diseases. Kingston notes that ‘members of the Papatoetoe Community Patrol 
group’ believed that the prostitutes ‘posed a risk to their clients and client’s partners.’727 
Another form of stigmatisation can be shown by brothels having their own hierarchy and thus 
charge different rates.  High-end brothels can charge a half-hourly fee of approx. $350 
whereas ‘lower-end walk-in brothels’ ‘charge considerably less… between $160 and 220 per 
hour.’728  This suggests that the hierarchy causes the ‘lower end’ prostitutes to be considered 
of less personal value. 
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1.2.4.1 Rebuttal re: Stigma against prostitution remains 
The Report
729
 accepts that stigma ‘plays a key role in the non-reporting of incidences’730 but 
notes that ‘it will take time before it dissipates’731 however there ‘has been a change of 
attitude’ … by some members of the Police [toward] sex-workers.732   
Scoular, when discussing prostitution and health says ‘Rights continue to be an important 
vehicle through which to challenge criminal regimes that threaten health.’733 This comment 
can be equally applied when discussing the overall stigma of prostitution given that part of 
the basis of stigma lies in the belief echoing from the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1862, 
1866 and 1869 that a prostitute is ‘dirty’ because she carries and spreads disease.   Giusta  
notes that stigma can be understood as a ‘loss of reputation which affects social standing for 
both clients and sex workers’734 however, ‘decriminalisation is framed by the assumption that 
the stigma of prostitution will cease if it is not treated as though it needs special criminal 
justice or civil regulations.’735 Instead prostitution takes ‘its place alongside any other 
profession’736 and like any other form of employment prostitution is regulated by health and 
safety provisions.  Phoenix notes that ‘decriminalisation has had a marked effect on 
safeguarding and protecting the rights and safety of those selling sex.’737   
Taking note of the criticisms of the NZ model, the next section will now put forward the 
proposal. 
1.3 The proposal  
Katherine Raymond, advisor to the then Home Secretary David Blunkett, argued that ‘sex 
workers lead difficult and dangerous lives and the truth is that most people, including 
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politicians, don’t care what happens to them’. 738 My proposal is to suggest the repeal of 
certain laws and offer a model much in line with the NZ model, similar to that of Jean 
Urquhart, the independent MSP, who brought forward a ‘radical policy for change’739 in 
Scotland,. The purpose of the proposal is to bring better cohesion to the law regarding the sex 
industry and to ensure less risk to the prostitute given that, as Raymond notes ‘possibly 
more’740 than an average of six prostitutes are murdered each year.  
I suggest that the criminality of prostitution could be solved from a criminal law perspective 
by including brothels within the Policing and Crime Act 2009 that gives Local Authorities 
powers to regulate Sexual Entertainment Venues and Sexual Encounter Establishments.  
Alternatively, and probably a better solution, would be to be introduce new legislation, as 
suggested by the 2014 ‘Shifting the Burden’741 report but this proposal recommends that 
within the drafting it encapsulates the whole sex industry under one title.  The new 
Commercial Sexual Activity Act (for the want of a title) would work alongside the SOA 2003 
and the Offences against the Person Act 1861.  This would remove the plethora of statutes 
that were once described as a ‘patchwork quilt of provisions ancient and modern’742 and it 
would work, not because ‘people make it do so’743 but because there is ‘a coherence and 
structure’.744   
To begin with, the issue of consent must be addressed.  Section 17 of the (New Zealand) 
Prostitution Reform Act 2003 protects the human rights of prostitutes by providing them with 
the right by law to withdraw consent and clarifies that the exchange of money does not 
constitute consent to sexual activity for the purposes of criminal law.  Section 74 of the SOA 
2003, as discussed in previous chapters, although offering a definition of consent does not 
explain clearly enough how a person can be ‘free’ to make a ‘choice’ to consent. It also fails 
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to define that consent can be conditional thus leaving the courts to interpret conditional 
consent.  The wording of s74 is neutral insofar as it applies to either sex but does not make 
any special provision for sex workers.  This proposal will include provisions for all sex-
workers for all forms of consent and not just for prostitutes, as with the NZ model.    
Conditional consent is paramount for a sex worker. The condition of a protective device such 
as a condom helps to prevent unwanted pregnancies and the spread of sexually transmitted 
disease. Public Health England commented in their Press Release that ‘Individuals can 
significantly reduce their risk of catching or passing on an STI by consistently and correctly 
using condoms.’745  The proposed Act will, in the spirit of the NZ model include the right for 
a sex worker (or client) to insist on the use of a prophylactic.   Section 9 of the PRA 2003 
makes it compulsory for the prostitute and client to take ‘all reasonable steps’ to ensure a 
sheath or other appropriate barrier is used for any sexual activity that has a risk of acquiring 
or transmitting sexually transmissible infections.   
 
The nature of the sexual activities, as with non-commercial sexual activities, should remain 
outside of the criminal law’s remit unless harm occurs that falls within the boundaries already 
established at law.   The purpose of the sexual activities as with all commercial sexual 
activities is to make a living which in turn raises issues as to the visibility of the venues with 
regards to unwitting viewers. This proposal suggests that for prostitutes working in groups of 
four or less within a building, the premises would constitute a ‘small owner-occupied brothel’ 
and at least one of the prostitutes must live in the premises as either the owner or occupier 
(tenant). The prostitutes must be part of a collective and the use of external pimps is not 
permitted. Groups of five or more prostitutes, all working within the same purpose built 
premises, would be designated as a Sexual Encounter Venue and would be regulated by the 
Local Authority.   The revenue required for the extra resources for each Local Authority 
could be met through the cost of the licence for each brothel and Council/business Tax 
payments.   
The brothel, as with lap dancing and peep show clubs, would be regulated by the Local 
Authority under the remit of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982. 
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This would reduce the risk of the prostitute being a victim to her pimp as the prostitute would 
be protected by the same employment laws that affect all workers, as are women who work in 
other Sexual Entertainment Venues and the pornographic industry. An additional proviso 
would be added that the Local Authority must ensure that the premises are inspected (to 
ensure the safety of the sex workers) on a minimum of four pre-announced visits per year and 
four unannounced visits. The prostitute would then have the opportunity to tell the inspector 
if she has been coerced or if an external pimp is controlling her.  Admittedly this would 
depend on the prostitutes and inspectors developing a good relationship but it is not 
unfeasible that such a relationship could exist.  The Local Authority in Leeds set up a 
managed zone where the prostitutes were free from the risk of arrest during certain hours and 
consequently developed a better relationship with the police.
746
   
  
The removal of external third parties (pimps) would allow prostitutes to be able to work 
together from the same venue and have the choice of either working for themselves or using 
the services of a manager who is solely responsible for that one brothel, alleviating the need 
for an illegal pimp who offers the prostitute no protection from him, instead forcing her to 
work under threats of violence.  On the face of it there would be no difference between pimp 
and manager but with managed brothels a prostitute would be ‘freelance’ and therefore free 
to leave and work elsewhere.  A prostitute working for a pimp is far less likely to be able to 
leave for fear of reprisals due to the complex relationship with the pimp.
747
   The prostitute 
would also be protected from the client who would no longer be able to take her to a remote 
place. If brothels were permitted, the criminal law would be able to protect the prostitutes by 
instigating a drive to ensure that no offences found within the Offences against the Persons 
Act 1861 or the Criminal Justice Act 1988 s40 were caused against the prostitute. This means 
that neither the client nor the pimp would be able to physically harm the prostitute. 
The brothel could advertise under the Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981 in the same way 
as a Sexual Entertainments Venue does and display the signage that states: 
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‘WARNING Persons passing beyond this notice will find material on display which they may 
consider indecent. No admittance to persons under 18 years of age’.748 
The notice would prevent unintentional passers-by and underage youth from entering. At the 
moment prostitutes are prohibited from advertising or soliciting, and there is a degree of 
difference between the two: soliciting involves direct interaction between the prostitute and 
the client, or the client and the prostitute. Sexual Entertainment Venues are prohibited from 
soliciting but as already mentioned are permitted to advertise. It would therefore be 
criminally responsible to continue the anti-soliciting nuisance law with regards to 
prostitution.  
This proposal departs from the NZ model because it includes all sex workers under the same 
umbrella statute.  In this way sex workers in the pornographic industry are further protected 
because they will have the same legal rights to insist on a prophylactic sheath or other 
appropriate barrier being used whilst engaging in sexual activity for the benefit of the 
pornographic film or pictures. Another departure from the NZ model is with regards to the 
signage outside a brothel.  The NZ model makes the provision that the Territorial Authorities 
may make bylaws that prohibit or regulate signage that advertises commercial sexual 
services.  The proposal for the new Act provides that there is one standard sign for all types 
of commercial sexual activity. This includes pornographic film and photo studios and Live 
Sexual Entertainment venues with Local Authorities being given the power to ensure that the 
sign complies with the legislation.   As with the NZ model, prostitutes who do not work in a 
brothel containing 5 or more sex workers, will be restricted to advertising in the classified 
advertisements section of the newspaper or periodical, however, soliciting will not be 
criminalised by either the sex worker or the potential client.   
This proposal also departs from the NZ model which rejected legalising prostitution because 
it would contain a need for a licensing regime which would need extensive administration 
and enforcement resources whereas this proposal would contain a prerequisite that all 
brothels will be subject to inspections.  Unlike Farley’s comments regarding the names of NZ 
brothel owners being kept secret, the licence holder and names of those working in a 
managerial capacity would be registered with the Local Authority.  Within the proposed Act 
to run in conjunction with the Licensing Act 2003, a requirement would be imposed for each 
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Local Authority to keep a register
749
 of all brothel owners and management; any security 
activity to be included within the licence
750
 and a legal duty for the owner/manager to 
publicly display, keep and produce the licence for examination by a constable or authorised 
person.
751
 
This proposal builds on the concept of consent and conditional consent which not only 
protects prostitutes but also those who work in the Live Sexual Entertainment industry.  The 
proposal makes a distinction between working in a brothel and a Live Sexual Entertainment 
venue where the one metre rule will still apply.    
By implementing the proposal the term ‘prostitute’ would then become superfluous: a 
‘prostitute’ would be a sex worker with identical rights as a lap dancer or any other sex 
worker. The generic term ‘sex worker’ would then be able to rightly address all people who 
work within the sex industry and the term prostitute could be removed from statute.  
1.4 Arguments against legalising prostitution and rebuttals. 
The proposal recommends introducing an overarching Act of Parliament, which whilst 
focusing on prostitution, would unify the regulation of the sex industry as a whole.  Of course 
there are arguments against such a suggestion and this section will deal with some of the 
critiques. 
 The Government considered the policy issue regarding legalised brothels and the opportunity 
for sex workers to work together in small groups.  Such a suggestion was raised in the 
Wolfenden Committee Report, and again in 2006  in the ‘Coordinated Prostitution Strategy 
and a Summary of responses to Paying the Price’ but insisted that managed prostitution was 
‘not an activity that we can tolerate in our towns and cities’.752   This policy issue is in line 
with academic arguments that suggest legalising brothels is ‘pie in the sky,’753   on the basis 
that ‘prostitution is fundamentally immoral.’754   These arguments detract from the main 
issues, namely: the  right of prostitutes and other sex workers to retract or refuse consent 
safely, the right for the prostitute and other sex workers to choose the nature of their sexual 
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activity, which in turn relates to consent, the right for prostitutes and other sex workers to 
make a living from their chosen profession and lastly the right for prostitutes and other sex 
workers not to be cast aside as ‘other’ whilst respecting the need for their activities to be kept 
discrete.  Thus, this section will look at the following issues: harm; health; regulation; and 
whether brothels have an effect on the surrounding location.   
1.4.1 The issue of harm 
We have seen in previous chapters, for both pornography (Chapter 2) and prostitution 
(Chapter 4) that recent legislation
755
 was introduced following the government’s narrative 
regarding physical and psychological harm.  This is not to be confused with safety.   
The proposal suggests that brothels are made legal and subject to regular inspection but as 
Susan Edward notes ‘even with inspection and regulation … [the] women’s personal safety 
can never be adequately addressed’.756  Not only will prostitutes remain at risk, personal 
safety for trafficked women will increase.   The law at present criminalises all forms of 
trafficking: the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 criminalises trafficking for 
reasons of prostitution, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 criminalises trafficking for all forms of 
sexual exploitation and the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 criminalises forced labour.  More 
recently the Government has introduced the Modern Slavery Act 2015 s(2) with a broader 
remit that criminalises a person who ‘arranges or facilitates the travel of another person’ with 
the view to exploit that person for any purpose irrespective as to whether that person consents 
to travel. 
Amnesty International claim that the legislation is ‘not fit for purpose’ and that ‘officials are 
overly concerned with immigration issues rather than assisting the victims of traumatic 
crimes, including sexual exploitation…’757 The Modern Slavery Act 2015 introduced after 
Amnesty International’s claim but it could be argued that the claim still stands. 
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It could be argued that exploitation will continue in licensed brothels because they ‘can end 
up being controlled by criminal cartels’758  and ‘without proper and regular inspection of 
commercial and private brothels, commercial crime is inevitable,’759  leaving the prostitute 
with even less safety. 
1.4.1.1 Rebuttal re: the issue of harm 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 s55 criminalises keeping a brothel for the use of prostitution 
and any property occupied by more than one woman for prostitution is a brothel.
760
 Therefore 
legislation at present makes it ‘impossible for a prostitute to inform police that he or she is 
being "trafficked" or knows of a person who is "trafficked" without risking arrest.’761  If 
criminalisation, both of the prostitute and the client, is continued then ‘the government makes 
it less likely abuse will be reported, increasing the vulnerability of those they wish to help. 
Traffick[ed] victims will pay the price.’762  Whereas ‘brothel and agency owners … are the 
most likely to see and report victims of trafficking,’763 it is the prostitutes who are in the best 
position to identify victims of sex trafficking and have the most motivation to bring such 
victims to safety. 
764
   
By regulating the brothels so that either in a small brothel the owner/occupier or in larger 
brothels the manager is in control, the argument that ‘licensed brothels can end up being 
controlled by criminal cartels’765 would be negated because the management would be 
regulated.  The suggestion that ‘without proper and regular inspection of commercial and 
private brothels, commercial crime is inevitable,’766  given that it is often the criminal cartels 
who use trafficked women and children for prostitution would be redundant. 
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The proposal within this thesis will include all trafficked sex workers – for instance, those 
who work in lap dancing clubs (and are forced to give “special” dances) as well as those who 
are forced to work as prostitutes.  The offence will remain as a strict liability offence with 
proof of mens rea not being required if it can be shown that the person was "forced, 
threatened, coerced or deceived" by a third party who was aware, or ought to know, that the 
person was trafficked. 
Decriminalising brothels and at the same time more effectively applying sanctions regarding 
controlling and/or purchasing sexual activity from a trafficked prostitute, gives the trafficked 
prostitute (or indeed any worker within the sex industry) the ability to either report the fact 
she is trafficked either directly to the police or to her manager without indirect repercussions.  
This in turn puts her, and non-trafficked sex workers in general, on equal terms with people 
who are not involved in the commercial sex industry with regards to having the freedom to 
make the choice whether to consent, to refuse consent or to withdraw consent.  The  Nordic 
model has an adverse effect to all prostitutes because it forces them to work in more 
dangerous ways than those who are protected by the NZ model.  The proposal takes its lead 
from the NZ model, which although silent on the matters of trafficking, provides inspectors 
with the powers to enter brothels.
767
 Mishra argues that decriminalisation is ‘a necessary step 
to securing sex workers rights’ and although decriminalisation does not ‘fix’ the situation it 
creates a better environment in which to prevent and curtail trafficking.
768
   
1.4.2 The issue of health and hygiene  
Keogh argues that in many cases health advantages (screening, for example) are not delivered 
and uses as his example Australia, where prostitution is regulated 
769
  and Morton notes that 
unregulated brothels ‘operate on all levels of quality and hygiene770 meaning that if a brothel 
is not regularly inspected the levels of hygiene can be so low as to be dangerous for the 
prostitutes as well as the clients.  Mayhew and Mossman note that ‘there are many barriers to 
exiting sex work: not least of the reasons are economic and the difficulty to ease back into 
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‘normal’ society.771   The barriers to exiting sex work force prostitutes to ‘end up back on the 
streets’772  and Morton suggests that as the prostitute gets older her position is further 
downgraded
773
  until she has no protection or autonomy whatsoever. 
1.4.2.1 Rebuttal to the issues of health and hygiene 
When discussing health and hygiene, and the avoidance of spreading sexually transmitted 
diseases, one must be careful to avoid the suggestion that prostitutes are ‘dirty’ and that it is 
the prostitute that spreads disease. The proposal does not suggest that legislation should force 
all prostitutes to be screened.  This would return to the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864, 
1866 and 1869 where women were harassed by police and subjected to ‘instrumental rape’774  
in the form of an internal medical examination.  To implement legislation that orders sex 
workers to have regular medical check-ups would have to be monitored by the police or other 
official, thus creating an ‘us and them’ relationship and consequently creating a chasm that 
would hinder any sex worker who needs to report any trafficking or other problem.  
 The NZ model makes it an offence to practice sex without prophylactics and as a matter of 
formality ‘each client should be examined by the sex worker to detect any visible signs of 
sexually transmitted disease’775 thus protecting both the sex worker and the client without 
laying any moral blame on either party.  My proposal suggests the same; that it is the 
responsibility of both the prostitute and client to practice safe sex and to inform each other if 
they have a transmissible disease then, the client/prostitute will have the freedom to decide 
whether to consent to sexual activity, and what form of sexual activity.  As discussed in the 
proposal above, the same should apply to women who work in the pornographic industry. All 
workers in the sex industry would have the legal right to insist on the use of prophylactics 
and pornography studios would be subject to regular inspection to ensure, among other 
things, that prophylactics are available.  Susan Edwards notes that in Australia sex workers 
are provided guidance by the Code of Practice as per the Australian Occupational Health and 
Safety Act 1998, with regards to ‘linen, food preparation, sex toys, accidental spills of body 
fluids, disposals of sharps, amenities, and education and training for sex workers.’ There is 
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‘no mechanism for monitoring or enforcement of the Code of Practice’ which means it is not 
the responsibility of the police or other agency, but in the interests of safety, the prostitute, 
manager and client can implement their own form of checks and balances by reporting the 
person who is breaching the law:  thus, each regulates the other.  The Ministry of Justice 
Report notes that the ‘PRA brought the sex industry under the (New Zealand) Health and 
Safety in Employment Act 1992’776 and that ‘there is a high level of awareness of 
Occupational Safety and Health requirements’777 however, they also noted that, as with the 
Australian system, ‘there is no system of regular inspections of brothels by Medical Officers 
of Health, and the Department of Labour.’778 The move toward ‘written, best practice 
employment contracts becoming standard for sex workers in brothels strengthen the human 
rights, employment conditions, health and safety, and well-being of sex workers’779 
The proposal suggests that sex work is work.  There are arguments that create a ‘contest 
between pro- and anti-sex sex work’780 and these arguments often direct ‘attention away from 
understanding sex work as work.’781 Jean Urquhart MSP in her proposal for the Prostitution 
Law Reform (Scotland) Bill said that ‘Policy‐ makers frequently reduce sex workers to a 
single homogenous group arguing that they all share the same characteristics’782 but this 
thesis argues that there is no standard sex worker, although each follow a set of rules, rituals 
and routines
783
and they pass their skills on to new workers.  This is not to say that sex work is 
“good” work, no more than any other low ability work is “good,” it is commercial sexual 
labour offered as a service.
784
  
By proposing that sex work is work, it offers the sex worker autonomy, with equal rights to 
all other workers and therefore provides the worker with the option to opt into a pension 
scheme, and for the management to provide, by law, a pension scheme.    
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Therefore, as a sex worker ages, she can either move to becoming a ‘maid’ working for a 
prostitute working as receptionist and/or housekeeper or retire from the sex industry.  As the 
system stands today, with prostitutes given criminal convictions ranging from breach of 
ASBO to soliciting or keeping a brothel, it makes gaining employment outside of the sex 
industry far more difficult and therefore if soliciting and brothel keeping were legal, exit 
strategies would have a far better success rate because of the lack of criminal convictions.  
Prostitutes are not a homogenous group
785
 and ‘exiting’ will have a different meaning to each 
prostitute depending on her circumstances.  It is because of the different needs for each 
woman that Hester and Westmarland strongly suggest that a ‘holistic support, which includes 
a range of mechanisms of support services …geared to the individual needs of women 
involved in prostitution … should be central to any [exiting] approach.’786   
This thesis recommends that providers of exit strategies in place today would remain to give 
advice and assistance to sex workers who wish to leave the industry.   This would be 
interlinked with organizing suitable accommodation in order to start a new life ‘away from 
the temptations of the street culture, life, and networks.’787 
Women who wish to retire (either because of age or for other reasons) from the sex industry 
would continue to be supported by outreach
788
 agencies such as ‘Safe Exit’ in Hackney who 
provide practical support for those who wish to leave the sex industry. The issue of whether 
the women will ‘end up back on the streets’789 is in part a realistic issue, not least because as 
Matthews et al note, women involved in prostitution tend to have low level skill-sets and 
consequently available employment opportunities are often low paid menial or temporary 
jobs. Criminal records through prostitution become a ‘trapping factor’ that causes women to 
‘yo-yo’ in and out of any exit strategy support but if soliciting and brothel keeping were 
legal, exit strategies would have a far better success rate because of the lack of criminal 
convictions.  
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1.4.3 The issue of regulating prostitution 
Regulating prostitution comes with an array of problems, not least of all who will regulate 
and who will pay for the regulation and as Morton notes: ‘It is one thing to turn a blind eye to 
the running of a sauna and a wholly different thing if the situation is legalised’ 790  
1.4.3.1 Rebuttal to the issue of regulating prostitution 
The question of who is going to be in day-to-day supervision of these premises is easily 
answered: the proposal suggests that it will be the management of SEV’s and large brothels 
and the owner/occupier of the smaller brothel.  The proposal answers the comparison 
between unregulated saunas and legalized prostitution by regulating all forms of commercial 
sexual activity under the same Act so there will be no opportunity to turn a ‘blind eye.’ 
The proposal suggests that regulating prostitution should be no different to regulating the live 
sexual entertainment industry.  Brothels can be classed as either Sexual Entertainment 
Venues as Jean Urquhart suggests, or renamed as Sexual Encounter Venues, distinguishing 
brothels from ‘no touching’ lap dancing clubs.   
The responsibility of the venue, whether it be a lap dancing club, brothel or pornographic 
film set, sits squarely with the management.  They are obliged, as with all other forms of 
industry, to abide by the law and ensure the safety of the workers at all times. 
The police, instead of concentrating on prostitutes and clients who solicit, can concentrate on 
dealing with tracing the perpetrators of trafficked prostitutes and the safety of the non-
trafficked prostitutes.  The experiment in Leeds frees up police time because it allows sex 
workers to work in a ‘managed zone’ between 7pm and 7am, where they are not told to 
‘move on’ or arrested by the police unless they are working outside the ‘managed zone’.  
This system cannot work by itself and would need the support of other agencies such as the 
local council providing extra bins put in place to collect the waste products generated.  The 
Leeds system has its advantages insofar as the anti-social behaviour orders and fines issued to 
prostitutes along with complaints from residents have dropped remarkably.  Prostitutes feel 
                                                 
790 
ibid 89 
215 
 
safer, and a better relationship between the prostitutes and police has the added advantage 
that prostitutes are more likely to report crimes to the police.
791
  
This is a system that is attempting to work within the confines of the legal process in place in 
England.  It is not without difficulties but it does show that by providing prostitutes with an 
area where they can work does lead to a drop in the level of complaints and a reduction in the 
visibility of street prostitution.  It also shows that prostitutes do not need to be treated as 
‘others’ and can be legitimately classed as sex workers. 
1.4.4 The issue of stigma and property  
James Morton argues that the ‘effect a brothel will have on [a] neighbourhood’792is ‘a 
consideration of some import to people living nearby.’793 
1.4.4.1 Rebuttals to the argument of stigma and property 
Morton makes a spurious argument with regards to brothels and locality.  The proposed 
smaller brothels containing not more than four prostitutes would have no greater impact than 
what is already in place with women advertising ‘massage’ instead of ‘sex.’  It is not the 
value of the property that is at stake but the collective attitude toward prostitution that needs 
to be addressed.   The perception of the prostitute is clouded by  arguments that stigmatises a 
prostitute  because she  is indiscriminate  with whom she has (paid) sexual activity.
 794
  And 
yet, as Bell
795
 notes whilst referring to Freud, ‘the difference between [a] mother and a whore 
is … not so very great, since at the bottom they both do the same thing.’796  The stigma 
attached to prostitution is not because of the nature of the sexual activity but because she is 
seen as a threat to monogamy by her sexual indiscrimination.   Penny Crofts notes that in 
Australia since prostitution has become imported into an existing legal framework with 
‘associated accountabilities, rights and responsibilities,’ there has been a shift resulting ‘in 
people viewing sex services premises differently.’797 
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For the larger brothels, Local Authorities have the responsibility through the planning and 
development departments to look at how an area will develop in the future.  We have already 
discussed how Local Authorities have refused further exotic dancing clubs to open in an area 
where it is deemed unsuitable (because of the surroundings).  In Leeds, the prostitution 
‘managed area’ is on the edge of a business area.  Further consideration in other towns could 
be put forward and suggest that an area devoted to the sex industry, this means both exotic 
dance clubs and brothels, could be earmarked where it has no impact on residential 
dwellings, and minimum impact on the town centre.  Women who work in the sex industry 
should not be positioned on the outskirts of an industrial area otherwise it will continue the 
‘contradictory images of the prostitute body’798 as someone who is other.  Situating the larger 
brothels near the commercial area instead of residential areas would lessen the impact of the 
nuisance of noise and detritus.  In New Zealand, the issue of nuisance caused by parked cars 
is removed by some of the larger brothels offering a service where either the client can be 
taken to the brothel or the prostitute can be taken to the client to work in private.
799
 Brothels 
in New Zealand are not restricted to the outskirts of a town or city and although this has 
helped to reduce the stigma
800
 legalising prostitution did not eradicate the stigma overnight 
and it does create disputes when a property is rented out to multiple businesses.
801
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Conclusion  
This thesis has shown, that with regard to consent there should be no difference whether the 
woman is a sex worker or not but the interpretation of s74 does not straightforwardly lend 
itself to application to commercial sexual activity with regards to the lack of consent. Also 
there is no difference in the nature of commercial and non-commercial sexual activities 
except where legislation imposes constraints. It is the constraints that create a distinction 
between commercial and non-commercial sexual activities and within the different spheres of 
commercial sexual activities. The purpose of non-commercial sexual activities differs to 
commercial sexual activities.  In non-commercial sexual activities, the purpose is largely for 
procreation and pleasure whereas in commercial sexual activities the primary purpose is 
financial profit. The visibility of sexual activities carries similar constraints for non-
commercial as for commercial sexual activities—to remain out of sight. The difference here 
is that for the prostitute it is not only the sexual activities that must be kept out of sight; the 
prostitute herself must also remain hidden.   
The comment that the laws on commercial and non-commercial sex are ‘a patchwork quilt of 
provisions ancient and modern that works because people make it do so [and] not because 
there is a coherence and structure’ still applies.802 The legislative patchwork quilt has yet to 
be reduced to a coherent single Act of Parliament with the current regulatory framework now 
consisting of approximately thirty statutes including: the Sexual Offences Acts of 1956, 1985 
and 2003; the Street Offences Act 1959, the Licensing Acts 1964 and 2003; the Criminal 
Justice and Police Act 2001 and the Police and Crime Act 2009. The multiplicity of these 
statutes contributes to the lack of coherence with regards to regulating the sex industry. 
Pornography and adult live entertainment are permitted with certain restrictions but 
prostitution is marginalised and cast as different from the rest of the sex industry. In addition, 
Sexual Entertainment Venues are regulated by the Local Authority and each Local Authority 
can impose their own rules; this creates a system with a potential for disparity when 
regulating Sexual Entertainment Venues, although all possess a common feature: the ‘no 
touching’ rule, between the viewer (the client) and the performer.  These grey areas 
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subsequently create a bigger gap than necessary when applying the criminal law to 
prostitution. 
To establish some coherence in how criminal law can approach the sex industry, as much as 
to understand how criminal law has so far approached the matter, it was necessary for this 
thesis to investigate permissible sex in a non-commercial relationship.  An understanding of 
the different criteria used to distinguish between permitted and not-permitted sexual 
relationships was analysed, before assessing the way in which they had been applied to 
commercial and non-commercial sexual relationships. The two types of relationships share 
some fundamental elements: the need for consent, the nature of the sexual activities, an 
indifference regarding the purpose of the sexual activities, except for prostitution, and an 
expectation of privacy.   
By utilising the four conceptual connectors this conclusion demonstrates the reasoning 
behind the proposal and then shows how the proposal benefits not only prostitutes but also 
the agencies engaged in either supporting prostitutes to exit prostitution and the police who 
have the task of moving on or arresting prostitutes. 
Consent 
It is when consent is withheld or withdrawn that the criminal law plays a role and although 
the SOA 2003 gives a definition of consent; it is the absence of consent that creates the 
criminality. Drawing from the constraints shown in Chapter 1 it was established that consent 
is the central requirement for all sexual activities and this applies for both non-commercial 
and commercial sexual activities. It is the consensual sexual activities that binds non-
commercial to commercial sexual activities and the wording of the legislation makes no 
obvious distinction between them, yet, as applied, the law introduces subtle (and sometimes 
more apparent) distinctions between consent in non-commercial and commercial sexual 
activities. 
Consent was defined for the first time in s74 of the SOA 2003 as follows: ‘a person consents 
if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice’ with evidential 
and conclusive presumptions in s75 to 76 to assist the jury. The constraints within s74 
regarding capacity apply to persons under the age of sixteen and also those with mental 
health issues.  Neither constraint is straightforward with the constraint of age carrying its own 
‘grey area’ within the criminal law. Consent may not be given by a child under the age of 
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sixteen and yet s9 states that if a person over the age of eighteen sexually touches a child who 
is under sixteen they must ‘reasonably believe that [the child] is sixteen or over’.803 This, 
means that the adult can rely on reasonable belief that the child is over 16 without actually 
ascertaining the child’s real age.  It is not until the child is under thirteen years of age804 that 
the reasonable belief defence is withdrawn.  
The second statutory constraint regarding consent is mental capacity which prohibits 
someone who intentionally
805
 sexually
806
 touches a person who is unable to refuse because of 
a reason related to a mental disorder
807
 or is unable to refuse
808
 because that person lacks the 
mental capacity,
809
 but offers little protection for a person with physical disabilities. The law 
is silent regarding persons with disabilities that do not prevent communication, indeed they 
are treated in the same way as a person who does not have any physical disabilities. It is the 
type of disability that affects communication that creates a distinction: the issue for the courts 
then becomes whether that person was able to give or refuse consent.    
These constraints aside, the SOA 2003 fails to give further direction with regards to having 
the ‘freedom and capacity’ to consent whilst under the influence of drink or drugs, and it is 
this issue that is crucial to women working in the sex industry. The terms within the SOA 
2003 are too narrow; the provisions in s75 are limited either to the complainant being asleep 
or otherwise unconscious at the time of the relevant act or that the drugs were administered to 
the complainant by the defendant. This is not wide enough to encapsulate self-administered 
drink/drugs as shown in the leading case of Bree where drunken consent was interpreted in its 
narrowest term, since the woman although obviously drunk, though not to the point of 
unconsciousness, was assumed to have consented. The dicta in Bree despite its lack of 
delicacy, is that drunken consent is still consent. The courts widened the scope in Evans
810
 
where in the first instance Judge Merfyn Hughes QC held that although the girl was not 
unconscious she was ‘in no condition to have sexual intercourse’ thus applying the law where 
the girl was ‘incapable’ of giving consent and applying s74, holding that her freedom to make 
a choice had been removed. The defendant in Evans had assumed consent from the girl and 
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by the time he had intercourse with her she was in no condition to retract or refuse consent. 
However, because she was possibly sober enough to consent to his colleague, it did not mean 
that she had consented to all. The issue in Evans is not an open door for all regrettable but 
consensual drunken sex. In Evans the courts held that the victim failed to have the required 
capacity to consent; the Evans case clearly widened the scope for evaluating the capacity to 
consent whilst drunk but the Criminal Case Review Commission referred the case back to the 
Court of Appeal based on new, and as yet undisclosed, material which was not considered by 
the jury at trial and subsequently the Court of Appeal
811
 in 2016 quashed Evans’ conviction 
and ordered a retrial. Nonetheless, the principle of capacity in Evans opens up an opportunity 
for other cases, should they come before the courts, to re-address the issue of capacity under 
s74 because s75 is too narrow. If a wider scope, such as in Evans, is taken by the courts it 
would certainly benefit women who are not in the sex industry but it is not likely to benefit 
sex workers because they do not reach that point of intoxication from either alcohol or drugs, 
for if they did they would not be able to continue with their work.    
Moreover, in commercial sexual activities, there are further criticisms of the SOA 2003 
regarding the issues of submission and coercion.  Although ss 74, 75 and s76 indirectly 
relates to women who work in the sex industry one could argue that the women are 
submissive due to fiscal pressures; women who work in the sex industry are also beholden to 
their manager or pimp and lap dancers et al run the risk of losing their job. Prostitutes can 
also lose money but because of the dark nature of pimping, face the real threat of violence 
from the pimp. The 2003 Act is written in such neutral terms it can only be applied to non-
commercial submission situations unless the courts are prepared to utilise judicial linguistic 
gymnastics.  
In the sex industry consent is often implied. With regards to pornography, the issue of 
consent is similar to that of other workers in the sex industry. The sex industry is fiscally 
driven and for pornography consent is contractually given between the cast and the crew and 
implied between the performer and viewer. The viewers’ consent is constrained by the BBFC 
who can limit the pornography seen by the viewer, and by the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008 which prohibits films that contain ‘extreme’ pornography. 
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In Sexual Entertainment Venues, both parties again imply consent: the performer by her 
presence on stage and the viewer by his purchase upon entering the venue. The performer 
may withdraw consent by refusing to perform, but this again could lead to fiscal pressure 
because a lack of performance would not generate any pay. The ‘no touching’ rule imposed 
by Local Authorities puts a further constraint on consent for the lap-dancer (or any other 
worker in a Sexual Entertainment Venue) so that the dancer/performer can only consent to 
being viewed. If she consents to sexual touching, she is then considered to be engaging in 
prostitution and the Local Authority would consider the Sexual Entertainment Venue to be a 
brothel, with all the criminality that entails. 
Regarding prostitutes, it is questionable whether consent can be implied; any sexual congress 
is not agreed until the exchange of money has also been agreed. Regarding cases of fraud 
vitiating consent, the courts focussed on the intention of the client, and whether he was going 
to pay or not, rather than whether the prostitute was consenting to sex or sex for payment.  
The principle of fraud can apply to prostitutes as opposed to other sex industry workers 
because the prostitute is paid directly whereas the client pays a third party for pornography or 
a lap-dance. Any money given direct to a lap-dancer is considered to be a ‘tip’ albeit a tip that 
is often shared with management. This leaves the prostitute in an invidious position: her 
consent, or lack of it, is dependent on the intention of the client (to pay or not to pay).  This is 
after she has made a hurried decision because, by simply negotiating, she may be liable for 
solicitation. 
The main issue with regards to consent is that when consent by a prostitute is denied or 
withdrawn, then as with any other person, the sexual activities constitute a statutory 
offence(s), as per sections 1 to 4 of the SOA 2003. The argument, as shown in the proposal, is 
that the performer in commercial sexual activities, as well as the prostitute, ought to be able 
to withdraw consent, implicitly or directly, and be treated in the same way as anyone 
embarking in non-commercial sexual activities, given that black-letter law does not 
distinguish. Sir William Blackstone
812
 in the eighteenth century recognised that prostitutes 
should be treated no differently in law to non-prostitutes with regards to rape (and other 
sexual offences). Yet, the law is not applied in the same way to the prostitute, as it is to a 
woman in a non-commercial sexual relationship. 
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There was a perception
813
 that prostitutes did not suffer from rape in the same way as non-
prostitutes  as shown in R v Bashir and Manzur (1969)
814
    and also, as Sir Matthew Hale
815
 
noted ‘in a rape case it is the victim, not the defendant, who is on trial’.  In practice, the 
opinion of Sir Matthew Hale still presides where the commercial sex-worker has her 
credibility challenged more than other victims. This can be shown by the prosecutor having a 
duty to assess the credibility and reliability of the victim’s evidence. The fact that many 
prostitutes have drink or drug addictions arguably make it more likely that the Crown 
Prosecution Service would evaluate the credibility of the prostitute as unfit for trial. If the 
prostitute convinces the Crown Prosecution Service that she is a reliable witness in court the 
second hurdle she must face is that evidence of her prostitution can be admissible in court 
with permission of the judge. This rule of evidence effectively discriminates between 
prostitutes and non-prostitutes, in violation of the SOA 2003 which does not state that proof 
of lack of consent depends on the person’s employment or that it should be different when it 
comes to prostitutes being the victims.  The final hurdle to face is the fact that it is incumbent 
upon the jury to decide in matters of rape, but there is an implicitness that sex-workers, 
especially prostitutes, carry some responsibility.
816
   
A further issue touched on is the myths and stereotypes that surround the issue of rape.  
Fairchild noted that victims who wear short skirts are still more likely to have blame 
attributed to them because they were dressed irresponsibly.
817
  This sort of stereotype affects 
all women, but it is an added burden for those who are working in the sex industry, for they 
are expected to dress provocatively. 
Thus, there are problems with the issue of consent: the SOA 2003 makes no distinction 
regarding gender or employment, but it is shown that s74 does not fit with people who work 
in the sex industry and/or who are drink/drug dependent. In instances of rape or other sexual 
offences, prostitutes, as I have shown, are treated differently to non-prostitutes, so that lack of 
consent is more difficult to prove than for a victim in a non-commercial relationship.  
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Government reports mentioned within the thesis do not concentrate on the issue of 
commercial sexual consent in a general way, but instead concentrate on those who either lack 
the capacity to consent or are being forced to prostitute by third parties.  Stemming from this 
the narrative sets the prostitute out to be the ‘victim.’ It avoids, and yet at the same time 
alludes to, the issue of whether prostitution ‘entails a violation of personhood that no woman 
can ever genuinely consent to …’818 whereas as Davidson notes, if the  ‘vulnerability’ of 
female prostitutes and the references to sex trafficking were removed from policy documents, 
‘the approach … would actually look like a fairly traditional policy of prohibition’ finding 
favour with those who consider prostitution as ‘a form of sexual and social deviance that 
causes public nuisance’.819     
This is the very narrative that the proposal seeks to redress. The intention of the proposal is 
that legislation should not be silent at worst, and implicit at best, when legislating about 
consent. Section 74 should make it clear that it encompasses commercial sexual activities, 
and whilst s75(2)(f) provides the evidential presumption regarding substances (including 
alcohol) that have been administered without the complainant’s consent, capacity should be 
widened to include self-administered intoxication.    
The nature of the sexual activities 
Aside from the constraints on consent, the nature of the sexual activities is also restricted by 
criminal law.  The criminal law makes no distinction between commercial and non-
commercial sexual activities when it prohibits certain forms of sexual activities such as 
intercourse with an animal
820
 or sexual penetration of a corpse.
821
 The regulation of 
pornography reflects these offences as not only are the acts forbidden but the possession of 
such images is also forbidden.
822
 Harm is also prohibited in both commercial and private 
sexual relationships. Indeed, in R v Brown (1993)
823
 it was held that, as a matter of public 
policy, in private relationships consent is not a defence if the level of harm caused by the 
sexual activities is comparable to an assault as per the Offences against the Person Act 1861. 
Pornography reflects this because the nature is defined by the prohibition of the content. The 
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BBFC constrains the nature of pornography by vetting the content and imposing certificates 
of viewing age and has the authority to enforce that certain parts of the film be cut. Film 
companies must comply with the censorship otherwise the film would not be permitted for 
general release. The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008
824
 also controls the nature of 
the content by prohibiting extreme pornography, defined as being:  an act that threatens a 
person’s life,825 or is likely to cause serious injury to a person’s breast, anus or genitals.826  
The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 fell short of criminalising rape scenes and it 
was not until the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 that the possession of rape scenes was 
criminalised.  Although there is argument that ‘stage rape’ scenes should fall within the SOA 
2003, the Ministry of Justice argue that it would also catch mainstream bondage and sado-
masochistic material and this was not the design of the 2008 Act. The Ministry of Justice 
further argued that to include rape that was ‘acted out’ would require a redefinition of 
pornography and obscenity. And yet it is difficult to see the logic behind the Ministry of 
Justice’s argument regarding redefining pornography given that pornography has been 
redefined by the very creation of ‘extreme’ pornography. Not only is there a redefinition of 
pornography but the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 and the Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act 2015 place the onus upon the viewer by creating the offence for a person to be in 
possession of the prohibited material.      
Like pornography, the content within live adult entertainment is also regulated but by 
different legislation and not in the same way. Live adult entertainment must be performed 
within Sexual Entertainment Venues and are regulated by Local Authorities empowered by 
the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 as amended by the Policing and 
Crime Act 2009. It is important to note that there is a disparity of the level of content 
depending on the type of entertainment. For instance, strippers and lap dancers may not 
imitate sexual intercourse or publicly masturbate, whereas a peep show artiste is permitted to 
do both. The type of content depends on the audience: in striptease and lap dancing venues 
the audience may consist of a group and the level of arousal must therefore maintain a degree 
of moderation, while the peepshow booth normally contains only one person, and sometimes, 
but rarely, two people, and so the level of arousal does not depend on decorum.  The decorum 
is required because to masturbate in public would outrage public decency and would also be 
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in breach of the SOA 2003 s66(1) which prohibits indecent exposure insofar as s66 prohibits 
the intentional exposure of genitals. However, the test of decency in both instances depends 
on the surrounding audience and relies on the activity to not only be seen but also cause 
alarm or distress; in a Sexual Entertainments Venue causing distress is highly unlikely.   
There is no legislation defining the nature of the sexual activities of prostitutes other than that 
which applies to non-prostitutes. Prostitutes are thus constrained in the same way as non-
prostitutes. The nature of the sexual activities involved in prostitution is redolent of the 
worker in either a pornographic film set or a Sexual Entertainments Venue: it can range from 
no-touching to touching and full intercourse. The ‘actress’ in a pornographic film can 
perform the same actions as a prostitute: oral or anal sex, vaginal penetration with objects, 
more than one sexual partner at a time, masturbation and a plethora of other activities, 
commonly for money to be viewed by all. The peepshow artist also gives performances akin 
to those of the prostitute and pornographic actress: she too performs sexual acts for the 
delectation of the viewer. In these instances, the difference between the pornographic actress 
or peepshow artist to the prostitute is that of distance. The viewer has no contact with the 
artiste. This could also be said of the pole/lap/table-top dancer except in certain 
circumstances where the viewer puts money into the knickers or bra of the dancer, but this is 
not considered to be touching of a sexual nature. Consequently, in pornography and in the 
Sexual Entertainment Venues, there is no touching between the sex worker and the viewer; it 
is even a regulatory offence giving rise to criminal liability should touching occur in a Sexual 
Entertainment Venue. However, this is not always true for prostitution. A prostitute can also 
engage in touching and full sexual intercourse. Although criminal law does not forbid 
touching and intercourse between a prostitute and her clients, it is the touching and especially 
intercourse with the client that sets her apart from the rest of the sex industry by the 
regulations set by the Local Authorities under the Local Government (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1982. However, neither the de Munck definition of a prostitute as: ‘…a 
woman who offers her body commonly for lewdness for payment in return’ nor the SOA 
2003 s51 which defines a prostitute as ‘a person who, on at least one occasion offers or 
provides sexual services to another person in return for payment…’ include having sexual 
intercourse, or indeed the need to touch as the exclusive sexual act that defines prostitution. 
The woman simply needs to be lewd for reward. Yet it is the idea of a woman having sexual 
intercourse that sets her apart from the rest of the sex industry. It is also intercourse that casts 
her apart from other women involved in non-commercial relationships, in a subtle and 
226 
 
indirect manner, through the boundaries established at civil law. The civil law, with its 
emphasis on vaginal intercourse as the only form of sexual activity’s validating a marriage 
between heterosexuals through consummation, closely associates intercourse with the 
sanctity of marriage, as if intercourse was the preserve for married women. When intercourse 
and marriage were also linked to the purpose of the sexual activities, i.e. procreation, the 
association of the two meant that the civil law projected an image of women who, when 
engaging in intercourse outside marriage, were ‘fallen’ and were thus prostitutes, not worthy 
of the protection of the law. Although the civil law is indifferent to the purpose of procreation 
it can still be seen that the stigma attached to the prostitute as a ‘fallen’ woman exists within 
the criminal law by how it approaches prostitution.   The proposal endeavours to eradicate the 
stigma by treating prostitutes and other sex workers equally and acknowledging in law that 
all sex workers are entitled to the same rights as any other worker. 
The purpose of the sexual activities 
Criminal law has always been indifferent to procreation as the purpose of the sexual activities 
but until 1950 civil law required that sexual activities within marriage had to be full and 
complete intercourse, suggesting that procreation was the purpose, although this requirement 
never translated into a criminal offence. Criminal law is also indifferent to whether people 
engage in sexual activities for the purpose of pleasure or for payment, as long as there is no 
harm committed as defined by the SOA 2003. Therefore, it can be said that criminal law does 
not interfere with the purpose of non-commercial sexual activities, unless the purpose is a 
prohibited act such as voyeurism where there is a lack of consent.  
Commercial sexual activities have two purposes: to create sexual arousal, in order to generate 
money. Criminal law does not interfere with sexual arousal as a purpose as long as there is 
consent and protection of the accidental viewer through the expectation of privacy.  
The level of sexual arousal in order to generate profit ranges from high to low and is 
dependent on the different types of entertainment within the sex industry.   
Pornography provides material that creates high arousal so the viewer may reach orgasm in 
private.  Chat lines and peep shows create a medium level of arousal because it is in their 
interest to keep the viewer sexually aroused for as long as possible because once orgasm has 
occurred the customer loses interest and no longer wishes to continue payment for more.  The 
level of arousal within a Sexual Entertainments Venue, including burlesque, striptease and 
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lap dancing, is intentionally low due to the viewer being part of a large audience but also to 
keep the customers interest so they continue to pay. The purpose of the prostitute is also for 
profit but the method is opposite to other sex workers: the prostitute wants the customer’s 
orgasm to occur speedily, partly because she is at risk of criminal arrest and partly because 
she, like the escort, is on a time limit. 
The purpose is linked to the business aspect of commercial sex, i.e. to generate money and 
criminal law does not interfere with payment as a purpose for the sexual activities.  The 
commercial purpose of pornography is the same as it is for Live Adult Entertainment as can 
be shown by the fact that the issue of payment is only referred to with regard to child 
pornography.  Profit is the primary function and there is no distinction made to any other 
commercial business. Indeed, it is shown how the fiscal purpose is supported by looking at 
the language in the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 and in the 
Policing and Crime Act 2009 with regards to Live Adult Entertainment. The Local 
Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 uses language such as ‘a significant degree 
of selling’ and in the Policing and Crime Act 2009 the language is even more direct by 
stating that the purpose is for financial gain.  
The primary purpose for prostitution is also for gain but the criminal law is far more 
ambiguous. There is no offence for a prostitute to receive money from her client; however, a 
prostitute cannot work with a pimp nor have an employee-employer type of relationship with 
the pimp who would pay her, as a sex worker in a Sexual Entertainment Venue would have 
with her employer. Indeed, pimping is a criminal offence; by contrast, being the director of a 
Sexual Entertainment Venue is not. This prohibition partially extends to civil law as a 
prostitute cannot set up her own company, as shown when Lindi St Clair was refused 
registration of her business in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Aken [1990]
827
 and 
subsequently the Inland Revenue demanded any unpaid tax due. This highlights the fact that 
the civil law is fraught with contradiction as the prostitute’s revenues are nonetheless taxed. 
Although there is no upfront prohibition of a client paying a prostitute, the business aspect of 
prostitution is prohibited, in contradiction with the acceptance the law demonstrates when it 
comes to the business aspects of working in Sexual Entertainment Venues. 
It is how the criminal (and civil) law establish the differences between the three categories 
within the commercial nature of the sex industry, and in particular prostitution, that forms the 
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absolute crux of the argument when comparing the sex industry. The external view of 
pornography is permitted in several ways and shows that the purpose and visibility are 
interconnected. A sex cinema is regulated by the Local Government (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1982 and shops are permitted to place pornographic magazines within view 
of customers. Sexual activities such as lap dancing are permitted within Sexual Entertainment 
Venues and such venues can only be refused within the grounds set in the Local Government 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982. Live adult entertainment is permitted as long as it takes 
place in specific locations that have to be licensed: the Sexual Entertainment Venues. 
Conversely, prostitution cannot occur in specific locations that are licensed because the 
Sexual Entertainment Venues have a no-touching rule, effectively banning prostitution from 
their premises; and brothels where prostitutes could congregate are prohibited with a criminal 
offence attached to running a brothel (but not to running a Sexual Entertainment Venue).  
Consequently, prostitutes are forced onto the street, but then become criminally liable if their 
business activities include advertisement or soliciting. Hostesses are similar in that they may 
not solicit but the bar may openly advertise the fact that topless waitresses or strippers are 
within.  The problem for prostitutes is that despite the purpose being profit, street prostitutes 
are at risk of not being paid as shown in Bouguenoune
828
 but if brothels are permitted and 
protected in law then cases such as Bouguenoune and Linekar
829
 will hinge on consent of the 
sexual activity and not on the intention to pay. 
Privacy/visibility     
Once valid consent is obtained, criminal law would still constrain sexual activities according 
to where it takes place with regards to the required expectation of privacy. This thesis has 
shown that the criminal law looks upon privacy from a different perspective to that of the 
civil law. Although there is no statutory law against enjoying sex ‘al fresco’, the criminal law 
places an expectation of privacy on all sexual activities whether it be heterosexual, 
homosexual, commercial or non-commercial, which is reliant on the visibility of the sexual 
activities. As shown in Crunden (1809)
830
 the locus relies on being in the presence of people. 
Thus, no matter if the land is privately or publicly owned, it is the presence of people that 
causes the activity to become public, and in Hamilton [2007]
831
 it depends whether those 
people are capable of seeing it, although they do not have to actually observe the activity in 
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order to create a public location. Criminal law, through the expectation of privacy, protects 
the accidental viewer, the one who did not consent. It also protects the parties from 
voyeurism as per s67 of the SOA 2003.  However, if both parties agree and give consent, the 
criminal law does not prohibit per se the sexual activities, but merely articulates the 
expectation of privacy and s66 of the SOA criminalises any intentional showing of genitalia 
to a non-consenting viewer. 
The unwitting or vulnerable observer must be protected from viewing the content of 
commercial (and non-commercial) sexual activities in order to prevent corrupting the mind of 
those who are open to such influences. The restrictions regarding visibility of pornography 
are not dissimilar to non-commercial sexual activities as the primary function is to protect the 
viewer. With regards to pornography the test is different. In non-commercial sexual activity 
the test is focussed on the activity being witnessed by an accidental viewer but in 
pornography the test focuses on the material, and the possession of extreme or child 
pornography is criminalised. 
Sexual Entertainment Venues are regulated so that all sexual activities take place inside the 
venue.  Passers-by, the accidental viewers who do not enter the venue, must not be capable of 
seeing the sexual activities within from outside the venue.  
However, as Philip Hubbard notes, ‘without spaces to flourish, marginal sexualities 
dwindle’832 and with the introduction of the Licensing Act 2003,  lap dancing clubs increased 
to an estimated 350 by 2005 , but since lap dancing clubs have been considered as Sexual 
Entertainment Venues and are regulated by the same criteria as a Sexual Encounter 
Establishment (sex cinemas and sex shops), the number of clubs have dwindled because of 
licence applications being refused, with many clubs not applying for a licence or a renewal of 
a licence, given the likelihood of refusal.
833
 
The Local Authority have two purposes: planning and licensing. The Local Authority must 
consider planning with future events in mind and licensing from a teleological perspective.  
Thus the planning application must fit in with what purpose the space would serve in years to 
come, whereas the licence is granted subject to the immediate impact. Even though planning 
and licensing are distinct in principle, as Hubbard notes, both planning and licensing 
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‘sidestep questions of decency, obscenity or manners to focus instead on … the reduction of 
nuisance’.834 The nuisance created by SEVs is not noise, fumes or vibrations, given the noise 
is unlikely to be any worse than that from a night club or bar. The nuisance complained of by 
NIMBYs
835
 is ‘stigma nuisance’ where the opening of a lap dancing club would lower the 
tone of an area and lower the value of the surrounding properties. Although there is little 
redress for such complaints, if there is a change of usage within the nearby area, the new 
licence or renewal licence would be refused if the SEV is no longer appropriate because of 
the increased usage of young or vulnerable persons.    
Planning ‘zones’ classify areas as either commercial, industrial or residential. The Licensing 
Act 2003 allowed lap dance club owners to open the clubs in the High Street as cafes – 
commercial buildings, but the planning department would want to put such a type of 
commercial activity on the outskirts of the commercial zones and not too near the residential 
areas, perhaps as a buffer between the commercial zone and the industrial zone. This pushes 
the sex industry away from the High Street into the hinterland of the town, in the same way 
as prostitutes are moved away from ‘society’.  The difference is that it is not the intention to 
abolish lap dancing altogether, whereas it is the intention to abolish prostitution.                                                                                                                                                   
Prostitutes are also subjected to the same legislative requirements as those who work in SEVs 
whereby should they engage in any sexual activities in a location where accidental viewing is 
likely to happen, like in a car, they would become criminally liable for the offence of 
outraging public decency as per the SOA 2003 and the Public Order Act 1986. In practice 
this situation is likely to occur as prostitutes are forbidden to congregate behind closed doors 
in brothels and so are forced onto the streets or in cars. Furthermore, prostitutes are subjected 
to additional requirements in that criminal law prohibitions are extended beyond the visibility 
of the sexual activities themselves and catch the visibility of the non-sexual activities the 
prostitute engages in by soliciting or by advertising her commerce.  Effectively, criminal law 
encompasses the commercial aspects of prostitution rather than concentrating solely on 
protecting the accidental viewer.  
Advertising commercial sexual activities is not free of constraints with the criminal law 
establishing such constraints because there is a perception that the public consists of 
vulnerable persons who would be either outraged or influenced. Hence, pornography is 
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permitted to advertise but within the constraints set in the Obscene Publications Act 1959. 
Advertising Sexual Entertainment Venues is also permitted, again under the aegis of the 
Obscene Publications Act 1959. By contrast, prostitutes are not permitted to advertise. It is an 
outright ban on their business. Yet, with the enactment of the Street Offences Act 1959, 
prostitutes found that the only way to attract customers was by advertising. They used 
telephone boxes as a convenient means of advertising as the customer could find the 
prostitute of his choice and phone immediately. However, the Criminal Justice and Police Act 
2001 s46 prohibits advertisements in telephone boxes by prostitutes but does not include 
advertisements by swingers’ clubs. In other words, the criminal law approach is to allow 
advertising for pornography and live adult entertainment within set boundaries, whereas for 
prostitution it is to ban advertisement outright. 
Many prostitutes, by their very nature, are visible because they work from the street.  It is this 
element of visibility, and not the sexual activities, that the criminal law, by means of public 
nuisance, demarcates prostitution from the other forms of the commercial sex industry. The 
sexual activities are regulated in the same way as non-commercial sexual activities and so it 
can be seen that morality overshadows prostitution and is disguised as originally a public 
nuisance and then within statute law. 
The Wolfenden Report was the impetus for subsequent governments to implement new laws 
in order to abolish the visibility of prostitution as a business. The Street Offences Act 1959 
strengthened existing laws in order to prohibit prostitutes from ‘loitering’ in public places for 
the purpose of prostitution. Loitering was already prohibited by the Vagrancy Act 1824, and 
it included prostitutes among the ‘idle and disorderly persons’ but the Obscene Publications 
Act 1959, as amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 specifically 
prohibits prostitutes to loiter or solicit in a street or public place. The Obscene Publications 
Act 1959 prohibited the prostitute from either standing still in a public place or approaching a 
prospective client. The client was also targeted; the SOA 1985, by creating the offence of 
kerb crawling, prohibited men from asking their price from either the car or the immediate 
vicinity of the car. The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 increased the powers of the 
police by making kerb-crawling an arrestable offence if it could be shown that the kerb-
crawler was causing a public nuisance. 
The prostitute (or the worker within a Sexual Entertainments Venue) is prohibited from 
approaching any member of the public directly in order to encourage them to participate in 
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commercial sexual activities. For the prostitute, the constraints set are to the point of 
absurdity. She may not loiter, solicit or advertise. Compelled to work the streets, because 
venues such as brothels are prohibited, she is then considered to be committing an offence of 
public nuisance just for going about her business. The interests of the prostitute are ignored 
and instead, the government introduces yet more harsh penalties for prostitutes by means of 
anti-social behaviour orders that prohibit the prostitute from entering the area she normally 
works. The government also enacted the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 where the 1998 Act 
gave a statutory footing for multi-agencies to implement exit strategies. None of this applies 
to the accepted forms of sexual activities within the rest of the sex industry but, as Roger 
Matthews expressed, the multi-agency initiatives are neither cheap nor fast and not all 
prostitutes welcome them. He argued that most of the women ‘pointed out that there was 
nothing which could give the level of remuneration which they earned as prostitutes.’836 A 
problem with such initiatives as used by the agencies is that they are ‘implemented in an 
uneven manner with different elements combining with different degrees of intensity at 
different times’.837 As a consequence of the initiatives, prostitutes move to the periphery of 
the area.
838
  Leeds has taken this into consideration and understanding the pressures the 
police are under due to funding cuts has implemented a managed area where the police do not 
arrest the prostitutes for soliciting.   
The law, criminal and civil, refuses to consider prostitution as a commercial activity that is an 
integral part of the sex industry. The commercial aspects of pornography and live adult 
entertainment venues are permitted within certain boundaries. Prostitution as a commercial 
enterprise is prohibited in all its external signs, making the situation of a prostitute 
intolerable, for what can a prostitute do if she cannot be in brothels, cannot solicit, and cannot 
advertise? How are people going to know about her business? The difference with the Sexual 
Entertainment Venue is particularly striking as the local community cannot object to the 
licensing of a Sexual Entertainment Venue on moral grounds, i.e. its disapproval of the 
sexual element in the industry. Yet, the local community can effectively drive prostitution 
underground. The law is inconsistent. For pornography and live adult entertainment, it 
recognises a fifth element in a sexual relationship: its commercial purpose and the visibility 
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of a business, but when it comes to prostitution, it prohibits the commercial purpose and 
visibility outright. 
In applying the four criteria
839
 established for non-commercial relationships to the sex 
industry, this thesis has demonstrated that those criteria remain applicable to commercial 
relationships, but not consistently to prostitution. It has also established that the visibility of a 
commerce/enterprise is accepted, within some limits, for all commercial sexual relationships 
except prostitution. Therefore, the question remains how this lack of coherence in criminal 
law should be remedied and is approached in the proposal of this thesis where it argues that 
the government is ostensibly following the abolitionist route to eradicate prostitution by 
adopting the Nordic model that criminalises the purchaser and not the seller. However, the 
British law criminalises both the purchaser and the seller. If one takes, for example, 
recreational hard drug usage the government has prohibited the sale, purchase and possession 
of hard drugs such as heroin. But heroin is still a common drug used by many; it has simply 
gone ‘underground’ and is available on the black market.  The same can be said for the sale 
of sexual activities in the form of prostitution. By criminalising the purchase of the sexual 
activities, the result is twofold: some women would exit prostitution, but many would 
continue, and because of the illegality of purchasing the sexual activities it would become 
increasingly dangerous for the prostitute because the sex may take place in more isolated 
locations, leaving the prostitute vulnerable to attack.  The argument that legalising brothels 
could create an underground market for other illegal services fails because a legal brothel 
would be a more secure area to work in, as shown by the NZ model. Although ‘very little 
research has been conducted regarding drug use amongst sex workers’840 it is argued that if a 
brothel is run as a legitimate business the risk of it becoming an outlet for illicit drugs or 
other illegal services would be not greater than that of any other business outlet. 
The Proposal 
By utilising the NZ model, and the example set by Leeds City Council in the Holbeck area, 
the proposal suggests that brothels are to be regulated by the Local Authority as with Sexual 
Entertainment Venues.  By doing so the problems with regards to fiscally driven consent 
created for the prostitute by having an unregulated pimp would then be alleviated.   It was 
also noted in the proposal that there would be a need for the ‘no touching’ rule within a 
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Sexual Entertainment Venue.  The ‘no touching rule’ in lap dancing clubs  would protect the 
lap dancer from any fiscally driven pressure of having to consent to prohibited sexual 
activities with a client by her manager. The brothel would be in a purpose built Sexual 
Entertainment Venue, the same as the lap dancing and peep show clubs, and regulated under 
the remit of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982. This would reduce 
the risk of the prostitute being a victim of the pimp as the prostitute would be protected by the 
same employment laws that affect all workers and tax payers, as are women who work in 
other Sexual Entertainment Venues and the pornographic industry.    
The removal of the prohibition of third parties would allow prostitutes to be able to work 
together from the same venue and have the choice of either working for themselves or using 
the services of a manager, thereby removing the need for an illegal pimp who affords the 
prostitute no protection, and the prostitute would also be protected from potential danger 
from the client. If brothels were permitted, the criminal law would be able to protect the 
prostitutes by instigating a drive to ensure that no offences were caused against the prostitute 
as   found within the Offences against the Persons Act 1861 or the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
s40. This means that neither the client nor an illegal pimp would be able to physically harm 
the prostitute. The proposal makes a distinction between a ‘pimp’ and a manager. The 
manager would be scrutinised by the Local Authority and would be responsible to the Local 
Authority for the prostitutes’ welfare. This would also apply to the pre-existing Sexual 
Entertainment Venues. This is not to suggest that houses containing not more than four 
prostitutes should be unprotected. The cooperative of four or less sex workers within a 
residence, the same as those in New Zealand, would also have to be licenced and regulated by 
the Local Authority. 
This suggestion does not force prostitutes to work in brothels but the proposal will put in 
place the ability for a street prostitute to either be self-employed or work for a registered 
manager and not under the control of an unregulated pimp.  She would be further protected 
by the criminal law with regards to issues such as consent. By its very nature the proposal 
would offer a solution to the ‘patchwork quilt’ of legislation and in addition to the inclusion 
of prostitution, the new statute would also include pornography and any other area of the sex 
industry. This would give all sex workers equal rights and equal protection.  
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